Downing v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama

Citations: 321 F.3d 1017; 2003 WL 302222Docket: No. 00-10481

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; February 12, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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James D. Downing, a former employee of the University of Alabama at Birmingham's campus police department, is pursuing equitable relief and damages against the University’s Board of Trustees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He claims he was sexually harassed by his supervisor and subsequently fired for reporting the harassment. The Board seeks to dismiss Downing's Title VII claim, citing sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, arguing that Congress exceeded its authority in amending Title VII to include state governments. They reference Supreme Court cases which assert that Congress cannot create new constitutional rights under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the Board's motion to dismiss, leading to the Board's appeal.

The court confirms that Congress intended to make Title VII applicable to state and local governments, referencing precedent that supports this interpretation. The key issue is whether Congress overstepped its authority by establishing rights not covered by the Equal Protection Clause, specifically concerning the right to be free from sexual harassment and retaliation for reporting such harassment. The court will address two main questions: (1) whether the right to be free from sexual harassment is solely a statutory right, and (2) whether Congress’s establishment of the right against retaliation was necessary to protect individuals from sexual harassment. The court draws on earlier case law, including Cross v. State of Alabama, where employees alleged sexual harassment and hostile work environment violations under Title VII and sought various forms of relief.

A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on all claims relating to sexual harassment under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, leading to an award of back pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. The State and officials appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the harassment claims. The court affirmed that the plaintiffs had the right to be free from sexual harassment and found the evidence adequate to establish both Title VII and Equal Protection claims, noting their identical elements. 

The State argued that the Equal Protection Clause does not protect against same-sex discrimination, but the court referenced Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., which rejected this argument, asserting that Title VII protects victims regardless of the harasser's or victim's sex. The Supreme Court emphasized that discrimination must be demonstrated through evidence of treatment "because of" sex, regardless of whether the harassment involved same-sex or opposite-sex interactions. The court highlighted that the employer remains accountable for harassment, asserting that claims are valid even when the harasser and victim are of the same sex. While establishing such claims may be more challenging, it does not negate the possibility of proving sexual harassment.

The Constitution prohibits intentional discrimination, as established in *In re Employment Discrimination Litigation Against the State of Alabama*, 198 F.3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). The court affirmed that the elements of a sexual harassment claim under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause are identical, requiring proof that a state actor intended to discriminate based on sex. There is no basis for differentiating between opposite-sex and same-sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The district court's decision to deny the Board Eleventh Amendment immunity concerning Downing’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) was upheld.

Additionally, the Board's contention that Congress overreached by applying the antiretaliation provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) to states was rejected. The court maintained that Congress has the authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to legislate against conduct that deters constitutional violations, even if such legislation encroaches on state autonomy. The antiretaliation provision aims to protect access to remedies for victims of discrimination, a purpose recognized by the Supreme Court in *Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.*, 519 U.S. 337 (1997). The court aligned with the Eighth Circuit’s view that § 2000e-3(a) is constitutional, thereby affirming the district court's denial of the Board's immunity claim. 

The relevant sections of Title VII were noted: § 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination based on sex in employment practices, and § 2000e-3(a) prohibits retaliation against employees for opposing discriminatory practices. The 1972 amendments to Title VII extended these provisions to state and local governments, as clarified in *Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer*, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).

The exclusion of "a State or political subdivision thereof" from certain provisions was removed by § 2(2) of the 1972 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The amendments expanded the definition of "employee" to include individuals under state civil service laws, allowing aggrieved persons to sue public employers for unlawful practices. Downing claims that severe sexual harassment created a hostile work environment, actionable under Title VII. The court highlighted that a work environment filled with discriminatory behavior violates Title VII when it significantly alters employment conditions. Downing is also seeking relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, and damages against his supervisor under Alabama common law. The district court granted summary judgment on the Disability Act and Rehabilitation Act claims, while state law claims against Strunk were stayed and are not part of the current appeal. The Eleventh Amendment limits federal and state court jurisdiction over suits against states by their own or other citizens, with Congress able to abrogate state sovereign immunity only with clear intent and valid authority. The Fourteenth Amendment affirms that states cannot infringe on citizens' rights without due process and empowers Congress to enforce its provisions through legislation.

The court imposed an injunction against the individual defendants, prohibiting retaliation against the plaintiffs and ordering their reinstatement to former or equivalent positions. The appeal included several grounds, notably that the Eleventh Amendment barred damages against the State and officials in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as Congress did not abrogate this immunity and Alabama did not waive it, which the court upheld. Additionally, the court vacated back pay awards against officials in their individual capacities since they were not considered employers under Title VII. The state commissioner overseeing the hospital was granted qualified immunity regarding claims against him personally. 

The plaintiffs alleged violations of their equal protection rights due to sexual harassment by the facility's director. To prove such a violation under the Equal Protection Clause, they need to demonstrate discriminatory intent. The court referenced precedents indicating that the elements of claims under § 1983 for equal protection violations and Title VII are aligned, with both requiring proof of intentional discrimination. This is supported by case law suggesting that establishing a claim under the Equal Protection Clause may be easier than under Title VII, as the former focuses on intentional discrimination rather than the effect of harassment on employment conditions. A plaintiff may prove sex discrimination by showing that the employer's failure to address harassment constituted intentional discrimination.