The appeal concerns the juvenile court's decision to grant the State's petition for discretionary transfer of D.D.C. to criminal court for prosecution of an alleged murder committed when D.D.C. was fifteen. D.D.C. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by asserting insufficient evidence supported two findings: (1) probable cause existed for the murder charge and (2) the community's welfare necessitated the transfer due to the offense's seriousness and D.D.C.'s background.
The State's amended petition, filed on March 17, 2022, outlined the allegations against D.D.C. and asserted the need for a transfer based on the gravity of the crime. A hearing on May 19, 2022, involved testimonies, including that of psychologist Dr. Richard Theis, who evaluated D.D.C. He noted the invalidity of D.D.C.'s psychological test results due to procedural inconsistencies and highlighted D.D.C.'s low intellectual capacity and educational struggles, suggesting potential for rehabilitation with appropriate interventions.
Further testimony from former detective Shane Wesley Collins detailed the circumstances of the shooting on February 19, 2022, where victim Tinasha Upton was found fatally wounded. Collins linked the incident to a prior altercation involving Upton's son and another juvenile, providing context for the events leading to the shooting. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's decision to transfer D.D.C. for criminal proceedings.
J.T.B. was reported to have a gun and attempted to lure D.W. and his brother into a secluded area, but they left instead. During interviews at a juvenile detention center, J.T.B. admitted involvement in a shooting with D.D.C., stating they followed Upton's vehicle after an altercation at a carnival. When Upton made a U-turn, J.T.B. and D.D.C. fired shots from their vehicle. Jacqueline Perez, D.D.C.’s girlfriend, drove the vehicle and later confirmed that they had followed Upton and fired shots after he turned around. She did not identify the shooter but stated she dropped off J.T.B. and others afterward and returned to her apartment with D.D.C. Another juvenile, M.R., identified D.D.C. as involved. Collins, based on the statements from J.T.B., Perez, and M.R., concluded there was probable cause for D.D.C.’s involvement in Upton's shooting and death.
During cross-examination, Collins admitted that J.T.B., M.R., and Perez had lied and altered their statements. Dr. Redus conducted a psychological evaluation of D.D.C., finding a below-average IQ score but average word recognition abilities. D.D.C. was assessed with the Risk-Sophistication-Treatment Inventory (RSTI), indicating he had a high risk of dangerousness compared to peers. Despite this, his emotional maturity was average, with mid-range scores in impulse control and decision-making evaluation. D.D.C. expressed a desire for help to manage his anger and improve his family's future, showing sincerity in wanting assistance. Dr. Redus clarified that her conclusions were based more on interviews and interactions than solely on the MMPI-A results, which indicated D.D.C. struggled with anger, impulse control, and some depression.
Dr. Redus evaluated D.D.C., an adolescent exhibiting a façade of competence and street smarts while likely experiencing depression, feelings of inadequacy, and unresolved trauma. She determined that D.D.C.'s decision-making and impulse control were typical of juvenile offenders, characterizing him as immature compared to adults. Her assessment indicated that D.D.C. is a high-risk offender due to impulse control issues and a history of fighting. Although he does not have an intellectual disability, he lags behind peers in development. D.D.C. demonstrated an understanding of right and wrong and the consequences of his actions.
Dr. Redus concluded that D.D.C. would benefit from a structured, long-term treatment program with daily therapy and constant supervision, emphasizing the importance of age-appropriate and cognitively suitable rehabilitation. She diagnosed him with disruptive impulse control conduct disorder, unspecified depressive disorder, and unspecified trauma and stressor-related disorder, noting that these could impair his thoughts and emotional processes. She asserted that children should not be treated psychologically as adults due to their developmental differences.
Juvenile probation officer Senea Williams provided background on D.D.C., noting his age (16 years) and four prior referrals for offenses, including evading arrest and assault. While on probation for assault, D.D.C. violated multiple conditions, including failing to complete community service and associating with gang-affiliated individuals. Williams highlighted D.D.C.'s social media activity, which indicated gang involvement with the Closed Mouth Playas (CMP) and connections to the Blood Stone Villains (BSV). She reported over fifty incident reports involving D.D.C. during his custody, including both minor and major infractions, such as altercations with peers. Williams believed that D.D.C. comprehends the seriousness of his alleged offenses and the transfer hearing process.
Williams determined that Victoria County lacked the necessary resources to rehabilitate D.D.C., a juvenile convicted of murder, noting the intensity and structure required for his rehabilitation. He further assessed that the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) would also be unable to provide adequate services for D.D.C. and concluded that the juvenile system would not likely rehabilitate him or protect the public. Based on D.D.C.’s criminal history, prior detentions during probation, aggressive behavior, and the severity of the murder charge, Williams recommended transferring D.D.C. to criminal court.
Following a May 19, 2022 hearing, the juvenile court approved the State’s amended petition for discretionary transfer, waiving its jurisdiction. The court confirmed the offense was a first-degree felony, noted no adjudication hearing had taken place, and recognized D.D.C. was 15 years old at the time of the alleged offense. The court conducted a thorough investigation as required by the Texas Juvenile Justice Code, considering factors such as the nature of the offense, D.D.C.’s maturity, his record, and public safety.
The court ultimately found that the community's welfare necessitated criminal proceedings due to the seriousness of the offense and D.D.C.'s background. It established probable cause that D.D.C. committed murder, detailing that he knowingly caused the death of Tinasha Lashaun Upton by shooting her in the head and engaged in behavior that endangered human life. The court noted these actions occurred during the commission of a felony, leading to the decision to transfer the case to adult criminal court.
The Court is waiving its exclusive original jurisdiction due to the nature of the offense being against a person, the Child's understanding of right and wrong, and the unlikelihood of effective public protection or rehabilitation through juvenile court resources. Consequently, D.D.C. is to be immediately committed to the custody of the Sheriff of Victoria County, Texas, for adult prosecution. The case is subject to an accelerated appeal process as outlined in Texas Family Code sections 56.01(c)(1)(A) and 56.01(h), allowing for precedence over other cases when custody is taken from a guardian and jurisdiction is waived.
The discussion outlines the standard of review for such jurisdiction waivers, which involves a two-step analysis: first assessing the juvenile court's findings for evidentiary sufficiency, viewing evidence favorably toward those findings and disregarding contrary evidence unless unreasonable to reject. If sufficient evidence supports the findings, the ultimate waiver decision is then reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, where a court abuses discretion if it acts without reference to guiding principles or applies the law incorrectly. The juvenile court serves as the sole factfinder in these hearings, adjudicating the credibility of witnesses.
Delinquent conduct, defined as actions that would be criminal if committed by an adult, falls under the jurisdiction of juvenile courts in Texas for minors aged ten to seventeen, per the Juvenile Justice Code. Juvenile courts may waive their jurisdiction and transfer cases to district courts for adult prosecution under specified conditions.
The transfer of a juvenile offender from juvenile court to criminal court is considered an exception, emphasizing the need for protection and rehabilitation of children and adolescents rather than subjecting them to the adult criminal system. The State bears the burden of proving that such a transfer is appropriate. The requirements for transfer differ based on whether the minor is under or over eighteen at the time of the transfer hearing. For juveniles under eighteen, as per Section 54.02(a), transfer is possible if the child is alleged to have committed a felony, was at least fourteen at the time of the offense, and the juvenile court finds probable cause for the alleged offense after a thorough investigation and hearing.
Factors the juvenile court must consider include the nature of the offense (with greater emphasis on offenses against persons), the child's maturity, their prior history, and the potential for public safety and rehabilitation. These factors are not exhaustive, and any combination of them can support a transfer; not every factor needs to favor transfer. The juvenile court is not obligated to find that all criteria are met before ordering a transfer and must only consider the relevant factors. While the court must provide reasons for waiving jurisdiction, detailed findings on each factor are not required.
D.D.C. claims that the juvenile court improperly waived its jurisdiction, transferring his case to district court for criminal prosecution. He acknowledges the court's findings of the alleged first-degree felony violation and his age at the time of the offense but contests the sufficiency of evidence supporting the court's determinations regarding probable cause for murder and the community's welfare necessitating criminal proceedings.
The juvenile court established probable cause based on Texas Penal Code provisions defining murder. The evidence presented included testimony from Collins, who recounted a shooting incident where Upton was found unconscious and later died from a gunshot wound. Witness statements indicated a confrontation involving Upton’s son and a group that included D.D.C., culminating in a shooting as Upton's vehicle turned towards them.
D.D.C. challenges the reliance on accomplice testimony, asserting it lacks corroboration. However, Texas law (Article 38.14) specifies that such corroboration is not necessary for probable cause assessments, a standard different from that required for convictions. The objective of a certification hearing is solely to determine if there is probable cause, not to establish guilt or innocence.
Appellant failed to provide legal authority indicating that a juvenile court cannot consider evidence from an accomplice during a transfer decision. Relevant case law supports that such evidence is admissible due to relaxed rules of evidence in transfer hearings. The juvenile court, as the sole factfinder, had the discretion to accept or reject witness testimony, including that of Collins regarding the murder investigation. The court found sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for D.D.C.'s alleged murder, countering claims of insufficient evidence.
In waiving jurisdiction, the juvenile court evaluated all four factors under Texas Family Code § 54.02(f) and noted: (1) the offense was against a person; (2) D.D.C. understands right from wrong and is aware of societal rules; and (3) the likelihood of adequate public protection and D.D.C.'s rehabilitation through juvenile services is low. Appellant contended the findings were insufficient, but the court determined that the nature of the offense, involving a fatal shooting, heavily favored transfer. Additionally, evidence of D.D.C.’s understanding of the seriousness of his charges supported the court’s finding of his sophistication and maturity, further justifying the waiver of jurisdiction.
In evaluating the maturity and sophistication of D.D.C. for potential transfer to adult court, several key findings emerged. Evidence from Dr. Redus indicated that although D.D.C. presents an outward appearance of being street smart, he struggles with internal issues such as depression, feelings of inadequacy, and traumatic experiences. His decision-making abilities and impulse control align more with typical juvenile offenders facing similar challenges, suggesting immaturity when compared to adults. Additionally, Dr. Theis's independent review corroborated these findings, noting D.D.C.'s limited intellectual capabilities and disadvantaged background, which affect his maturity relative to his age.
Despite these concerns, both experts acknowledged D.D.C.'s intellectual capacity to understand right from wrong, which favors transfer. Specific observations included D.D.C.’s average word recognition, satisfactory school performance (grades A's and B's), and the absence of an intellectual disability, though he remains behind peers his age in certain developmental areas. Dr. Redus's evaluation showed that D.D.C. possesses average decision-making skills for autonomy, scoring mid-range among juvenile offenders in impulse control and reasoning. Furthermore, testimony from Williams confirmed D.D.C.'s understanding of the seriousness of the alleged offense and the consequences, while evidence of attempts to evade responsibility highlighted his sophistication and culpability. Overall, while D.D.C. showed signs of immaturity, the evidence suggested he was capable of comprehending the legal proceedings and the implications of his actions.
The juvenile court's determination that D.D.C. was sufficiently sophisticated and mature to stand trial as an adult was supported by various factors. Notably, D.D.C.'s actions post-offense, including attempting to evade detection by dropping off other juveniles after a shooting, indicated a level of maturity beyond that typical for a fourteen-year-old. The court found substantial evidence demonstrating that D.D.C. understood right from wrong and was aware of the consequences of his actions, countering claims of immaturity.
While the juvenile court did not explicitly address D.D.C.’s record and prior history, the existence of multiple referrals to the juvenile department, including unadjudicated offenses for unauthorized use of a vehicle, evading arrest, and possession of marijuana, coupled with an adjudicated assault offense, weighed in favor of transfer. D.D.C. had previously violated probation conditions, which further informed the court's assessment. Although D.D.C. contended that his unadjudicated, nonviolent offenses were insufficient for certification, the court considered additional factors, like gang affiliation, as significant in evaluating his history. Overall, the findings were deemed legally and factually sufficient to support the decision to transfer D.D.C. to adult court.
A juvenile court appropriately considers evidence of gang affiliation and previous criminal history when evaluating a child's case for potential transfer. Testimony from Williams confirmed that D.D.C. was a member of the CMP gang, with social media activity indicating significant gang involvement. There was no evidence contradicting D.D.C.'s gang affiliation. The court also factored in D.D.C.’s rule infractions while in detention, noting over fifty incident reports, including both minor and serious infractions such as fights. This evidence supports the court's finding that public safety and rehabilitation considerations warranted the transfer of jurisdiction.
Regarding the likelihood of rehabilitation and public protection, the juvenile court determined that rehabilitation within the juvenile system was unlikely due to the seriousness of the crimes, particularly intoxication manslaughter. Testimony indicated that D.D.C. participated in a planned shooting that resulted in a murder, emphasizing the crime's severity. Further assessments by Dr. Redus indicated D.D.C. posed a significant risk to public safety due to his impulsive behavior and violent tendencies. D.D.C. also had a troubling criminal history, including three unadjudicated offenses and violations of probation conditions. Overall, the evidence strongly supports the juvenile court's decision to waive jurisdiction under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 54.02(f).
Evidence presented indicated D.D.C.'s potential for rehabilitation, with Dr. Redus testifying that D.D.C. demonstrated mid-range treatment amenability and expressed a willingness to seek help, believing it would be beneficial. Dr. Redus concluded that D.D.C. would benefit from a structured long-term treatment program featuring daily therapy and constant supervision, tailored to his age and intellectual capacity. Dr. Theis echoed this view, asserting that D.D.C. could be rehabilitated with significant psychological or psychiatric intervention and appropriate educational opportunities.
However, both experts warned that without intensive intervention, D.D.C. posed a risk to others due to potential ongoing behavioral issues. They recommended a secure residential treatment facility, individual and group counseling for coping skills, trauma-informed counseling, and monitoring for depressive symptoms that might necessitate psychiatric evaluation. Additionally, drug counseling and education were advised to help maintain sobriety and abstain from mood-altering substances. Continuation of education and career counseling to explore vocational options were also suggested.
Contrarily, testimony from Williams revealed a lack of resources in Victoria County to meet D.D.C.'s intensive treatment needs, indicating that the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) could not provide appropriate services or sufficient structure for his rehabilitation. Williams noted that the juvenile system's limited duration for placements and the nature of offenses typically managed by TJJD would not adequately address D.D.C.'s requirements. He recommended transferring D.D.C. to criminal court based on his aggression history, repeated detentions, and the severity of the murder charge, concluding that the juvenile system could not ensure public safety, as individuals could parole out before their nineteenth birthday. D.D.C. contends that Williams' testimony highlighted available resources for his rehabilitation.
During cross-examination, Williams was unaware of the Giddings State School, which D.D.C. claimed had rehabilitation programs for serious offenders. The juvenile court was not obligated to accept D.D.C.’s assertions about the facility or its resources. As the sole fact finder, the juvenile court had the authority to assess witness credibility and determine the weight of evidence. The absence of supporting testimony or evidence about the Giddings State School's resources meant the court's findings remained unchallenged. Although Williams acknowledged some general knowledge of TJJD facilities with special programs, this did not constitute evidence of their capability to rehabilitate D.D.C. The juvenile court concluded that adequate public protection and D.D.C.’s rehabilitation were unlikely through existing juvenile services, with sufficient evidence supporting this determination. The conflicting nature of some evidence did not constitute an abuse of discretion by the court, which acted consistently with legal standards. Consequently, the court's decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer D.D.C.’s case to the criminal district court was upheld, affirming the order issued by the juvenile court.
