Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit

Citations: 335 F.3d 932; 2003 WL 21544107Docket: No. 01-36172

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 10, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Save Our Valley (SOV), a community group, has challenged the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority's (Sound Transit) plan to construct a light-rail line through the predominantly minority Rainier Valley in Seattle, arguing that it discriminates against local residents based on race, violating a Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation. SOV contends that this regulation, which prohibits federally funded projects from causing racial discrimination, creates an individual federal right enforceable under the Civil Rights Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court ruled that the regulation does not establish such a right and granted summary judgment to Sound Transit. The court also upheld the taxation of $5,310.55 in costs against SOV. The appellate court's primary inquiry is whether DOT's disparate-impact regulation confers individual rights enforceable through § 1983. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the court concludes that agency regulations cannot create individual rights under § 1983, as the statute is designed to enforce rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws, not mere regulations.

Claiming a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not valid on its own, as the statute does not provide inherent protection. The Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have established that agency regulations cannot confer an individual federal right enforceable under § 1983, emphasizing that rights must stem from Congressional intent. In contrast, the D.C. and Sixth Circuits have ruled that agency regulations can create such rights, interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in Maine v. Thiboutot broadly to suggest that violations of all valid federal laws, including regulations, may be remedied through § 1983. The Supreme Court has not directly resolved this circuit split, but recent decisions in Alexander v. Sandoval and Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe have reinforced the reasoning of the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits by asserting that only Congress can create private rights of action. In Sandoval, the Court rejected claims based on the text of regulations, focusing instead on the statute's text, which indicated that individual rights must be created by Congress. This interpretation suggests that individual rights enforceable under § 1983 must also derive from Congressional statutes, not merely from agency regulations.

Regulations cannot create private rights of action unless Congress has authorized them through statutory text. Agencies may implement laws but cannot create new rights beyond what Congress has established. Both implied rights of action and rights enforceable under Section 1983 are dependent on federal substantive law, which is exclusively within Congress's legislative powers as outlined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has affirmed this principle, notably in the cases of *Sandoval* and *Gonzaga*, which emphasize that rights enforceable through Section 1983 and implied rights of action derive from Congressional intent to create federal rights. The Court's reasoning indicates that only Congress has the authority to create such rights, dismissing any notion that agencies can legislate or imply rights through regulation. Other Supreme Court cases also reinforce the necessity of Congressional intent for the creation of individual rights enforceable through Section 1983.

The Third Circuit underscores that the Supreme Court's rulings in Sandoval and Gonzaga clarify that agency regulations cannot independently establish rights enforceable through Section 1983. This principle aligns with the foundational constitutional tenet that only Congress, not the executive, has the authority to create laws. The argument presented by SOV, relying on Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, suggests that valid federal regulations can establish enforceable rights under Section 1983. However, the analysis indicates a distinction: while the Wright Court allowed a 1983 suit concerning federal statutes and associated regulations, it did not affirm that the regulations alone created enforceable rights. Instead, the Court interpreted the regulations to elucidate rights conferred by the statute, emphasizing Congress’s intent rather than the agency's. The dissenting opinions in Wright raised concerns about the potential for regulations to create rights independently of Congressional intent, questioning whether such an outcome could be justified. The excerpt expresses apprehension that if regulations could create enforceable rights, it would detach the determination of these rights from Congressional intent, leading to an unstable legal framework regarding federal rights.

Wright does not establish that regulations can independently create federal rights; this view is reinforced by subsequent Supreme Court cases emphasizing Congress's exclusive role in conferring federal rights. In Sandoval, the Court focused on congressional intent rather than the intent behind administrative regulations. SOV cites two cases, Wilder and Suter, which discuss Wright and imply that regulations can define rights under certain circumstances. However, both cases clarify that a statute must first confer specific rights for regulations to further define them, not create them independently. Recent Supreme Court decisions reinforce that only Congress can create enforceable rights. SOV's reliance on Buckley is misplaced, as that case centered on the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act itself, not its regulations, affirming that the rights stem from the statute, not the regulations. Lastly, while the D.C. and Sixth Circuits have found that regulations can create rights, examples cited, such as Samuels, underline specific contexts rather than a general principle allowing regulations to create enforceable rights under section 1983.

HUD’s grievance procedure regulations are established as federal law under congressional direction, impacting individual rights and obligations. The Supreme Court's interpretation in Thiboutot indicates that Section 1983 allows for legal remedies against violations of valid federal laws, including regulations created under congressional authority, which are recognized as part of federal law. The D.C. Circuit's reasoning is flawed for asserting that being classified as a 'law' under Section 1983 is sufficient for creating rights; it must also secure 'rights, privileges, or immunities.' Section 1983 serves as a mechanism for enforcing rights secured by other laws, and the Supreme Court has suggested that only certain laws—not regulations—can create such rights. The D.C. Circuit mischaracterizes the distinction between Section 1983 claims and implied rights of action, neglecting to acknowledge that a plaintiff must first demonstrate that Congress intended to create a federal right before benefiting from the presumption of enforceability under Section 1983. The initial inquiry to determine if a statute confers rights is crucial, paralleling the examination in implied rights of action cases. The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning mirrors the D.C. Circuit’s but is less thorough, simply stating that federal regulations, having the force of law, can create enforceable rights.

The Sixth Circuit's ruling mirrored flaws in the D.C. Circuit's decision by incorrectly presuming that any regulation classified as a 'law' must be enforceable under Section 1983. Both circuits’ opinions were outdated as they preceded the Supreme Court's rulings in Sandoval and Gonzaga, which clarified that only Congress can establish individual federal rights. Consequently, the court rejects the positions taken by the Sixth and D.C. Circuits, asserting that agency regulations cannot independently create such rights. 

Key principles established include: violations of rights, rather than mere violations of laws, are actionable under Section 1983; plaintiffs must show that a statute—rather than a regulation—confers an individual right; and while agency regulations can inform the interpretation of statutory rights, the primary focus must be on congressional intent. The analysis confirms that Congress did not intend to create a right related to claims of racial disparate effects, as established by the Supreme Court, which has emphasized that Title VI addresses only instances of intentional discrimination.

Furthermore, even if regulations could create enforceable rights, the specific disparate-impact regulation in question does not do so. This regulation, created by the Department of Transportation under Title VI, prohibits practices that have discriminatory effects based on race but extends beyond the original statute's prohibition of intentional discrimination. There exists a noted conflict between the intent of Title VI and the disparate-impact regulation, leading to the affirmation of the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' action.

In Alexander v. Sandoval, the Supreme Court established that regulations can prohibit activities resulting in disparate racial impacts, but the validity of the regulation in question was not contested, and thus its potential invalidity was not addressed. The Fourth Circuit's analysis was deemed superficial compared to other circuits, primarily focusing on the lack of Supreme Court precedent and expressing skepticism about whether administrative regulations alone could confer rights. It concluded that administrative regulations cannot create enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless those rights are already embedded in the underlying statute. A partial dissent argued that rights enforceable through § 1983 differ from implied rights of action, emphasizing that the former constitute substantive entitlements while the latter serve as remedies. However, the dissent did not convincingly argue why executive agencies could not create implied rights of action as established in Sandoval but could create enforceable rights through § 1983. The document asserts that both types of rights must be established by Congress as part of substantive federal law. The opinion referenced prior cases indicating the distinction between implied rights of action and rights enforceable under § 1983, while also noting that the Supreme Court had introduced additional considerations in Gonzaga regarding implied rights of action and their influence on § 1983 enforceability. The Eleventh Circuit highlighted a consensus that only statutes can create rights, with regulations serving to clarify those rights established by Congress.

Regulation 966.57(b) serves only as an interpretation of the relevant section, and while SÓV refers to the Supreme Court's practice regarding section 1983 cases enforcing Social Security Act regulations, it does not imply that the regulations themselves create enforceable individual rights. The initial step is to assess whether the statute and its interpretive regulations establish an enforceable federal statutory right, as established in Buckley, 66 F.3d at 190. SÓV's argument that regulations are equivalent to "laws" is unhelpful. Typically, this evaluation would involve the Supreme Court's three-prong Blessing test: (1) Congress must intend for the provision to benefit the plaintiff; (2) the asserted right must not be vague or amorphous; and (3) the statute must impose a clear obligation on the states. However, the Blessing test does not need to be applied here because the Supreme Court has already determined that Title VI does not create the asserted right. The dissenting opinion does not endorse the majority's view that regulations are only valid if they clarify a specific statutory provision, nor does it express any opinion on the validity of regulations. The conclusion is that the disparate-impact regulation does not establish a right enforceable under section 1983, particularly considering the Supreme Court's rulings in Sandoval and Gonzaga. The district court’s decision to award costs to Sound Transit, as the prevailing party, is subject to review for abuse of discretion, referencing Sea Coast Foods, Inc. v. Lu-Mar Lobster and Shrimp, Inc., 260 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 2001).