Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; June 9, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Rhonda Gillett-Netting appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security, which denied her minor children, Juliet and Piers, child’s insurance benefits based on their deceased father Robert Netting's earnings. Gillett-Netting contends that the court incorrectly ruled that Juliet and Piers are not Netting’s children under the Social Security Act and were not dependent on him at his death. Despite being conceived posthumously using Netting's frozen sperm, Arizona law recognizes Juliet and Piers as his legitimate children, thus establishing their dependency for benefits.
Netting was diagnosed with cancer in December 1994 and, anticipating possible sterility from chemotherapy, deposited sperm for future use. He died on February 4, 1995, and Gillett-Netting subsequently conceived Juliet and Piers through in-vitro fertilization, with their births occurring on August 6, 1996. After applying for benefits, the Social Security Administration denied the claim, asserting that the children were not dependent on Netting at the time of his death. An Administrative Law Judge upheld this decision, stating that dependency must be assessed at the wage earner’s death, ruling out children conceived afterward.
Gillett-Netting's complaint in district court was met with cross-motions for summary judgment, resulting in the district court siding with the Commissioner, confirming that Juliet and Piers do not qualify as Netting’s 'children' under the Act and that their equal protection rights were not violated. After the district court denied her motion for reconsideration, Gillett-Netting appealed. The appellate court reversed the district court's decision, concluding that Juliet and Piers are legitimate children under Arizona law and entitled to benefits, remanding the case for an award of benefits.
The standard of review for the denial of social security benefits is de novo, meaning the appellate court can review the case independently of the district court's findings. Benefits may be denied if the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) commits legal errors or if the findings lack substantial evidence.
Current laws do not adequately address legal issues surrounding posthumous conception regarding child insurance benefits under the Social Security Act and Arizona family law. To qualify for child insurance benefits, a claimant must demonstrate they are a child of the deceased individual who was insured, that an application for benefits has been filed, that they are unmarried and a minor (or meet disability criteria), and that they were dependent on the insured at the time of death.
It is established that Netting was fully insured at death, and Juliet and Piers are his biological, legitimate children, fulfilling the dependency requirement. The definition of 'child' under the Act includes natural and legally adopted children. The Commissioner contended that additional provisions (42 U.S.C. 416(h)(2) and (3)) further define 'child' and impose additional requirements. However, these provisions aim to assist children whose parentage is disputed or whose parents were unmarried, and they do not apply to the current situation. The precedent set in McMillian by McMillian v. Heckler supports that illegitimate claimants can establish their status as 'children' under specific provisions, particularly focusing on the ability to inherit from the insured as defined by state intestate succession laws.
In 1965, section 416(h)(3)(C) was added to clarify how a claimant can establish entitlement when parentage is in dispute. Under the current version of 416(h), a claimant is recognized as the child of an insured individual if they meet one of several criteria, including: the ability to inherit from the individual under state intestacy laws; a purported marriage between the child's parents that was invalid due to an unknown legal impediment; written acknowledgment of the claimant by the deceased wage earner; a court decree establishing parentage; a court order for support from the deceased wage earner; or satisfactory evidence that the insured individual was the claimant's parent and was living with or supporting the claimant at the time of death. These provisions apply only when parentage is disputed, and since the Commissioner concedes that Juliet and Piers are the biological children of Netting, the district court's ruling stating otherwise was incorrect.
Furthermore, the issue of dependency arises because the district court concluded that Juliet and Piers could not demonstrate actual dependency since they were not born before Robert's death. However, under the Act, claimants must show dependency to qualify for child’s insurance benefits. Despite this, the Act provides that legitimate children are presumed to have been dependent on their deceased insured parent without needing to prove actual dependency. The law recognizes all legitimate children as dependent, except in specific circumstances not applicable here. Legitimate children need only demonstrate that their deceased parent was fully insured to qualify for survivor benefits, while 'illegitimate' children who establish parentage via 42 U.S.C. 416(h)(2) or (3) are considered legitimate for the purposes of dependency as well.
Provisions under 416(h) are primarily concerned with establishing dependency rather than parentage. The Act provides that legitimate children, those entitled to inherit under intestacy laws, children with formal defects in their parents' marriage, and children acknowledged by their insured father or judicially decreed as such, are presumed dependent unless adopted by another. Most children are statutorily recognized as dependent on their deceased parents, with only unacknowledged illegitimate children required to demonstrate actual dependency for child’s insurance benefits. The Act is interpreted liberally to ensure financial support for children after a parent's death.
Juliet and Piers, as Netting's legitimate children under Arizona law—which no longer recognizes illegitimacy—are entitled to support irrespective of their conception via in-vitro fertilization. Arizona law treats every child as legitimate, granting them rights to support from their biological parents, including those born through artificial insemination if the father is married to the mother. The Commissioner’s assertion that Juliet and Piers do not meet the “legitimate child” criteria under 402(d)(3) is incorrect, as legitimacy is defined by state law. Children recognized as legitimate under state law qualify for child’s insurance benefits without having to prove dependency. Therefore, Juliet and Piers, being legitimate under Arizona law, are deemed dependent under 402(d)(3) without needing to demonstrate further dependency or legitimacy under 416(h).
Juliet and Piers are recognized as Netting's legitimate children and are entitled to child’s insurance benefits under the relevant Act, leading to the reversal of the district court's decision and a remand for benefit award instructions from the Commissioner of Social Security. Gillett-Netting's claim that denying benefits to posthumously conceived children violates equal protection rights is not addressed since the entitlement to benefits for Juliet and Piers is established. Although Gillett-Netting previously claimed a violation of substantive due process rights regarding reproductive privacy and citizenship privileges, these claims were not pursued in her summary judgment motion nor on appeal.
The court notes that while the issue of posthumously conceived children's benefits is novel, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that such children can inherit from deceased sperm donors under specific conditions. The Commissioner’s interpretation of 20 C.F.R. 404.355 does not exclude establishing parentage by other means, and the regulation is deemed inapplicable to Juliet and Piers, as they are considered legitimate children under Arizona law. The court emphasizes that a posthumously conceived child’s eligibility for benefits is contingent on their established dependency on the deceased wage earner. The ruling clarifies that not every posthumously conceived child in Arizona qualifies for benefits; eligibility hinges on the donor’s marital status and the ability to demonstrate dependency under the Act. Since Juliet and Piers are established as legitimate children, further consideration of their ability to inherit under Arizona intestacy laws is unnecessary for their entitlement to benefits.
