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Trentadue v. Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Company
Citation: 479 Mich. 378Docket: 128624
Court: Michigan Supreme Court; July 25, 2007; Michigan; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The Michigan Supreme Court addressed a wrongful death case involving Dayle Trentadue, the personal representative of Margarette F. Eby's estate, against several defendants, including Jeffrey Gorton, who was convicted of Eby’s rape and murder in 1986. The central legal issue was whether the common-law 'discovery rule' could toll the statute of limitations for wrongful death claims, or if MCL 600.5827, which specifies that a claim accrues when the plaintiff is harmed, solely governs the limitations period. The Court concluded that MCL 600.5827 controls the time of accrual and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, remanding the case to the Genesee Circuit Court for further proceedings. The factual background indicated that Eby was murdered in 1986, and DNA evidence identified Gorton as the perpetrator in 2002, leading Trentadue to file the complaint on August 2, 2002. The defendants claimed the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to wrongful death actions. MCL 600.5852 allows for a three-year extension of the statute of limitations based on the appointment of a personal representative; however, it was deemed inapplicable in this case as 16 years had elapsed since the relevant events. Defendants argued for dismissal of the suit due to untimeliness under the statute of limitations. The plaintiff contended that the common-law discovery rule should apply, asserting that the limitations period was tolled until she could identify the killer. The Genesee Circuit Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, affirming that the common-law discovery rule is still valid in Michigan. The court stated that a personal injury claim accrues only when all elements can be properly pleaded, noting that knowledge of the killer's identity is essential to establish the claim. Consequently, the court found that most of the plaintiff's claims were not time-barred, as she could not ascertain breaches of duty or causation until 2002. However, the court granted summary disposition for Bekofske and MFO, indicating that any claim related to inadequate security was known to the plaintiff at the time of the killing. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld in part and reversed in part, ruling that the common-law discovery rule tolled the limitations for all claims, including those against Bekofske and MFO. They concluded that until the killer's identity was known, no causal connection could be established between any breach of duty and the victim's death. The appellate court did not address the lack of a common-law discovery provision in MCL 600.5827 and assumed the coexistence of the discovery rule with the statute. Buckler, the Gortons, and MFO sought leave to appeal, which was granted to determine if the common-law discovery rule remains in Michigan law or if MCL 600.5827 is the sole means for tolling. The applicable statute of limitations for wrongful death is MCL 600.5805(10), which stipulates a three-year period following death or injury. MCL 600.5827 establishes that the limitations period for legal actions begins when the claim accrues, which is determined by specific provisions in sections 5829 to 5838, or, in other cases, at the time the wrongdoing occurred, regardless of when damages are realized. Although Justice Kelly raises questions about MCL 600.5827's applicability to MCL 600.5805(10), the courts have consistently interpreted these statutes together, as they are complementary. MCL 600.5805(10) specifically states that personal injury and wrongful death claims accrue at the time of injury or death. The timing of the wrong aligns with the moment the plaintiff is harmed, confirming consistency between the statutes. Justice Kelly’s perspective that MCL 600.5805(10) should apply independently would not alter outcomes since both statutes indicate the same accrual timing. Furthermore, incorporating a common-law discovery rule into MCL 600.5805(10) contradicts its explicit language, which provides a clear three-year limitations period post-injury or death. The Revised Judicature Act details specific instances for tolling the limitations period but does not include scenarios where a plaintiff is unaware of the tortfeasor's identity. Although plaintiffs argue for a judicially created discovery rule to prevent bar on claims due to lack of awareness of actionable grounds, such a rule has been superseded by statute. Under discovery analysis, a claim accrues only when a plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the cause of action. Plaintiff contends that her claims should not have accrued until she identified Gorton as the killer, arguing that prior to this discovery, she could not substantiate her claims. The court rejects this argument, asserting that the statutory scheme is exclusive and does not permit tolling of accrual based on the discovery rule in cases where no statutory provisions apply. The Legislature has the authority to override common law, and in instances of conflict, statutory law prevails. The Revised Judicature Act delineates explicit limitations periods and accrual times, with MCL 600.5827 stating that a claim's limitations period begins when it accrues. Specific statutory provisions, including MCL 600.5838, 600.5838a, 600.5839, and 600.5855, outline exceptions for tolling based on discovery, particularly in medical malpractice, where the discovery rule has been codified. MCL 600.5855 allows for tolling in cases of fraudulent concealment, indicating a legislative intent for a comprehensive and exclusive framework. The possibility of a general extrastatutory discovery rule would undermine MCL 600.5855 by enabling claims to be tolled without establishing fraudulent concealment, thereby circumventing the legislative intent. The court concludes that no extrastatutory discovery rule can apply to toll accrual, rejecting the precedent set in Chase v Sabin, as the statutory scheme is comprehensive and balances the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. Consequently, the lower courts erred in permitting the plaintiff to assert claims 16 years post-decedent's death, leading to the overrule of Johnson and related cases that conflict with the legislative framework, which does not create expectation or reliance interests. In Robinson, the court articulated criteria for reconsidering the overruling of previous decisions, emphasizing the need to assess potential 'practical real-world dislocations,' undue hardships on reliance interests, and whether changes in law or facts undermine the prior ruling. The court questioned the validity of the discovery rule as applied by courts, asserting that it does not impact a plaintiff's reliance interests because plaintiffs do not delay claims based on the expectation of extrastatutory tolling. Instead, discovery-based tolling serves as retroactive relief for plaintiffs who could not foresee their claims. The court pointed out that it is the defendants' reliance interests that are adversely affected when claims are filed long after the events in question, complicating their ability to manage records and evidence. Additionally, the dissenting opinions, particularly Justice Kelly's, were critiqued for overlooking the court's central reasoning regarding the applicability of the discovery rule. Justice Kelly argued that the common-law discovery rule is deeply embedded in Michigan's legal framework and that overturning it would harm the state's jurisprudence. The court countered that rather than abolishing the discovery rule, the Legislature has clarified its application, leading to greater consistency for all parties involved. The court also rejected Justice Kelly's assertion that the Legislature merely ratified previous decisions regarding the discovery rule, questioning her true motivations in advocating for or against certain precedents. Justice Weaver's perspective was similarly challenged, as she implied that the Legislature's focus on specific circumstances indicated the common-law rule's ongoing relevance. The dissenting justices interpret the Legislature's intent as limiting the discovery rule in specific contexts, rather than establishing strict limitations on its application. Justice Kelly argues that MCL 600.5838 and 600.5838a suggest that the discovery rule does not apply to professional negligence claims, implying it should apply in other cases. However, MCL 600.5838(1) states that professional malpractice claims accrue when the professional ceases to serve the plaintiff, irrespective of when the plaintiff discovers the claim. Conversely, MCL 600.5838(2) allows for discovery-based tolling, permitting claims to be filed within set timeframes after discovery of the claim. This indicates that the statutes both authorize and limit discovery-based tolling in malpractice cases. The dissenting view misinterprets the legislative intent, which clarifies that malpractice claims accrue regardless of discovery timing, aligning with MCL 600.5827's requirement that the limitations period starts when a claim accrues. Several statutes, including MCL 600.5838, 600.5838a, 600.5839, and 600.5855, provide exceptions that allow claims to be initiated post-discovery even if the limitations period has elapsed. MCL 600.5855 particularly supports unlimited tolling for claims that are fraudulently concealed, challenging the notion that the statutes merely limit the discovery rule. If an extrastatutory discovery rule were applied, it would undermine the purpose of MCL 600.5855, as it would allow tolling without requiring allegations of fraudulent concealment. Justice Weaver argues that the fraudulent concealment provision is inadequate for plaintiffs who lack necessary information to pursue claims after the statute of limitations has expired. She suggests that the common-law discovery rule is essential for innocent plaintiffs, as it allows claims to be preserved regardless of whether the information was intentionally concealed. This interpretation undermines the fraudulent concealment statute, which is effectively rendered unnecessary by the broader common-law rule. Weaver's stance overlooks the Legislature's intent to balance protections for innocent plaintiffs against the need to shield defendants from stale claims, with this balance varying based on the defendant's culpability. Justice Kelly's argument that the lower courts could apply a discovery rule, citing MCL 600.5869, is also contested. The statutes governing wrongful death actions and the related statutes regarding discovery rules have remained unchanged since 1986. Thus, the legal framework has not evolved to accommodate a retroactive application of the discovery rule as suggested by Kelly. The claim that the rule could have been invoked in 1986 is flawed, as it was unnecessary at the time. The discretionary nature of the common-law discovery rule means it cannot be universally applied as the governing law for past claims, creating a paradox where the ruling would not affect claims that accrued prior to the decision, allowing them to be brought indefinitely. Justice Kelly's emphasis on MCL 600.5869 distracts from her main argument, which seeks to limit the application of existing statutes, specifically PA 236 and PA 495, regarding discovery-based tolling. This approach contravenes the principle that judicial decisions generally apply retroactively unless "exigent circumstances" warrant a prospective-only application, as established in Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n. Even when a new legal principle is established, its application must consider the purpose of the rule, reliance on the old rule, and the impact of retroactivity on justice. In this instance, a prospective-only application is unsuitable for several reasons: it contradicts legislative limits on reviving old claims, the nature of the discovery rule does not support reliance, and the administration of justice is not significantly hindered since defendants are shielded from stale claims. Furthermore, the decision does not eliminate a plaintiff's right to sue before an injury occurs, as claims do not accrue until a wrong is committed under MCL 600.5827. Regarding due process, the plaintiff contends that interpreting MCL 600.5827 in this manner denies her the right to seek damages because she may be unaware of the perpetrator's identity. While she acknowledges that the three-year statute of limitations is generally reasonable, she argues it becomes unreasonable if a plaintiff cannot identify the wrongdoer through no fault of their own. This argument is supported by historical legal principles asserting that limitations must provide a reasonable timeframe for seeking legal remedies, as noted in Price v Hopkin. Such a statute that fails to do so may violate due process under both the U.S. Constitution and Michigan's Constitution. Justices Kelly and Weaver argue that the holding in Price is relevant to their claim of due process violation; however, they misinterpret its application. Price focused on a legislative change that shortened the limitations period for ejectment suits, effectively extinguishing the right to sue for certain plaintiffs who had relied on the previous period. The Price Court found this unconstitutional since it removed an existing right without allowing time to file a suit after the statute took effect. In contrast, the current case involves a consistent limitations period since the plaintiff's causes of action arose, meaning no due process violation occurs simply because a remedy is no longer available once the limitations period expires. The Price decision established that while the legislature can enact statutes of limitation, any challenge must assess whether the law serves a legitimate legislative purpose without infringing on fundamental rights. The interpretation suggested by Justice Weaver, which implies that due process rights are violated if a limitations period expires before a plaintiff is aware of their claim, is rejected. The court emphasizes that the legislature has the authority to set reasonable limitations periods, which serve the legitimate purpose of relieving defendants from enduring claims after a specified time. The discovery rule allows plaintiffs to seek equitable relief despite being barred by the statute of limitations due to late injury discovery. However, it poses risks to defendants by potentially reviving old claims that may undermine their security and fairness. While the harshness of barring a plaintiff’s action who discovers their injury late is acknowledged, it is equally unfair to compel defendants to respond to stale claims. Justice Kelly, in dissent, emphasizes that limitations statutes aim to penalize plaintiffs who do not diligently pursue their claims, while Justice Weaver acknowledges the dual purpose of protecting defendants from stale claims. The legislature has balanced these interests by providing a three-year limitations period with extensions for personal representatives and tolling provisions for fraudulent concealment. This careful legislative consideration ensures reasonable time for plaintiffs to bring suits without violating due process rights. Regarding equitable tolling, the court declines the plaintiff's request for a unique application of equity to make her claims timely, referencing Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Centre, which differentiated between negligence and medical malpractice claims. In Bryant, some claims were allowed to proceed due to confusion about the claim's legal nature, indicating that the plaintiff's delay was not due to negligence. In the case referenced, the court differentiates its application of equity as seen in Bryant from the current situation, emphasizing that equity is only appropriate when confusion arises from court-created circumstances. In Bryant, equity was invoked due to complex existing case law that hindered the plaintiff, whereas in the present case, the plaintiff has not relied on any confusing precedent. The discovery rule, which allows for claims to be brought after the standard statute of limitations due to delayed knowledge of the claim, is deemed inapplicable here because the plaintiff did not wait to file based on reliance on the rule but rather due to external factors that obscured claim discovery. The court highlights that a controlling statute, MCL 600.5827, governs the limitations period for claims related to the incident at issue, which occurred in 1986. This statute dictates when claims accrue, and the legislative intent is clear: defendants should not face litigation years later based solely on the plaintiff's delayed discovery of facts. The court asserts that allowing courts to override clear statutes in favor of equity could undermine the separation of powers and lead to unpredictability in the legal system. Consequently, the court concludes that MCL 600.5827 prevents the application of a common-law discovery rule to toll the claims' accrual date, affirming that the claims accrued at the time of Eby's death. The judgment of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court’s denial of the defendants’ motions for summary disposition are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Dissenting from the majority, the author argues that MCL 600.5827 does not solely dictate the accrual of the plaintiff's claims. Instead, they support the Court of Appeals' application of the common-law “discovery rule,” which allows for tolling the statute of limitations if a plaintiff could not reasonably discover the cause of action's elements within the limitation period. The author agrees with Justice Kelly that the discovery rule is deeply entrenched in legal expectations, and altering it could lead to significant practical disruptions. The factual background details Dr. Margaret Eby's leasing of a gatehouse near the Ruth R. Mott estate in Flint, Michigan, beginning in 1981. Dr. Eby reported multiple break-ins, including a burglary in January 1985, prompting the Mott Family Office (MFO) to install deadbolt locks but not an alarm system as requested. On November 7, 1986, Dr. Eby was found murdered in the gatehouse, having been attacked with signs indicating no forced entry. The investigation initially focused on acquaintances, yielding no leads. In 1991, an unrelated murder of Nancy Ludwig, sharing similarities with Dr. Eby’s case, led to a reopening of the investigation. Subsequent DNA and fingerprint analysis linked both murders to Jeffrey Gorton, who had previously worked on the Mott Estate's sprinkler system. Jeffrey Gorton, who was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder and first-degree criminal sexual conduct, was granted unsupervised access to the gatehouse basement of the Mott Estate by MFO employees Victor Nyberg and Todd Bakos in 1986. This access facilitated his subsequent attack on Dr. Eby on November 7, 2002. Dayle Trentadue, Dr. Eby’s daughter and personal representative of the estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against multiple defendants, including Buckler and the Gorton family, alleging negligent hiring and supervision. The complaint highlighted that Gorton’s parents were aware of his violent criminal history prior to the murder yet employed him at their family business. Additionally, it was claimed that defendants Ruth Mott and MFO neglected to enhance security at the gatehouse, despite Dr. Eby’s requests. The circuit court granted summary disposition to Mott and MFO on one count, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision regarding MFO, citing that the discovery rule tolled the limitations period, as the plaintiff could not assert claims until Gorton’s culpability was revealed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals' application of a common-law discovery rule to determine the accrual of a plaintiff's claims is under scrutiny regarding its consistency with MCL 600.5827. MCL 600.5805(10) establishes a three-year limitation period for wrongful death actions post-death or injury. MCL 600.5827 indicates that limitations run from the time a claim accrues, which occurs when the wrongful act is committed, irrespective of when damage is evident. This legal framework aims to encourage prompt claims, penalize inaction, ensure timely examination of claims, and protect defendants from stale demands. The Court highlights that if a plaintiff fails to pursue a claim diligently or attempts fraud, the statute of limitations would apply to bar the suit. However, the discovery rule is invoked in cases like the plaintiff's, where access to evidence necessary to establish a claim is delayed beyond the limitations period. The law in Michigan as of 1986 recognized that a cause of action arises only when all essential elements can be pleaded: the existence of a duty, breach of that duty, and a proximate cause linking the breach to the injury. The plaintiff must demonstrate that damages were suffered to pursue a wrongful death claim. At the time of Dr. Eby’s murder, the plaintiff lacked sufficient information to assert that the death resulted from the negligence of Ruth Mott, MFO, and Buckler Automatic Sprinkler Co and its employees. The plaintiff was not aware of the killer's identity or any connection to the defendants until after the murder investigation was reopened. Initially, the police focused on known acquaintances of Dr. Eby, neglecting to investigate the relationship between Buckler and the killer, Jeffrey Gorton, which contributed to the unsolved case until after the statute of limitations expired. Consequently, the plaintiff could not adequately plead a wrongful death claim until the connection was established. Defendants argued that a general negligence claim could have been made within the statutory period, but the evidence suggested Dr. Eby may have allowed the killer into her home, making a negligence claim likely legally deficient. In Michigan, the limitation period for ordinary negligence claims is three years, and it begins when the plaintiff is harmed by the defendant's negligent act, not when the negligent act occurred. A plaintiff's legal claim may be barred before the injury occurs or if the plaintiff is unaware of the injury, leading to potential injustices if the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of injury. To address this, the common law has established equitable rules, notably the discovery rule, which allows the statute of limitations to start only when the plaintiff is aware of their injury and its cause. This principle of fundamental fairness was illustrated in the case of Chase v. Sabin, where the plaintiff discovered a surgical error years later while pursuing a different claim. The court recognized that the strict application of statutes of limitation could unjustly extinguish valid claims. While the discovery rule aids plaintiffs, it also raises equitable concerns for defendants, who may face claims arising from distant events. The rule can undermine the security intended by statutes of limitation, as it may force defendants to address stale claims. In balancing these interests, the court noted the importance of determining when to apply the discovery rule, particularly in negligence claims related to medical malpractice. The case addresses allegations of ordinary negligence, distinguishing it from previous rulings that applied the discovery rule in medical malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, and products liability actions. In Moll v. Abbott Laboratories, the discovery rule was extended to pharmaceutical product liability cases, where evidence is less likely to degrade over time. In contrast, automobile tort cases often rely on witness testimony that can fade, making the discovery rule inapplicable for ordinary negligence claims based solely on a misjudgment of injury severity. The court emphasized that a cause of action for tortious injury accrues when all elements can be properly alleged, as highlighted in the Stephens case. There, the plaintiff was aware of her injury and its cause before the limitations period expired, leading to the conclusion that the discovery rule did not apply. Conversely, in the current case involving plaintiff Trentadue, the wrongful death claim could not be pursued until she identified the killer and understood how access to Dr. Eby’s residence was gained, which occurred 16 years post-death, beyond the limitations period. The court references MCL 600.5827, which states that the limitations period begins when the claim accrues, typically when the wrongful act occurs, regardless of when damage manifests. Defendants argued that the claim was barred since the alleged negligence occurred before the limitations period, whereas the plaintiff contended that this interpretation would prevent her from ever bringing an action, effectively abolishing her claim before it could arise. Defendants argue that the statute of limitations serves as a statute of repose, intended to protect them from outdated claims, particularly in an industrial context. They assert that the Legislature aimed to safeguard industrial and commercial interests by limiting liability for defective products and workmanship. However, this interpretation is rejected. The Revised Judicature Act, which was created by a reputable committee for procedural improvements, does not support the defendants' claims of legislative intent regarding industrial policy. The statute maintains that the term "damage" retains significance, even when "wrong" is interpreted as actionable wrong. In personal injury cases, plaintiffs must allege and prove all elements of damages, including future losses, in a single cause of action. A claim accrues when all elements, including damage, are present, and subsequent damages do not reset the statute of limitations. In wrongful death actions, the claim accrues when the plaintiff becomes aware of the necessary information to establish the elements of the claim. In this instance, the plaintiff could not have known the relevant details until 16 years after the decedent's death, meaning the claim did not accrue until that point. The majority ruling effectively overrides prior precedents, limiting potential claims by those unaware of their injuries within the statutory period. The majority justifies this change by asserting that the Legislature's enactment of MCL 600.5801 et seq. created a comprehensive scheme that replaces common law, but the cited authority does not convincingly support this claim. The case referenced, Hoerstman, involved the Uniform Commercial Code and established that the Legislature intended to eliminate common-law defenses related to negotiable instruments, demonstrating that the statutory language is comprehensive and exclusive in its application. The statute in question is intended to abrogate common law on the relevant subject, but lacks the comprehensive enactment language seen in the negotiable instruments statute (MCL 440.3102). This statute clearly defines its scope, excluding money, payment orders, and securities, while Chapter 58 of the Revised Judicature Act does not provide a similar definition or express intent to abrogate common law. The majority opinion claims that previous cases (Hoerstman and Millross) do not necessitate specific language for abrogation. However, it is argued that comprehensive legislation is necessary to convey intent to abrogate common law effectively. The Hoerstman Court referenced Millross, which indicated that the Legislature intended the dramshop act to be a complete solution to a problem inadequately addressed by common law and that it was the exclusive remedy for related actions. Conversely, Chapter 58 lacks provisions establishing exclusivity or any indication of intent to replace the common-law discovery rule. The majority argues that MCL 600.5855 (pertaining to fraudulent concealment of claims) renders the common-law discovery rule meaningless; however, the author contends that this interpretation is flawed, as plaintiffs still need to establish the existence of a claim to benefit from this statute. Evidence of fraudulent concealment is necessary for a plaintiff to utilize the fraudulent concealment provision under Michigan law; in this case, no such evidence exists against the named defendants, preventing the plaintiff from leveraging this provision. Consequently, without proof of fraudulent concealment, other plaintiffs also cannot pursue claims if they were unaware of the necessary information to establish their claims after the limitations period expired. The definition of fraudulent concealment involves deliberate acts intended to obstruct inquiry and mislead potential claimants, distinguishing it from mere silence. Furthermore, the discussion emphasizes that a narrowly drawn statute does not inherently alter established common law unless explicitly stated by the Legislature. The common-law discovery rule, which assists plaintiffs unaware of their claims due to fraudulent concealment, remains relevant and can coexist with the statutory provisions, as shown in specific malpractice claim statutes. The malpractice claim accrual rule specifies that claims arise when the professional relationship ends, regardless of the plaintiff's awareness of a potential claim. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving they did not discover the claim at least six months before the expiration of the statutory period; failure to file within this timeframe results in claim barring. The wrongful death limitation provisions do not restrict the application of the common-law discovery rule, unlike the malpractice limitation provisions, which specify its application. The Legislature acknowledges the existence of the common-law discovery rule and selectively limits its application in certain cases, as seen in MCL 600.5805, which allows actions to recover damages for personal injury or death within three years of the incident. Importantly, if the majority interpretation of MCL 600.5827 denies a plaintiff their right to bring a claim, it would infringe upon due process rights. While the Legislature has the authority to establish statutes of limitations, such laws must afford a reasonable timeframe for legal action; otherwise, they could be deemed unconstitutional. Historical precedent, as in Price v. Hopkin, emphasizes that statutes of limitation must provide an adequate opportunity to pursue claims. The court has consistently recognized the discovery rule's applicability to ensure plaintiffs are not unjustly deprived of their legal remedies, allowing accrual to be based on the date of injury rather than the date of the negligent act, as established in Connelly v. Paul Ruddy's Equipment Repair Service Co. The court reinforced this principle in recent rulings, affirming that the discovery rule applies in pharmaceutical products liability cases. The excerpt addresses the implications of the statute of limitations on claims related to injuries that plaintiffs may not be aware of at the time of the defendant's breach. It argues that if the three-year limitation period commenced upon the breach, many claims could be barred before the plaintiff is aware of the injury or its cause, which would be an unreasonable outcome. The text references several cases where the discovery rule was applied, including those involving products liability, breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and medical malpractice, emphasizing that this rule allows plaintiffs to bring claims even if the standard limitation period has expired due to lack of awareness of the injury. The majority's conclusion that MCL 600.5827 governs the accrual of claims without the possibility of invoking the discovery rule is contested. The dissent argues this interpretation unjustly deprives plaintiffs of their right to pursue legal action, particularly in cases where they could not reasonably discover the elements of their cause of action in time. The dissent further notes that a limitation period that effectively denies access to the courts is deemed unreasonable. Citing various precedents, the dissent advocates for the application of the common-law discovery rule, asserting that it is essential to ensure plaintiffs can seek justice in wrongful death cases when they are unaware of the cause of action within the limitations period. In a wrongful death action, Dayle Trentadue, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Margarette F. Eby, challenges the applicability of the common-law discovery rule in relation to the statutory period of limitations under MCL 600.5827. The majority opinion concludes that MCL 600.5827 governs the accrual of the plaintiff's claims, a stance with which Justice Kelly strongly disagrees. Kelly argues that MCL 600.5827 is not applicable, that the majority's decision undermines Michigan's established common-law discovery rule, and that, regardless of the majority's position, the plaintiff should be permitted to invoke the discovery rule's benefits in this case. The factual background involves the murder of Margarette Eby, who rented the gatehouse on the Mott Estate from 1981 until her death on November 9, 1986. During her tenancy, she experienced several break-ins and communicated her concerns to her landlord, Ruth Mott, who managed the property through MFO Management Company. Mott's responses to Eby's complaints suggested negligence on Eby's part for not securing her property adequately. On November 7, 1986, after a dinner party, Eby was seen locking her side door, but two days later, she was found murdered in a brutal crime scene. The investigation yielded little evidence, leading police to incorrectly theorize that Eby had willingly let her assailant into her home, failing to consider the possibility of a stranger being responsible. Jeffrey Gorton, an employee of Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Company, was given access to the common area under Mrs. Eby’s home by the MFO while performing sprinkler winterization two days prior to her rape and murder. It is believed he unlocked an entry point during this visit, allowing him to reenter the home on the night of the crime. Gorton was identified as a suspect 16 years later when similarities between Mrs. Eby’s murder and that of Nancy Ludwig were recognized. DNA testing confirmed he was responsible for both murders, and advanced fingerprint analysis linked him to evidence found at the scene. Gorton was arrested on February 8, 2002, and pleaded no contest to murdering Mrs. Eby, subsequently receiving a life sentence. On August 2, 2002, Mrs. Eby’s estate filed a wrongful death complaint against several parties, including Gorton, the MFO, and Buckler, alleging negligence and failure to provide adequate security, among other claims. The defendants, except Gorton, argued that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. On October 28, 2003, the trial court denied most motions for summary disposition, ruling that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of causation until 2002. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial of motions regarding the MFO and Mrs. Mott's estate for failure to provide adequate security but reversed the ruling concerning other claims. The panel determined that the common-law discovery rule suspended the statute of limitations for all claims, concluding that the plaintiff could not have known about a possible cause of action until Jeffrey Gorton was identified as the killer. The Court granted the defendants’ appeal, instructing the parties to examine whether the application of the common-law discovery rule is inconsistent with MCL 600.5827, Michigan's accrual statute, and whether prior rulings recognizing this rule should be overturned. In reviewing the statute of limitations, the Court noted that, in cases with no disputed facts, the determination of whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations is a legal question subject to de novo review. MCL 600.5827 states that the limitations period begins when a claim accrues, with specific provisions outlined in sections 5829 to 5838. The Court found that MCL 600.5827 does not apply to the plaintiff’s claims, arguing that the majority's decision incorrectly applies 5827 to this case, and that the common-law discovery rule should remain valid. All tort actions are governed by a statute of limitations, primarily MCL 600.5805, which specifies a three-year limit for personal injury actions under subsection 10, detailing both the filing period and the accrual time as the time of death or injury. Unlike other subsections, subsection 10 includes its own accrual provision, meaning that when it is applicable, MCL 600.5827 is not relevant. Therefore, the Court concluded that it need not address the applicability of the discovery rule in relation to 5827, asserting that addressing this question was an overreach. The court should not overrule its prior decisions recognizing the common-law discovery rule, as MCL 600.5827 is not applicable to the plaintiff's claims. Even if it were, the majority's decision to disregard the common-law discovery rule undermines established legal precedent. The majority acknowledges that MCL 600.5805(10) provides the specific statute of limitations and its commencement but continues to apply MCL 600.5827 erroneously. This judicial activism is criticized as unnecessary, as the case should be resolved strictly under MCL 600.5805(10). The dissent emphasizes that the court should wait for a case where MCL 600.5827 is applicable before deciding on the interaction between the discovery rule and the statutory limitations. Furthermore, the dissent points out the majority's inconsistency in its approach to precedent and notes that the factors from Robinson v Detroit favor maintaining the longstanding rule. The dissent argues that the majority's decision erases over a century of legal foundation and calls into question their commitment to the principle of stare decisis. The opinion evaluated the Robinson factors to determine the appropriateness of overruling the precedent established in Kassab v Michigan Basic Prop Ins Ass’n, which allowed for discriminatory behavior under the Civil Rights Act. The Court unanimously agreed that maintaining an erroneous interpretation of the Act, meant to protect against discrimination, was inappropriate, regardless of reliance by some individuals on that decision. The majority was advised to consider recent opinions, including Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc., Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, and Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters of America, rather than Smith and Haynes. The Robinson factors assess whether a prior decision was wrongly decided and the implications of overruling it, including practical workability, reliance interests, and changes in law or fact. Although the dissenting opinion in Liss expressed disagreement with the Smith decision, it did not advocate for its overruling due to a lack of compelling interests. Similarly, in the dissenting opinions in Rohde and Nestlé, the author acknowledged the binding nature of earlier decisions despite disagreement. The primary inquiry focuses on whether prior decisions regarding the common-law discovery rule were wrongly decided. The majority contends that MCL 600.5827 indicates legislative intent against applying the common-law discovery rule. However, the dissent argues that legislative actions have recognized and ratified the rule, demonstrating legislative support for it. The common-law discovery rule has long been part of Michigan's limitations law, applied in various contexts, including medical malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, products liability, and pharmaceutical liability. Following the recognition of this rule by the court, the Michigan Legislature enacted MCL 600.5838 and MCL 600.5838a, which specifically limit the rule's application in professional negligence cases by stating that the limitations period applies regardless of when a plaintiff discovers the claim. This legislative action indicates the Legislature's acknowledgment of the discovery rule's applicability in other contexts while explicitly excluding it in professional negligence cases. The statutes reflect legislative acceptance of the discovery rule, implying its relevance in cases not covered by these provisions. The majority's interpretation, which suggests that the statutes do not imply broader applicability of the discovery rule, contradicts the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, suggesting that the inclusion of limitations for professional negligence implies the rule's application in other areas. The Legislature’s language in MCL 600.5838 and MCL 600.5838a indicates intent to remove professional negligence claims from the discovery rule's scope, but the majority's conclusion undermines this intent, rendering the statutory language redundant. Overall, the Legislature's actions imply a strong endorsement of the common-law discovery rule, which should remain intact. Stare decisis is emphasized as a critical legal principle, promoting consistency and reliability in judicial decisions. Overruling precedent requires careful consideration of reliance interests and the potential hardships it may create. The excerpt asserts that the common-law discovery rule has become deeply embedded in Michigan's legal framework, and its removal could significantly disrupt established jurisprudence. The legislature's enactment of MCL 600.5838, which introduces a statutory discovery period, does not undermine the argument for the common-law discovery rule; instead, it reflects a legislative intention to maintain access to courts for plaintiffs. Historical references to cases dating back to the 19th century underscore the importance of allowing reasonable time for legal remedies, highlighting that the discovery rule prevents unjust limitations on plaintiffs' rights. The elimination of the common-law discovery rule would adversely affect plaintiffs by potentially barring claims before they are even aware of them, thus constituting a severe disruption to practical legal processes. The abolition of the common-law discovery rule could lead to a loss of public confidence in the legal system, as individuals may be denied compensation for injuries due to delays in identifying their causes. Key considerations for overruling prior court decisions include the practicality and workability of the existing rule, as well as whether changes in law or fact warrant such a shift. The discovery rule maintains strong support, with 35 states and the District of Columbia adopting it, indicating its effectiveness. There has been no demonstration that the rule is unworkable; in fact, the legislature's choice to eliminate it only for professional negligence cases implies an endorsement of its continued application in other areas. The majority's decision to abolish the rule risks creating impractical outcomes and potential constitutional issues. In Wyoming's Olson v A H Robins Co, Inc and the District of Columbia's Burke v Washington Hosp Ctr cases, the legal principle that statutes of limitations should not commence before a cause of action exists is emphasized to prevent unjust outcomes. The discovery rule is vital, as it allows plaintiffs to pursue claims even if they are unaware of their injuries until after the limitation period has expired. This concern is illustrated by the precedent set in Henry v Dow Chemical Co, where the court determined a tort claim requires a present injury, highlighting the risk that some injuries may remain undiscovered until it is too late to file. The text argues that it is unreasonable for a legal system to deny a cause of action before it can be initiated, comparing it to absurd hypothetical scenarios. The author critiques the abolition of the discovery rule, arguing it raises constitutional issues regarding legislative authority over limitations statutes, which should allow reasonable time for plaintiffs to act. Previous rulings, such as in Dyke v Richard, reinforce the notion that a limitations period must provide adequate time for discovery of a cause of action, ensuring plaintiffs are not penalized for delays beyond their control. A statute that extinguishes the right to bring suit cannot serve as a law of limitation, particularly for individuals who are unaware of their cause of action within the designated two-year period. Such a statute may only be enforceable if it explicitly abolishes a common law cause of action, which this statute does not. It should be viewed as a statute of limitation applicable to all cases except where the plaintiff lacks knowledge of the cause of action. Additionally, limitations provisions that do not provide a reasonable timeframe to file suit are constitutionally impermissible as they obstruct access to the courts. The court has reaffirmed the necessity of the common-law discovery rule to grant plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to recognize their causes of action. Abolishing this rule raises constitutional issues and undermines established legal precedents. MCL 600.5869 mandates the application of the common-law discovery rule to claims. Despite the majority's opinion that MCL 600.5827 renders the discovery rule inapplicable, the dissent argues that the Court of Appeals' decision should not be reversed. The dissent emphasizes that the common-law discovery rule was recognized in 1986 when the relevant events occurred, thus allowing the plaintiff to benefit from it. The rule stipulates that a claim accrues when a plaintiff can allege all elements of the claim based on objective facts. In personal injury claims, this includes establishing that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty, and that the breach was the cause of the injury. Section 5869 of Michigan law dictates that all actions and rights are governed by the law in effect at the time the right accrued, which includes common law. The court recognized a common-law discovery rule in 1986, necessitating its application to the plaintiff's case. The majority's debate over the retroactive versus prospective application of decisions is deemed irrelevant. The claim arose in 1986 when the discovery rule was acknowledged, so it should apply. The plaintiff could not identify the tortfeasor, Jeffrey Gorton, until after his arrest, which delayed the start of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed suit within three years of this identification, making the claims timely. The dissent argues that the majority's decision undermines legal claims before they can be discovered, mistakenly overruling established precedent on the discovery rule. The dissent emphasizes that MCL 600.5827 is not applicable, and the Legislature supports the continuation of the discovery rule in all cases except professional negligence. The conclusion advocates for affirming the Court of Appeals' judgment and maintaining the discovery rule for this plaintiff.