The case of C.K. v. Tahoe involved an appeal from a judgment by the Supreme Court of Albany County, which dismissed the petitioners' application to review the State Education Department's decision denying their children admission to Specialized High Schools (SHSs) based on the specialized high school admissions test (SHSAT). SHSs, including Stuyvesant High School, Brooklyn Technical High School, and the Bronx High School of Science, were established in the early 20th century and have utilized the SHSAT for admissions, allowing students to be admitted based on their scores in descending order until all available seats are filled.
The Hecht-Calandra Act of 1971 codified the admissions process, allowing for a "discovery program" aimed at increasing diversity by reserving seats for disadvantaged students. To qualify for this program, students needed to score below a specified cut-off on the SHSAT, be certified as disadvantaged, recommended by their school for potential, and maintain a satisfactory academic record. Admission through the discovery program required participation in a summer preparatory program. The definition of a "disadvantaged" student included various criteria, such as qualifying for free or reduced lunch, attending a Title I school, or being in foster care, among others. The case was heard by the Appellate Division, Third Department, with multiple justices and legal representatives involved.
Between 2002 and 2008, the Department of Education (DOE) designated five additional specialized high schools (SHSs) and implemented a unified admissions process using the Specialized High Schools Admissions Test (SHSAT). Students can apply to multiple SHSs by ranking their preferences, with admission determined by SHSAT scores. The lowest score admitted to the last available seat at each SHS establishes the cut-off score for that school.
The discovery program, designed for disadvantaged students, requires applicants to score below the lowest cut-off score and follows a similar admission process as the score-only seats. Students must also attend and pass a summer program to secure their admission.
In summer 2018, Chancellor Richard Carranza modified the discovery program to enhance diversity within SHSs. Changes included expanding the number of discovery program seats—13% reserved for the 2019-2020 academic year and 20% for 2020-2021—and redefining the criteria for "disadvantaged" students. This new definition includes students from schools with a 60% economic needs index and those qualifying for free/reduced lunch, receiving public assistance, in state custody, or English-language learners. Additionally, the process for determining disadvantage was centralized to the DOE, maintaining a single discovery program cut-off score and contingent summer program completion for admission.
N.A., R.B., and C.Y. (collectively referred to as the student-applicants) applied for admission to specialized high schools (SHSs) for the 2019-2020 academic year, taking the SHSAT and ranking their preferred SHSs. In March 2019, they were informed that their scores fell below the cut-off for their ranked schools, resulting in denials of admission by the Department of Education (DOE) and the Chancellor (collectively, the City respondents). Petitioner C.K., on behalf of N.A., filed an administrative appeal under Education Law 310, claiming the discovery program was illegally implemented and that the admission denial was arbitrary and capricious. Similar appeals were filed by the parents of R.B. and C.Y., leading to a consolidated proceeding.
MaryEllen Elia, the former Commissioner of Education, dismissed the appeals, ruling that the petitioners lacked standing regarding the discovery program changes, except concerning the increase in discovery program seats which reduced score-only seats. She upheld that the admissions criteria complied with the Hiring Criteria Act (HCA) and deemed the admission denials non-arbitrary. The petitioners subsequently initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the State Education Department (SED) and its Acting Commissioner, alleging unlawful denial of admission and challenging Elia's determination.
The Supreme Court found Elia's decision rational and dismissed the petition, which led to an appeal by the petitioners. The court noted that the petitioners had standing to challenge the expansion of discovery program seats since it resulted in higher cut-off scores for admission. The City respondents acknowledged that, absent the discovery program, two of the applicants would have been admitted. The court concluded that the denial of admission fell within the interests protected by the HCA and identified an error in Elia's initial determination regarding the petitioners' standing to contest the use of the lowest-scoring SHS's cut-off as the discovery program cut-off.
Eligible disadvantaged students who exceed the discovery program cut-off score cannot be considered for discovery program seats. An example illustrates that if a student's SHSAT score falls between the cut-off scores for their first- and second-ranked selective high schools (SHSs), they are offered a score-only seat at their second choice rather than a discovery program seat at their first choice. The admissions process is subject to challenge under the HCA, although petitioners lack standing to contest the criteria defining "disadvantaged" students or the program's logistics. The term "disadvantaged" remains undefined by the Legislature, allowing for broad interpretation, and the Department of Education (DOE) is responsible for its application. Petitioners acknowledge that the student-applicants do not meet the current or previous criteria for "disadvantaged" status and fail to propose alternative definitions. Consequently, their arguments regarding these criteria are deemed too speculative to establish standing for a challenge.
The focus shifts to the merits of expanding discovery program seats and the use of a single cut-off score. The review under CPLR article 78 assesses whether Elia’s determination was legally erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. A decision is arbitrary if it lacks a rational basis. Although petitioners accept that the HCA allows SHSs to operate discovery programs for high-achieving disadvantaged students, they argue that increasing the number of seats has unduly raised score-only cut-off scores, hindering student-applicants' admission. The HCA does not specify a seat limit for the discovery program, suggesting intentional exclusion. Legislative history indicates that a former 14% cap on discovery program seats was removed during Senate deliberations, granting the Board of Education discretion over seat allocation. This authority was later transferred to the Chancellor following a restructuring of New York City's management.
The Legislature has granted the Chancellor the authority to determine the number of seats each Specialized High School (SHS) can allocate for its discovery program. The City respondents have a rational basis for promoting diversity—racial, ethnic, geographic, and socio-economic—to increase admissions for disadvantaged students. The petitioners argue that the High School Admissions (HCA) mandates a unique discovery program cut-off score for each SHS; however, the interpretation of the HCA indicates that any student scoring above the cut-off for their chosen SHS earns a seat, while disadvantaged students scoring below the cut-off can still be considered for discovery program seats.
Historically, the HCA allowed for independent admissions processes for each SHS, but the current unified admissions process permits students to apply to multiple SHSs with a single SHSAT score. This means that students who score above the cut-off are offered admission based on that score, while those below are considered for discovery program seats at their ranked schools. Although the unified process differs from the original 1971 framework, it remains compliant with the HCA.
The respondents argue that maintaining a unified discovery program cut-off score is essential to avoid complications and delays in the admissions process. Introducing individual cut-off scores for each SHS would slow down admissions, as each school would have to wait for the preceding school to finalize its process before determining available seats. The agency's interpretation, which requires understanding operational practices rather than just legal terminology, is afforded deference.
The SHS with the second-highest cut-off score must wait for its prospective discovery program students to complete their summer program before it can finalize its admissions, resulting in a cascading delay for subsequent SHSs. This process risks leaving students uncertain about their admissions status until late summer or even into the fall semester, which in turn affects the admissions timelines of other New York City high schools that will need to adjust for students not admitted to SHSs. The decision affirms the City respondents' expertise in SHS admissions and maintains the rationality of the discovery program cut-off score.
Regarding procedural challenges raised by petitioners, the Department of Education (DOE) is not classified as a state agency under the State Administrative Procedure Act and is not subject to its regulations. Additionally, local law cannot override the Chancellor's rulemaking authority as granted by Education Law. The Chancellor's modifications to the definition of a "disadvantaged" student and the expansion of the discovery program did not require approval from the Panel for Educational Policy, as the Legislature has empowered the Chancellor to oversee SHS operations. Other petitioners' claims not explicitly addressed are deemed without merit. The judgment is affirmed without costs.
Footnotes clarify that admissions to specific SHSs are determined through a competitive examination process and that the discovery program aims to support disadvantaged students without compromising the academic standards of SHSs. The admissions process for Fiorello H. LaGuardia High School, which is not part of this litigation, is noted to differ as it involves examinations in music and arts.
In the 2011-2012 academic year, four out of eight specialized high schools (SHSs) had discovery programs. By the 2016-2017 academic year, six SHSs implemented such programs, with disadvantaged students making up 4.95% to 13.68% of their populations. A seventh SHS added a discovery program in the 2017-2018 academic year, with discovery seats representing 1.32% to 12.12% of total enrollment. By the 2018-2019 academic year, all eight SHSs offered discovery programs, comprising 1.46% to 13.49% of their populations. Administrative appeals by petitioners were consolidated with those from four other parent groups, with some findings applicable to a child, M.N., whose parents were deemed to have standing. Petitioners and M.N.'s parents initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding, though M.N.'s parents are not involved in the current appeal. The 1996 restructuring empowered the Chancellor by transferring authority from the Board of Education, which now serves primarily in an advisory and policymaking role. The restructuring also removed the HCA from the Education Law while maintaining its language, indicating legislative intent regarding the HCA. Petitioners did not contest the unified admissions process.
