Daniel Kordash v. United States

Citation: Not availableDocket: 21-12151

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; October 21, 2022; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal of Daniel Kordash's tort claims against federal officers, specifically Customs and Border Protection officers, concerning his airport detentions. Kordash initially filed Bivens claims, alleging unlawful detention, but the district court granted the officers qualified immunity, leading to dismissal. Subsequently, Kordash filed a new complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act, asserting claims such as false imprisonment, assault, and negligence. The district court dismissed this new complaint for failure to state a claim, prompting Kordash to appeal. 

The government argued for collateral estoppel, asserting that the prior determination in the Bivens action—that the officers acted lawfully—should preclude Kordash's tort claims, as lawful federal actions are immune from state-law tort liability under the Supremacy Clause. The court agreed, affirming the dismissal of Kordash's complaint. The background details included three significant detentions of Kordash by CBP officers between 2017 and 2018, highlighting issues of false currency reporting, excessive questioning, and alleged harassment, including an incident involving Kordash's friend being detained and questioned in a derogatory manner.

Nilsen and Kordash's relationship was reportedly "sabotaged" following Kordash's November 2018 detention. Kordash subsequently filed a Bivens claim against Customs and Border Protection officers, identified as "John Does 1–6," alleging violations of his rights under the Fourth, First, and Fifth Amendments. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, accepting the Customs and Border Protection report's details over Kordash’s allegations regarding the detention duration. The court found that the officers had qualified immunity, determining that their actions were within the scope of their authority and did not violate clearly established constitutional rights. Specifically, the court ruled that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the initial detention and that routine detentions did not require reasonable suspicion. Kordash did not demonstrate a constitutionally protected intimate relationship with Nilsen, nor did he establish a Fifth Amendment violation related to lawful airport screening.

Instead of appealing, Kordash filed a new action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging state-law torts including false imprisonment, false arrest, assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. The government moved to dismiss, referencing the prior Bivens dismissal and asserting it controlled the outcome. The district court dismissed the new complaint, ruling that Kordash failed to plead sufficient facts for his claims, including unlawful detention for false imprisonment, excessive force for battery, unreasonable behavior for assault, and overcoming the discretionary-function exception for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. The court did not address collateral estoppel.

The legal standard of review for dismissals based on failure to state a claim is de novo, as established in Feldman v. Am. Dawn, Inc. The Supremacy Clause asserts that federal law takes precedence over conflicting state law, applicable not only to direct conflicts between laws but also in cases involving federal officials performing their duties under state law. If state-law liability obstructs federal objectives, such liability cannot be imposed. This principle was upheld in Denson v. United States, where a Bivens claim related to an air traveler's detention was dismissed because the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers acted lawfully in furtherance of federal interests under the Fourth Amendment.

In Kordash’s case, the district court concluded that CBP officers acted lawfully to promote federal policy while detaining him, maintaining that they operated within their discretionary duties and complied with federal law. The court found reasonable suspicion for the initial detention and determined subsequent searches were routine and lawful. Kordash failed to prove violations of the First and Fifth Amendments. Consequently, the court's decisions met the Denson criteria for barring state tort claims under the Supremacy Clause. The government seeks to apply collateral estoppel to prevent re-litigation of these resolved issues.

Collateral estoppel is applicable when four conditions are satisfied: (1) the issue in question is identical to one previously litigated; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior case; (3) the prior determination was essential to the judgment; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. In Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, these conditions were met. In this case, the issue of whether the officers' actions furthered federal policy and complied with federal law was identical to an issue in a previous Bivens action, where the court assessed the officers' discretionary authority and adherence to federal law. These issues were properly litigated in the Bivens suit. The finding of qualified immunity for the officers, based on their compliance with federal law, was critical to the dismissal of Kordash’s claims in that action. Additionally, Kordash had a fair opportunity to present these issues in the earlier suit, having initiated the Bivens litigation himself. Consequently, Kordash is barred from relitigating these matters, leading to the affirmation of the dismissal of his complaint.