Valley Outdoor, Inc. v. County of Riverside

Docket: No. 02-55475

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 31, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Plaintiffs-Appellants Valley Outdoor and Regency Outdoor Advertising, billboard companies, challenge the constitutionality of two versions of Riverside County’s sign ordinance, claiming violations of the First Amendment. They argue that both versions impose excessive restrictions on speech, favor commercial over noncommercial speech, and grant County officials excessive discretion in permitting signs. Additionally, they allege that the "grandfather" provision in the new ordinance targets their billboards for retribution. The case involves four billboards near State Highway 91, with the plaintiffs owning interests in these and two additional proposed billboards. 

The original ordinance, Ordinance 348, distinguished between off-site and on-site advertising, imposing stricter regulations on off-site signs. It required permits for erection, alteration, or relocation, with violations classified as misdemeanors. The new ordinance, effective July 23, 1999, retains this distinction but deems all existing signs illegal unless compliant with prior regulations. It also permits noncommercial messages wherever signs are allowed. Valley and Regency initiated their lawsuit on January 13, 2000, after their initial complaint was dismissed, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged constitutional violations and requesting the court to declare both ordinances unconstitutional and prevent the County from enforcing them or removing their billboards. They also sought unspecified general damages.

In October 2001, the district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment filed by both parties, partially granting and denying each motion. The court declared section 19.2(f)(1) of the New Ordinance unconstitutional as it defined sign legality based on compliance with the original sign ordinance. However, the court found the remainder of the New Ordinance enforceable, determining the unconstitutional section could be severed, allowing the rest to function independently. The court concluded that summary judgment for Riverside County was justified because the signs in question violated zoning, height, and surface area provisions, which were deemed constitutional and severable.

The court affirmed the severability of the unconstitutional aspects based on California law, referencing criteria that require provisions to be grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable. It cited previous cases to emphasize that severability is valid if the remaining text is complete and reflects legislative intent, which remains intact without the grandfather provision. The court noted that the New Ordinance's purpose included aesthetic and safety considerations for Riverside County, necessitating proper sign control for the preservation of open spaces and the wellbeing of residents.

The zoning, size, and height restrictions in the ordinances are deemed constitutional as they are content-neutral 'time, place, and manner' regulations that do not reference the content of speech, serve significant governmental interests, and allow ample alternative communication channels. The appellants' billboards are illegal because they do not comply with these content-neutral restrictions outlined in both the Original and New Ordinances. Although the appellants claim damages based on the Original Ordinance's alleged unconstitutionality, no damages are justified since the billboards were 'independently' illegal under its provisions. Valley and Regency acquired their billboard property interests from OMG in June 1998. The Original Ordinance defined 'outdoor advertising display' broadly, including various structures and signs used for advertising. It also exempted specific official notices and signs mandated by law. The New Ordinance defines 'non-commercial structure or sign' as one that does not advertise for profit, propose a commercial transaction, or solely relate to economic interests. The district court did not clarify any unconstitutional aspects of the Original Ordinance.