Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 15, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
The State of Washington's "blanket" primary system allows voters to choose candidates without party restrictions, a practice contested by the Democratic, Republican, and Libertarian Parties. These parties argue that the system infringes on their supporters' freedom of association, a claim supported by references to the Supreme Court's decision in California Democratic Party v. Jones. Established in 1935, the blanket primary allows all registered voters to select candidates from any party for all positions, facilitating "ticket-splitting." Presidential primaries differ, with party-specific ballots available upon request.
In this case, the Democratic Party of Washington sought a declaratory judgment against the Secretary of State, aiming to limit participation in partisan primaries. The Republican Party intervened with similar objectives, and the Libertarian Party also joined the action. The Washington State Grange supported the blanket primary. Despite a stipulation to hold the 2000 primary under the existing law, the district court later dissolved a preliminary injunction that would have limited future primaries. The court struck the parties' witness declarations and denied their motions for summary judgment, concluding they failed to prove a substantial burden on their First Amendment rights. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants, leading to the political parties' appeal regarding the evidentiary rulings and the summary judgment decision.
The district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. The Grange contends the constitutional issues are barred by res judicata, referencing past Washington State Supreme Court rulings from 1936 and 1980 that upheld blanket primaries. However, this argument is rejected because the plaintiffs were not parties to those cases and significant changes in constitutional law occurred, notably the 2000 decision in Democratic Party v. Jones.
The analysis of the relationship between private, state, and federal election regulations has evolved, particularly with cases like Jones, which deemed California's blanket primary unconstitutional for infringing on the right to free association. The plaintiffs in the current case challenge the Washington blanket primary's constitutionality, arguing it is similar to California's scheme. The Secretary of State contends the Democratic and Republican Parties failed to demonstrate harm due to the exclusion of their evidence. However, the court emphasizes that the plaintiffs do not bear a burden of proof in this facial challenge to a statute affecting First Amendment rights.
Following the precedent set in Jones, which determined the burden based on the statutes' language rather than party evidence, the Washington blanket primary is viewed as indistinguishable from California's blanket primary, both allowing voters to select candidates from any party on the same ballot. Washington's assertions that its primary is distinct due to non-partisan voter registration and that primary winners are "nominees" of the electorate rather than the parties are dismissed as irrelevant distinctions. The court concludes that the non-disclosure of party preferences at registration does not negate their existence.
The Washington scheme restricts party members from nominating their candidates without interference from voters affiliated with other parties. Those engaged in partisan activities, such as caucusing and serving on party committees, possess a First Amendment right to advocate for their party's agenda, which is undermined by the statutory framework that limits their ability to choose nominees. The right to associate politically extends beyond casual gatherings; it encompasses the process of selecting party nominees. The state's assertion that nominees from blanket primaries represent the electorate, rather than the parties, highlights a flaw in the system, as it obstructs a party's ability to choose its representatives. The First Amendment safeguards the right to political association, including the right to exclude non-party members from the nomination process, which is crucial for a party's identity and effectiveness. Historical examples illustrate the potential dangers of non-party involvement in nominations, and Supreme Court rulings emphasize the importance of protecting a party's selection process. The Washington blanket primary system, akin to California's, is unconstitutional unless the state proves it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest, a standard that has previously been unmet. The state has proposed several interests, including promoting fairness and maximizing voter choice, but these have been deemed insufficient by the Court, which requires a more significant justification for the law's impact on party nominations.
California's arguments regarding voter participation in primaries and the interests of nonmembers are rejected based on precedents established in Jones. The court emphasizes that a party's right to determine its own membership qualifications outweighs the desires of nonmembers to influence party affairs. Increased voter choice is not considered a compelling state interest, and the perceived unfairness of excluding non-affiliated voters is outweighed by the need to prevent them from "hijacking" party nominations.
Privacy concerns raised by the state are also dismissed, as the Supreme Court in Jones found that the state's interest in maintaining voter privacy in primaries does not rise to a compelling level. Washington law mandates disclosure of voters' partisan affiliations in presidential primaries, distinguishing them from general elections where voter secrecy is protected.
The state argues that blanket primaries enhance voter participation by making every vote feel impactful, but this argument is deemed inadequate and similar to rejected claims of fairness. The state's assertion of a sovereign right to determine public officer selection is critiqued for lacking specificity.
Moreover, the state’s claim that blanket primaries recognize the associational interests of groups beyond political parties is challenged. The Grange, which advocates for rural interests, argues that its members' rights to engage across party lines would be compromised by requiring party affiliation. However, the court notes that this perspective on special interests varies and highlights that both the Grange and political parties maintain First Amendment rights to control their membership and messaging. The court ultimately finds this argument indistinguishable from those previously rejected in Jones.
California argued that blanket primaries yield candidates who better reflect the electorate's interests by requiring them to appeal to a broader voter base, thereby diminishing partisan focus. The Court compared this imposition to compelling an organization to include a group with differing views in their events, asserting that such a requirement infringes on the autonomy of speakers. The Court emphasized that the appropriate recourse for parties dissatisfied with candidates is to vote for alternatives, not to dictate candidate selection. The appellants challenged the district court's rulings on evidence exclusion, but the Court determined that the evidentiary issues were unnecessary to resolve because the appellants would prevail based on a constitutional challenge to the Washington blanket primary law, which was found to impose an unconstitutional burden on the free association rights of the involved political parties. The ruling reversed and remanded the case for summary judgment, declaratory judgment, and injunction in favor of the appellants. The text references several legal precedents regarding the evolution of constitutional law in relation to primary elections and the relationship between the state and political parties.
Respondents presented four state interests: promoting fairness, increasing voter choice, enhancing voter participation, and protecting privacy. While these interests are not automatically dismissed, they are not considered compelling in this case. Citing relevant legal precedents, the text references Washington state law and the constitution regarding election scheduling and procedures. Specifically, it notes that elections for state officers occur every fourth year on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, as stipulated in both state and federal law. The citations include references to key cases and legal briefs submitted by parties involved, emphasizing the legal context of the discussion.
