State v. Roberts

Citation: 2022 Ohio 3772Docket: E-21-047

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; October 21, 2022; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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In State v. Roberts, 2022-Ohio-3772, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the Erie County Court of Common Pleas' October 26, 2021 decision granting Marisa Roberts (formerly known as Riffle) limited driving privileges after her conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide and assault stemming from a 2008 DUI-related accident. Roberts had been sentenced to three years in prison and faced a lifetime driver’s license suspension for the homicide, with concurrent ten-year suspensions for the assaults.

Roberts had previously attempted to obtain limited driving privileges in 2014, 2016, and 2017, all of which were denied. In her 2019 motion, she cited her employment and responsibilities as a single mother. The state opposed her request, claiming her lifetime suspension precluded any driving privileges. A hearing on the matter occurred in March 2020, focusing on whether limited privileges could be granted under a class-one lifetime suspension.

The trial court ultimately granted limited driving privileges specifically allowing Roberts to take her driver's license exam, drive to work, and transport her child, prompting the state to appeal. The appellate court reviewed the case de novo, emphasizing that while the trial court has discretion in granting limited privileges, the appeal centers on statutory interpretation under R.C. Chapter 4510 regarding license suspensions. The court concluded there was no legal error in the trial court’s decision.

The section mandates a class one suspension of an offender’s driver's license for aggravated vehicular homicide, alongside any other sanctions. The 2017 revision of R.C. 2903.06(B)(2)(d) specifies that certain divisions of R.C. 4510.54 apply to this suspension. The state's argument revolves around the interaction between R.C. 4510.021 and R.C. 4510.13, which detail conditions under which limited driving privileges may be granted during a suspension. R.C. 4510.021 allows for limited driving privileges unless expressly prohibited, which can include purposes such as occupational needs, medical appointments, and attending court-ordered treatment. However, R.C. 4510.13(C)(3) prohibits judges from suspending any part of a class one suspension imposed under specific sections, leading the state to contend that granting limited privileges would violate this prohibition. The appellee argues that driving privileges do not constitute a suspension modification. 

The debate references the Supreme Court of Ohio case, State v. Manocchio, which addressed the issue of limited driving privileges in relation to a lifetime license suspension. The court ruled that granting limited driving privileges does not modify a lifetime suspension, emphasizing that the General Assembly has created distinct procedures for limited driving privileges and suspension modifications.

The state references the Seventh Appellate District's decision in State v. Morris, which dismissed an appeal for limited driving privileges after a class-one lifetime license suspension due to an aggravated vehicular homicide conviction. The court differentiated this case from Manocchio, highlighting that the denial in Manocchio was based on a time restriction, unlike the current case. It concluded that R.C. 4510.13, which is cited in R.C. 4510.021, applies, and that the appellee's request for driving privileges essentially sought to "suspend the suspension," which is prohibited under R.C. 4510.13(C)(3).

The analysis rejects the Morris court's interpretation, asserting that "limited driving privileges" are defined in R.C. 4501.01(UU) as privileges granted during a suspension, subject to exceptions in R.C. 4510.13. Notably, R.C. 4510.13(C)(3) does not specifically prohibit limited driving privileges for those convicted under R.C. 2903.06. Instead, R.C. 4510.13(A)(1) applies to judges regarding license suspension and limited privileges, while other subsections explicitly restrict privileges for certain offenses, suggesting that R.C. 4510.13(C)(3) should not be interpreted as prohibitive.

The appellant argues that "portion of a suspension" in R.C. 4510.13(C)(3) implies limited driving privileges, but this view is dismissed. The conclusion is that had the legislature intended to prohibit limited driving privileges for specific class one suspensions, it would have used clear language as seen in other subsections. Furthermore, interpreting the statute according to its plain language aligns with established legal principles, as defined terms should be understood in their ordinary meaning.

The definition of "portion" indicates it refers to a limited part of a whole. In the context of R.C. 4510.13 and the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation in Manocchio, section (C)(3) does not aim to restrict the availability of driving privileges for class-one suspensions under R.C. 2903.06 but rather limits the court's authority to entirely suspend the suspension. The court granted appellee limited driving privileges for work and child-related activities during specified hours, which was deemed compliant with R.C. 4510.021. The appellant's challenge was found to be without merit.

There is a noted conflict with a decision from the Seventh Appellate District in State v. Morris. According to Section 3(B)(4), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, when such conflicts arise, the case must be certified to the Supreme Court of Ohio for a resolution. The Supreme Court has established three criteria for certification: the conflict must concern the same legal question, it must be based on a rule of law, and the certifying court must clearly state the conflicting rule of law. The current court certifies the conflict regarding whether limited driving privileges are permissible under a class-one lifetime suspension due to R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a).

The judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed, with the appellant ordered to cover appellate costs. A certified copy of this entry serves as the mandate. Judge Zmuda concurs with the decision but emphasizes that the statute's plain language suffices for the outcome without requiring interpretive analysis. The state has requested an interpretation of R.C. 4510.13(C)(3) regarding the prohibition of granting limited driving privileges during a suspension imposed under R.C. 2903.06.

The Ohio Supreme Court has articulated a clear process for statutory interpretation. When a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, it should be applied as written without further interpretation, as established in Wingate v. Hordge and reiterated in State v. Hairston. A statute is deemed ambiguous only if it allows for multiple reasonable interpretations, according to State v. Jordan. In this case, R.C. 4510.13(B) specifies that individuals whose licenses are suspended for certain violations may petition for limited driving privileges, while R.C. 4510.13(C)(3) explicitly prohibits the suspension of a class one suspension. The clear language of R.C. 4510.13(B) indicates that granting limited driving privileges does not lift the suspension; it remains in effect while privileges are granted. 

The court concluded that there is no reasonable interpretation of R.C. 4510.13(C)(3) that supports the state's argument that granting limited driving privileges equates to a suspension of the original suspension. The majority of the court agreed that the statute's plain language does not support the state's interpretation, rendering the statute unambiguous and negating the need for further interpretation. The decision also notes a conflict with a prior case, State v. Morris, which has been certified for resolution by the Ohio Supreme Court. The author of the opinion concurs with the majority’s decision solely on the application of the statute’s plain language.