Redd, A. v. Spaulding, M.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 57 WDA 2022

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; October 26, 2022; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Morgan Spaulding appeals an amended final Protection from Intimidation (PFI) order issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County on December 30, 2021, under the Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act. The petition was filed by Anthony Redd on behalf of his minor daughter, C.R., a 17-year-old student at McGuffey High School, where Spaulding served as the head basketball coach. Allegations against Spaulding include inappropriate communications with C.R., daily pursuits, aggressive physical contact, and being the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation.

The trial court initially granted a temporary PFI order after an ex parte hearing on November 8, 2021, which was extended pending a final hearing. A final PFI order was issued on December 10, 2021, following extensive testimonies. Spaulding subsequently sought reconsideration regarding prohibitions against her access to McGuffey High School, where she is employed as an assistant principal. The court clarified the "no contact" provisions and amended the final PFI order on December 29, 2021. 

Spaulding filed a notice of appeal on January 5, 2022, presenting three issues: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting the PFI order due to insufficient evidence of intimidation.
2. Whether the prohibition against her presence on school property hindered her employment rights.
3. Whether the stipulation regarding the continuation of the order past the victim's 18th birthday, transferring the plaintiff role to the child, was erroneous.

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

Appellant's first claim challenges the trial court's issuance of a Protection From Intimidation (PFI) order, arguing that the victim did not demonstrate "intimidation" as required under Section 62A03. The court's interpretation of the Act is guided by the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, which aims to reflect the General Assembly's intent while honoring all statute provisions. The Act specifies that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning prevails. The trial court issued the PFI order to safeguard the victim from alleged intimidation, which the General Assembly recognizes can cause humiliation and fear. The Act provides victims with civil remedies, including imposing distance from the offender. Intimidation is defined within the Act as conduct constituting harassment or stalking, particularly involving interactions between individuals where one party is under 18 years of age. Harassment under the Crimes Code includes various forms of offensive communication, while stalking involves repeated conduct that instills fear or emotional distress in the victim.

A hearing must occur within ten days of filing a petition for a Protection From Intimidation (PFI) order, where the plaintiff is required to demonstrate that the victim is a target of the defendant's intimidation and to show a continued risk of harm by a preponderance of the evidence, as outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. 62A06(a)(1), (2). Crucially, the plaintiff does not need to establish elements of criminal harassment or stalking; merely alleging intimidation suffices. In a specific case, the trial court found credible evidence that the victim, a minor, was subjected to inappropriate contact by the appellant, an adult and her basketball coach, who reached out to her at late hours and during school without consent, despite the victim expressing discomfort. The appellant’s inconsistent testimony was deemed not credible, while the victim's and her parents' accounts were found convincing, leading to the conclusion that intimidation occurred. The appellant contested the sufficiency of the evidence but did not provide legal analysis to support her claims, instead relying on contradictory testimony. Consequently, the court rejected her appeal, stating that it cannot re-evaluate evidence already assessed by the trial court and deemed the issue waived, emphasizing the requirement for legal argumentation per Pa.R.A.P. 2119.

The claim against the Appellant is deemed to lack merit, as the trial court found credible testimony from the victim and her parents, supported by extensive evidence, indicating that the minor child was a victim of the Appellant’s intimidation, in line with Section 62A06(a)(1) of the Act. The court referenced the case A.M.D., establishing that the filing party is not required to prove elements of criminal harassment or stalking to assert a claim under the Act. It clarified that the father merely needed to assert that his daughter was a victim of intimidation and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she faced a continued risk of harm from the Appellant. The statutory language does not necessitate special findings regarding criminal harassment or stalking for a finding of intimidation. Additionally, the Appellant's argument regarding insufficient evidence for a continued risk of harm is dismissed as waived because it was not included in her Rule 1925(b) statement or the Statement of Questions Involved, as mandated by relevant procedural rules.

An appellant’s obligation to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925 is triggered by the trial court’s order, which specifically warned that any issue not included in the timely filed Rule 1925(b) statement would be deemed waived. The court will not consider issues not presented in the appellate brief's statement of questions involved, and any unraised issues are considered waived. The appellant has voluntarily waived her second claim concerning a trial court order prohibiting her from entering school property, which has since been amended to allow her employment. Even if this claim had not been waived, it would be deemed moot, as courts cannot address moot questions.

The appellant also contends that the trial court lacked authority to state that the victim would become the plaintiff upon turning 18 if the PFI order extended beyond that age. Although the appellant acknowledges that the statute limits the order's duration to a maximum of 36 months, she argues that it should automatically expire upon the victim reaching 18. The court finds this argument illogical, noting that the victim was a minor during the alleged intimidation and at the time the PFI order was issued. The statute permits a PFI order to extend beyond a minor's 18th birthday, and the trial court acted within its discretion in granting a three-year order. Consequently, the court affirms the final PFI order against the appellant.