Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 2, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
The case arises from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rice v. Cayetano, which determined that the classification of 'Hawaiian' in the Hawaiian Constitution is race-based, thus violating the Fifteenth Amendment when limiting trustee elections to 'Hawaiians.' The Supreme Court did not address the legitimacy of the administrative framework or benefits allocation based on Hawaiian classification. Patrick Barrett and John Carroll challenge the constitutionality of Article XII of the Hawaiian Constitution and associated statutes, alleging they violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting benefits to those classified as 'native Hawaiians' or 'Hawaiians.' Neither Barrett nor Carroll identify as Hawaiian or native Hawaiian.
Barrett’s original complaint, filed on October 3, 2000, asserts that Article XII allows for racial discrimination in government benefits and seeks a declaration for all races to access these benefits. Carroll’s complaint, filed on October 2, 2000, similarly claims that Article XII and related statutes allocate benefits based on race, seeking to enjoin race-based benefits distribution through the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA).
The district court dismissed Barrett’s claims on July 12, 2001, finding he lacked standing due to no demonstrated injury and failure to include the United States as a party, which retains consent rights over Hawaiian homestead lease alterations. Barrett later moved for reconsideration, raising new arguments regarding federal law implications and the necessity of notifying or joining the United States, but these issues were not previously presented.
On September 18, 2001, the district court denied Barrett's motion for reconsideration, citing his failure to present relevant arguments in a timely manner. The court stated that notification under 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) was unnecessary, as the rule aims to prevent courts from ruling on the constitutionality of congressional Acts without input from the United States. Barrett's invocation of this rule was deemed an attempt to address his own standing issues. The court also found that 2403(a) was inapplicable since it had not directly questioned any Act's constitutionality, and fairness concerns led to the denial of Barrett's joinder argument under Rule 19(a), as he had previously avoided including the United States in the lawsuit. Additionally, the court determined that Barrett's injury was not redressable, as a ruling in his favor would not ensure the continuation of the homestead lease program intended for native Hawaiians.
On February 22, 2002, the court granted summary judgment against Carroll, concluding he lacked standing to challenge Article XII and chapter 10 due to failure to demonstrate any personal injury from the denial of equal treatment. Carroll's generalized grievance regarding benefits allocation to Hawaiians was insufficient, and his claim of 'representational harm' was not comparable to voting rights cases. Jurisdiction was affirmed under 28 U.S.C. 1291. The standard of review for standing is de novo, with the appellate court examining the evidence favorably towards the nonmoving party to identify any genuine issues of material fact. The denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Standing requires a concrete injury, causation by the defendant, and a likelihood of redressability, with the burden on the party invoking federal jurisdiction to establish these elements.
The Supreme Court has established that a generalized grievance regarding illegal government actions does not provide sufficient grounds for legal standing. Specifically, in cases of racial discrimination by government actors, only individuals personally affected by the discrimination can claim standing. The Court advises against adjudicating broad public issues that constitute generalized grievances, emphasizing this principle in equal protection challenges as well.
In the context of Barrett's appeal against the district court's summary judgment, he argues two points: first, that he had standing to challenge the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) business loan program; and second, that he had standing to contest the Hawaii Housing Corporation's (HHC) homestead lease program due to a lack of redressable claims. Notably, he does not appeal the ruling against his challenge regarding native Hawaiian gathering rights.
Carroll, another appellant, contends he experienced injury due to racial classifications under Article XII and chapter 10, as well as from OHA's allocation of benefits that favor native Hawaiians over other state residents. He disputes the OHA's mission to address the needs of Hawaiians while criticizing the absence of initiatives for Caucasian residents. Carroll also likens his situation to "representational harm" seen in racially gerrymandered districts.
Barrett's specific claim regarding the OHA business loan program reveals that he submitted an incomplete application without necessary information. OHA returned the application for completion, but Barrett did not respond and had not developed a business plan. His lack of work history and reliance on Social Security disability payments further complicated his claim, with the district court noting that Barrett's complaint was filed shortly after the loan application submission.
A plaintiff alleging an equal protection violation regarding a race-conscious program must show an inability to compete on equal footing rather than merely lacking access to benefits. In the case of Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court ruled that standing is established if the plaintiff can demonstrate they are "able and ready" to bid on contracts, which was confirmed when the plaintiffs indicated they regularly bid on contracts in Jacksonville. This principle was reaffirmed in Bras v. California Public Utilities Commission, where a plaintiff challenging a preference for minority-owned businesses was deemed to have standing due to his long-standing work with Pacific Bell and expressed intent to continue that relationship.
In contrast, Barrett failed to demonstrate he is "able and ready" to compete for an OHA loan. His submission of an incomplete application indicated a lack of readiness or ability to compete, as he did not seek alternative financing, lacked a business plan, had no work history for 25 years, did not research business expenses, and had only vague knowledge of necessary costs. Although intent can play a role in determining standing, as seen in Gratz v. Bollinger, where the plaintiff was found to have standing despite not applying for admission, Barrett's actions do not substantiate his claim of readiness to apply for an OHA loan, as his application was materially deficient.
Barrett lacks a relevant work history with small business copy shops and failed to respond to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) request for additional information regarding his loan application, indicating unpreparedness to compete for the loan. His generalized grievance does not meet the necessary criteria for valid legal standing, specifically regarding the injury in fact requirement, which he fails to demonstrate. Consequently, there is no need to explore further standing requirements such as causation and redressability.
In contrast, Barrett has successfully shown an injury in fact related to his application for a Hawaiian homestead lease, as the district court determined that merely expressing a desire and providing personal information suffices to establish this injury. Barrett argues that Hawaii’s Article XII, which implements the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA), violates the Fourteenth Amendment by limiting homestead leases to native Hawaiians. The HHCA, enacted by Congress in 1921, set aside 200,000 acres for native Hawaiian homesteading and was incorporated into Hawaii's Constitution upon statehood in 1959. The HHCA stipulates that only native Hawaiians can receive homestead leases, and any changes to this qualification require federal consent. Thus, any attempt to declare Article XII unconstitutional must also address the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Admissions Act, which governs amendments to the HHCA.
Section 4 of the Admissions Act stipulates that changes to lessee qualifications require the United States' consent, a provision Barrett did not contest. He likely recognized that the United States needed to be involved from the start of litigation, as he acknowledged in his complaint that the State adopted the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA) in agreement with the United States. Despite citing Rice v. Cayetano, which discusses Congress' concern for native Hawaiians, Barrett maintained he was not challenging any federal law’s constitutionality, seemingly to strategically exclude the United States from the case until after a summary judgment ruling unfavorable to him. Barrett lacks standing to contest the native Hawaiian eligibility for Hawaiian Homestead leases because any remedy would necessitate changes to qualifications that involve both the State of Hawaii and the United States. His claim is unredressable without including the United States as a party, which he failed to do despite prior notice of its necessity. He also introduced a new argument during oral arguments, claiming the Hawaiian Admissions Act is outdated due to lack of reauthorization by Congress, but the court stated it would not consider this argument as it was not presented in his brief. Barrett’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his homestead lease claim was denied because he raised new arguments too late. The court emphasized that reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly and typically requires newly discovered evidence, clear error, or significant changes in law.
A Rule 59(e) motion cannot introduce new arguments or evidence that could have been presented earlier in the litigation. Barrett could have raised his 2403 notification and Rule 19 joinder arguments before the summary judgment. No new evidence or changes in law justify reconsideration. Barrett failed to demonstrate standing or challenge the constitutionality of any Act of Congress, and the court's dismissal for lack of standing negates the need for input from the United States under 2403(a). The burden of establishing Article III standing lies with the party invoking federal jurisdiction. If the action is dismissed due to the plaintiff's lack of standing, the United States' right to intervene under 2403(a) is rendered moot, which applies to Barrett’s Rule 19(a) argument as well. Barrett's claims, lacking a challenge to the Admissions Act and presented without the United States as a party, are not redressable. The district court correctly found that Barrett failed to show an injury from the OHA loan program and that his challenge to the HHC homestead lease program was also not redressable.
Carroll asserts that the district court erred in finding he did not demonstrate an injury in fact, presenting three claims of injury. First, he claims injury from being subjected to racial classifications under Article XII and chapter 10. Second, he argues that the OHA's allocation of grants unfairly favors native Hawaiians over other state residents. Third, he likens his injury to 'representational harm' in racially gerrymandered districts. The district court correctly dismissed Carroll's claims, noting that while the provisions define native Hawaiians and authorize benefits, only individuals denied equal treatment can seek relief. Carroll's claim rests on the existence of racial classifications rather than a denial of equal treatment, which does not establish standing. No authority supports the idea that racial classification alone constitutes individualized harm.
Racial classifications undergo strict scrutiny, requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate standing through a specific denial of equal treatment. Individuals, regardless of race, can compel governmental entities to justify any racial classification that results in unequal treatment. The Supreme Court has not ruled out race-conscious decision-making entirely; it recognizes that race consciousness does not automatically equate to impermissible discrimination. The case of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater illustrates the principle of standing in equal protection claims, where the plaintiff could only challenge specific programs in which he competed, not the broader program itself.
In the current case, Carroll claims injury from the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' (OHA) allocation of benefits to native Hawaiians. However, he has not identified any specific OHA program he wishes to engage with, nor has he applied for any such program. His assertions of discrimination are general and lack evidentiary support showing a particularized injury. The requirement for standing necessitates that a plaintiff demonstrate actual harm caused by the alleged wrongs, which Carroll fails to do. His claim that the government is not complying with the Constitution, without evidence of personal injury or intent to engage with the programs, has been deemed insufficient for standing, as established in Allen v. Wright.
Plaintiffs in Allen challenged the IRS for not denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools, arguing this failure hindered their children's access to a desegregated education. The Court ruled the plaintiffs lacked standing, asserting that the mere right to demand lawful government action does not grant federal jurisdiction. Carroll similarly lacked standing, as he failed to demonstrate an injury from the allocation of benefits to native Hawaiians and Hawaiians, presenting only a generalized grievance regarding state compliance with his constitutional interpretation. Carroll's claim of 'representational harm' was rejected since it did not involve gerrymandering or voting practices, and the Court found no basis to apply the concept in the context of benefit allocation. Consequently, the district court's ruling that both Barrett and Carroll lacked standing was affirmed, with specific definitions provided for "native Hawaiians" and "Hawaiians" based on ancestry. Barrett's additional challenge regarding native Hawaiian gathering rights was not pursued in this appeal, and his disability was deemed irrelevant to the standing assessment.
