Tracie Dickey, leader of Deliverance Tabernacle Ministries International, exploited her followers—misleading them into believing she received divine commands—by forcing them to live in church premises, work multiple jobs, and surrender all their earnings to her. Utilizing both physical and mental coercion, she threatened non-compliance with violence and homelessness, amassing approximately $1.5 million, which she used for personal luxuries. Dickey was indicted on wire fraud and forced labor charges, ultimately convicted on one count of each. She appealed the district court's decisions, specifically contesting the denial of her fourth motion to delay the trial, the rejection of a jury instruction related to religious liberty, and the restitution order for her victims' future mental health treatment. The appeal was affirmed. Throughout the pretrial phase, Dickey's legal representation was unstable, changing attorneys six times and receiving three continuances while the district court set a firm trial date. Despite the extended preparation time, she sought yet another delay shortly before trial commencement.
Dickey informed her attorney about new witnesses shortly before the trial, prompting skepticism from the district court, which noted that Dickey had delayed this information until the last moment. Despite concerns about the emotional toll on the victims, the court postponed the trial to October 9, 2018. Afterward, Dickey's counsel sought to withdraw due to an ethics complaint filed by Dickey, leading to the appointment of standby counsel. Dickey then retained Victor Henderson, who requested another continuance, which the court granted, rescheduling the trial for February 4, 2019, with a stern warning that it would not be postponed again. Henderson attempted to delay the trial twice more, but the court maintained the February date, emphasizing that the timing had been arranged around other trials and that expert testimony on victim consent would not be admissible.
The trial proceeded as scheduled with four victims and former members testifying, alongside Hyatt employees and FBI investigators. Dickey called current members to testify that their contributions were voluntary. The court instructed the jury on wire fraud and forced labor, while Dickey requested instructions regarding the influence of religion; however, the court declined this request, fearing it could mislead the jury. The government argued against allowing Dickey to use religion as a defense, while the defense maintained that the victims acted of their own free will. The jury ultimately convicted Dickey on both counts.
During sentencing, Dickey showed little remorse, stating her actions were misinterpreted, while victims recounted their traumatic experiences, with one likening her time at DTM to "psychological bondage."
Dickey suffers from severe mental health issues, including panic attacks and suicidal thoughts, comparing her situation to that of cult members involved in mass suicide. Victims K.H. and L.H. provided accounts of their psychological and physical harm, respectively. The district court sentenced Dickey to 144 months in prison, to run concurrently, and three years of supervised release, also convening a special hearing on restitution. Dr. Diana Goldstein, a clinical neuropsychologist, testified on the victims' trauma-related disorders and provided treatment cost estimates, leading to the court ordering Dickey to pay $1.14 million in restitution, including $12,714 for each victim's future mental health care.
Dickey appealed her conviction and sentence, challenging the denial of her fourth motion to continue the trial, rejection of a jury instruction on religious liberty, and the restitution order based on Dr. Goldstein's testimony. The court's denial of the continuance was reviewed for abuse of discretion, considering factors such as preparation time, potential prejudice, the defendant's actions, case complexity, discovery availability, movant's needs, and public interest. The district court cited the prolonged trial history, Dickey's role in delaying proceedings by rejecting multiple competent attorneys, the impact on victims, and its own demanding caseload as reasons for denying the continuance.
The district court exercised its discretion appropriately in denying Dickey's motion for a fourth continuance, as there was no demonstrated prejudice against her. Despite her claims of needing more time for expert retention and case preparation, the defense counsel successfully engaged an expert, developed a coherent theory, and effectively cross-examined witnesses, thereby fulfilling his responsibilities. The court confirmed that the counsel had reviewed all discovery with Dickey.
Regarding the jury instructions, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on their theory of defense if it is legally correct, supported by evidence, not part of the government’s charge, and necessary for a fair trial. Dickey's requested instruction to disregard her religious practices when determining guilt was rejected because it inaccurately interpreted the law and could excuse criminal conduct based on religious grounds, which is unsupported by case law. The court provided adequate instructions that allowed Dickey to argue her case, including the ability to assert that her victims voluntarily participated in the church.
Finally, concerning restitution, the court's calculation for the victims was reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dickey acknowledged that restitution could encompass future mental health treatment costs for the victims, aligning with established legal precedents.
A district court can order a defendant to pay restitution for the necessary medical and psychological services incurred by victims due to the defendant's offenses, as per 18 U.S.C. 3663, 3663A. The case United States v. Danser establishes that restitution may cover future therapy costs for victims of sexual exploitation. The defendant objected to the calculation method of damages, but the district court has broad discretion in determining restitution procedures. The government must prove the amount by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning it must be more likely than not to be true. Although prospective loss estimates may have inherent uncertainties, this does not invalidate them.
In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in assessing future mental health treatment costs. Expert testimony from Dr. Diana Goldstein, a clinical neuropsychologist, was presented, detailing the necessary treatment for complex PTSD, which includes multiple interventions and therapies. Dr. Goldstein's estimate considered related psychological conditions and was based on her expertise and case facts, although it was applied to the victims collectively due to limited individual information.
The district court also evaluated extensive trial testimony from victims, including their psychological symptoms and experiences, and conducted a dedicated hearing for restitution. After thorough review, the court determined that restitution at the lower end of Dr. Goldstein's treatment cost recommendations was appropriate for each victim. The court's careful decision-making process was upheld, and the ruling was affirmed.
