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Bigby v. Cockrell
Citations: 340 F.3d 259; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15007; 2003 WL 21741587Docket: No. 99-11262
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; July 28, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Petitioner-Appellant Gary Eugene Bigby appeals the district court's denial of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, arguing that the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself after Bigby assaulted him constituted a violation of his due process rights. Bigby also raises a Penry claim, contending that jury instructions during the punishment phase hindered the jury from considering mitigating evidence. The court affirms Bigby's conviction but reverses the district court’s denial of a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on the Penry claim, grants the COA, vacates Bigby’s sentence, and remands the case with instructions. Factual background includes the events of December 24, 1987, when Grace Kehler discovered the bodies of her partner Michael Trekell and their infant son, Jayson, in their trailer. Kehler implicated Bigby in the deaths, noting unusual activity at the home prior to her return. Crime scene investigations revealed Trekell was shot in the head, while Jayson drowned. Bigby later confessed to both murders after a standoff with police. During the trial, Bigby attempted to escape and assaulted Judge Don Leonard, who subsequently denied a motion for mistrial and recusal after a hearing determined that the assault did not bias him. The judge allowed the introduction of Bigby’s escape attempt as evidence of guilt. A jury found Bigby guilty of capital murder, rejecting his insanity defense, and the trial court imposed the death penalty on March 25, 1991. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both the conviction and sentence, with the U.S. Supreme Court later denying Bigby's certiorari petition. Following this, Bigby filed a state habeas corpus application, which was denied. Subsequently, on August 10, 1998, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the Northern District of Texas, leading to a district court denial on October 18, 1999. However, a Certificate of Appealability (COA) was granted on the issue of whether Bigby was denied a fair trial after assaulting the state trial judge. Following comprehensive briefing and oral arguments, the case was influenced by evolving case law regarding the Penry claim. The standard for obtaining a COA requires showing that reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's resolution of constitutional claims, particularly given the death penalty context. The review adheres to the standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which limits federal habeas corpus relief to instances where state court decisions are contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. A state court's decision is deemed an unreasonable application of federal law if it identifies the correct legal principle but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a prisoner's case. State court factual findings are presumed correct unless based on an unreasonable determination. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. Any judicial officer exhibiting bias violates this right. In Bigby’s case, the core issue is that Bigby's assault on Judge Leonard created a bias that infringed on his constitutional right to a fair trial. The district court acknowledged that proving bias is challenging due to the presumption of public officials' integrity and their presumed proper discharge of duties. Bigby must overcome these presumptions to demonstrate a due process violation. The Supreme Court has outlined conditions under which a decision maker is constitutionally unacceptable, including having a direct personal interest in the case, being a target of abuse from the party, or holding dual roles of investigator and adjudicator. Bigby needed to establish a genuine question regarding Judge Leonard's impartiality for relief. Additionally, adjudication by a biased judge is classified as a structural error, warranting automatic reversal. The issues arising from Bigby’s assault on Judge Leonard and subsequent recusal failure present a new legal question in the Fifth Circuit, with relevant persuasive authority from other circuits. During a pretrial hearing in the case of Wilks, the petitioner exhibited violent behavior towards the judge, including throwing objects and physically assaulting him while on the witness stand. Initially, the judge expressed a strong intention to impose a severe sentence, but later retracted this statement, claiming that the incident was just another case among many. The court addressed the issue of whether the trial judge should have recused himself, stating that the petitioner must demonstrate that the refusal to recuse constituted a "fundamental defect" leading to a miscarriage of justice. The court acknowledged that while a judge may react negatively to unruly conduct, a deliberate attack on the judge does not automatically warrant recusal. Adopting a per se rule based merely on the appearance of prejudice would encourage disruptive behavior in court and undermine judicial administration. Instead, the court emphasized the necessity of examining the trial for actual bias, determining that the judge's rulings were appropriate and showed no animosity towards the petitioner. The court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's position that a presumption of prejudice solely based on the attack would allow for manipulation of the judicial system. The petitioner also argued that the judge's decision to admit evidence of the attack without a limiting instruction indicated bias; the court planned to evaluate the nature of the evidence and the judge's rationale for his ruling. Bailiff Tim M. Stallings testified about witnessing the defendant, James Bigby, attempt to escape during a break in court. At approximately 10:00 AM, while Stallings was seated at his desk, Bigby stood up ostensibly to get water but instead ran behind the judge's bench and reached for the judge's desk drawer. Stallings drew his weapon and ordered Bigby to stop, but Bigby pointed a .38 Colt revolver at Stallings. Stallings ducked for cover as Bigby escaped through a door into the corridor. Bailiff Barbara Hackney provided further testimony, stating she was in Judge Leonard's office at the same time when Bigby entered with a gun. She identified Bigby in the courtroom and described how he pointed the gun at the judge's head, commanding him to comply. Judge Leonard reacted by grabbing Bigby's gun hand and forcing him against the wall, while Hackney ran out seeking help. The court evaluated the impact of this testimony on the jury, noting that Stallings' account was balanced but deemed Hackney's testimony prejudicial. This was due to the jury's likely identification with the judge, as jurors typically hold judges in high regard and may view an attack on the judge as a personal affront, potentially biasing their perception against Bigby. The admission of evidence regarding Bigby’s attempted escape and the failure to provide a limiting instruction raised concerns about due process rights and the fairness of the trial. However, the trial judge justified the evidence's admission based on its relevance to guilt or innocence and potential implications for Bigby's mental state. Defense counsel objected, arguing the evidence was overly prejudicial, but the court overruled this objection, stating that escape evidence is admissible under Texas law as it may imply guilt. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, determining it fell within a reasonable interpretation of the law. Bigby's subsequent habeas corpus application claimed a violation of due process due to the assault evidence, but the court dismissed it as a rehashed evidentiary issue previously decided. While the trial judge's failure to mitigate the prejudicial impact of the testimony was noted, it did not demonstrate bias or a lack of impartiality. The trial court had a legal basis for its ruling, and the decisions regarding the attack evidence did not constitute sufficient indicators of bias to warrant a determination of structural error in Bigby's trial. The due process inquiry continues beyond the trial judge's bias, specifically addressing whether the admission of attack evidence and the absence of a limiting instruction deprived the petitioner of a fair trial due to its prejudicial nature. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows for relief when evidence is so prejudicial that it renders a trial fundamentally unfair. The analysis does not consider whether the evidence was admissible under state law but focuses solely on constitutional violations. Even if the admission of the attack evidence constituted a constitutional error, the petitioner must demonstrate that it had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict. The overwhelming evidence presented during the trial, including two confessions and expert testimony indicating the petitioner knew his conduct was illegal, makes it improbable that the jury would have reached a different verdict without the attack evidence. Therefore, the due process argument fails on these grounds. The impact of the attack evidence during sentencing is acknowledged as more complex but is not evaluated here since the petitioner’s sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing due to a reversible error related to a 'nullification instruction' given to the jury. Additionally, the petitioner claims unconstitutional jury instructions that allowed jurors to nullify mitigating circumstances, infringing on his right to an individualized assessment of the death penalty's appropriateness. This claim was rejected by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals during direct appeal. Bigby asserts a nullification argument based on Roberts v. Louisiana, claiming that the jurors’ discretion in avoiding the death penalty is capriciously dependent on their willingness to deliver a false verdict. To comply with the Eighth Amendment, a state's capital punishment framework must (1) channel judicial or jury discretion to prevent arbitrary death sentences and (2) allow sufficient discretion for the sentencing body to consider the offender's character and history. This means that relevant mitigating evidence must be accessible to the jury. For a successful Penry claim, it must be shown that the evidence is constitutionally relevant and that it was beyond the jury's effective reach. Bigby has demonstrated that reasonable jurists could find the district court's handling of his Penry claim debatable, particularly due to evidence of his chronic paranoid schizophrenia, a serious mental condition influencing his criminal behavior. The nullification instruction applied in his case is akin to one deemed unconstitutional in Penry I, which restricted jurors’ access to critical mitigating evidence during sentencing. Consequently, the district court’s denial of a Certificate of Appealability (COA) is reversed, and the COA is granted. The court notes that the merits of Bigby’s claim regarding the nullification instruction's constitutionality are ready for decision. The circuit requires defendants to prove two elements to present relevant mitigating evidence: (1) that they have a severe, permanent handicap not of their own making, and (2) that their criminal actions are linked to this condition. Testimony from psychiatrist Dr. James Grigson supports Bigby’s claim, illustrating the debilitating effects of his schizophrenia, including paranoid delusions and impaired reality testing, which are crucial to understanding his culpability. Dr. Grigson testified that Bigby experienced delusions at the time of the murders, specifically believing in a conspiracy involving Michael Trekell. He asserted that Bigby suffered from a severe mental illness, chronic paranoid schizophrenia, which impaired his understanding of right and wrong during the offenses. Unlike the case of Davis v. Scott, where the defendant failed to link his mental illness to the crime, Bigby established a connection between his delusional state and his actions, satisfying the criteria for constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. Additionally, Bigby challenged the jury instructions from the sentencing phase, claiming they limited the jury's ability to consider mitigating circumstances, contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Penry I. The jury was tasked with three special issues regarding the nature of the crime and the defendant's future threat to society. The Supreme Court in Penry I found that these issues did not adequately permit consideration of mitigating evidence, such as mental retardation or childhood abuse. On remand, the state court reiterated the same three special issues but included a supplemental instruction allowing the jury to take mitigating factors into account during deliberations. The jury was instructed to weigh any mitigating evidence when assessing the defendant's culpability and determining an appropriate sentence. If the jury believed that mitigating evidence warranted a life sentence instead of the death penalty, they were to indicate this with a negative finding on the special issues. However, the verdict form only allowed "yes" or "no" answers to the three special issues, leading the jury to answer all "yes," resulting in a death sentence for the defendant, Penry. In Penry II, the Supreme Court found that the jury instruction was inadequate for a reasoned moral response to mitigating evidence, as the special issues did not sufficiently allow for consideration of such evidence. The Court criticized the conflicting instructions, which required jurors to answer "yes" based on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt while also needing to answer "no" to reflect mitigating circumstances. This created a dilemma for jurors, as they would have to provide an untruthful answer to avoid a death sentence, violating their oath to deliver a truthful verdict. The instructions in Bigby’s case were nearly identical to those in Penry II, leading to the conclusion that Bigby faced the same constitutional issues. Consequently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision was found to be contrary to established federal law, resulting in the reversal of the district court's denial of Bigby's application for a Certificate of Appealability (COA) regarding jury instructions, vacating his sentence, and ordering habeas relief based on the Penry claim. Additionally, Bigby argued that he was improperly denied the right to impeach the chief witness against him by exposing her potential motive to testify falsely due to a pending civil suit and highlighting her contradictory statements. However, the record indicated a different account of the trial proceedings. Judge Leonard permitted Bigby to cross-examine Kehler regarding her financial interests related to her ongoing wrongful death lawsuit against Bigby’s physician and hospitals, but stipulated that the civil petitions would not be admitted as evidence unless Kehler denied the suit. Bigby asserted his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, which includes cross-examination, but this right is subject to the trial judge's discretion to impose reasonable limits. The court found that Bigby did not demonstrate that his cross-examination of Kehler was unconstitutionally restricted or that the rejection of his impeachment arguments violated established federal law, leading to the conclusion that a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on this issue was unwarranted. Bigby also challenged the trial court's decision to have him shackled and handcuffed in the jury's presence, arguing it violated his rights. The court explained that shackling is permissible when there is a risk of escape or danger to trial participants, and noted that following Bigby's assault on Judge Leonard, the judge acted within his discretion to ensure courtroom safety. Therefore, no COA would be issued on this matter. Lastly, Bigby claimed he was denied due process when the trial court altered the order for juror challenges as outlined in Article 35.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. This article specifies the challenge sequence for jurors in capital cases, requiring the state to challenge first, followed by the defendant. The trial court modified this sequence during voir dire, but further details on the specific alterations were not provided in the excerpt. The court addressed multiple challenges regarding the voir dire process, specifically citing the State's and appellant's challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. Bigby’s counsel objected to the ruling on the selection procedure per Article 35.13, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found to be an error; however, it deemed this error harmless. The court noted that violations of state law typically do not warrant habeas review unless they render the trial fundamentally unfair. Bigby failed to show that the alleged tactical disadvantage resulted in such unfairness. In a separate issue, after evidence of Bigby’s assault on Judge Leonard was presented, defense counsel sought to withdraw, claiming they should testify about the incident’s relevance to Bigby’s mental state. The judge denied this request to avoid unnecessary delays but suggested that one attorney could testify. Although this could indicate a conflict of interest, neither attorney chose to testify. Bigby argued that this decision constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, which requires showing both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. He did not provide clear grounds for deficiency or demonstrate prejudice from the attorneys’ decisions. Lastly, Bigby claimed that the prosecution violated his due process rights by withholding medical records detailing his psychotropic medications during incarceration. The court referenced Brady v. Maryland, stating due process is violated when material evidence favorable to the defense is withheld. However, it ruled that the prosecution had no obligation to direct the defense to evidence that could have been discovered through reasonable diligence, concluding that the records were accessible in this manner. As a result, the court affirmed Bigby’s conviction, denying the issuance of a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on all claims. The court has reversed the district court's denial of Bigby's application for a Certificate of Appealability (COA) regarding his nullification instruction claim, granted the COA, vacated Bigby's sentence, and remanded the case for the district court to issue an order for Bigby's habeas relief related to his Penry claim. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated, and remanded the case. Citing precedents, the court highlighted the importance of impartiality in judicial proceedings, noting that a judge's personal interests or biases can violate due process rights. The court referenced several cases emphasizing that bias can arise from both extrajudicial sources and significant predispositions based on trial events. It acknowledged Bigby's claims of due process violations due to the introduction of evidence concerning an armed escape attempt during the trial's guilt-innocence phase. However, the court concluded these claims pertain primarily to the admission of evidence rather than clear violations of due process. Specifically, the trial court had previously rejected Bigby's complaints regarding this evidence on direct appeal. Dr. Grigson's testimony established that Bigby suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, and he discussed the basis of the charges against Bigby during psychiatric evaluations. Mr. Bigby was assessed by a doctor who concluded that at the time of his offense, he was suffering from a severe mental illness, specifically schizophrenia, which rendered him unable to distinguish between right and wrong. This mental condition included delusions, stemming from a belief that Frito Lay owed him $26,000 and that various individuals, including the victim Mike Trekell, were part of a conspiracy against him. The doctor asserted that without these delusions and the schizophrenia, Mr. Bigby would not have committed the murder, as there was no rational motive for his actions. Regarding the murder of an infant, Jason Trekell, the doctor indicated that Mr. Bigby had previously shown affection towards the child, and the act was deemed irrational and tragic, with no rational explanation beyond his mental illness. In the case, the jury was instructed to consider specific special issues regarding Mr. Bigby's conduct, including whether it was deliberate and if he posed a continuing threat to society. They were also guided on how to weigh any mitigating circumstances that might suggest a life sentence would be more appropriate than a death sentence. The instructions provided to the jury in this case were similar to those in a referenced case, Penry II, with minor phrasing differences that did not significantly alter the jury's understanding of their obligation to consider mitigating evidence when determining Mr. Bigby's culpability.