Chambers v. Wayne County Airport Authority

Citations: 765 N.W.2d 890; 483 Mich. 1081Docket: 136900

Court: Michigan Supreme Court; June 12, 2009; Michigan; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Michigan Supreme Court, in an order dated June 12, 2009, granted a motion for reconsideration regarding a prior decision from December 19, 2008, and subsequently vacated that earlier order. The Court denied the application for leave to appeal a June 5, 2008 judgment from the Court of Appeals, concluding that the issues presented did not warrant review. Justice Corrigan dissented, arguing that the Court erred in granting reconsideration. She maintained that the Wayne County Airport Authority was entitled to summary disposition because the plaintiff failed to provide the required notice of his injury within 120 days, as mandated by the public building exception to governmental immunity under MCL 691.1406. Justice Corrigan emphasized that this notice is a prerequisite for recovery and criticized the majority decision for creating an obligation for governmental agencies to anticipate potential lawsuits, undermining the legislative intent behind the notice requirement. She cited the statutory requirements for the notice, including details about the injury and defect, and referenced the case of Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm to highlight the importance of adhering to the notice provisions, which the Court previously upheld as valid social legislation.

The notice provision, as outlined in MCL 691.1406, mandates that an injured person serve a written notice on the responsible governmental agency within 120 days of the injury. This requirement serves multiple purposes, including allowing the agency to prepare for potential claims and reducing uncertainty regarding future demands. The plaintiff failed to serve the required notice, asserting that an internal incident report generated by the defendant met this requirement. However, the report was not served on an authorized individual capable of accepting legal process for the defendant, nor did an informal oral statement made by the plaintiff suffice to meet the statutory requirement for written notice. The statute clearly necessitates that notice be served on someone who can lawfully accept such service, emphasizing that informal oral communications do not fulfill this obligation. Consequently, the absence of proper notice bars the plaintiff from recovering damages related to injuries sustained due to a dangerous or defective public building, as service of notice is a prerequisite for any recovery under this statute. The Court of Appeals' failure to enforce this statutory requirement undermines the functionality of the governmental agency involved.

A routine internal incident report may fail to indicate to governmental agencies that an injured individual is considering a claim. The reasoning of the Court of Appeals could extend beyond public building cases, suggesting that a minor traffic or pedestrian accident report might also serve as notice under the highway exception (MCL 691.1404(1)). This newly recognized duty of self-notification could significantly burden governmental agencies in Michigan, obligating them to review numerous reports for potential claims, possibly leading to increased staffing costs or a decision to limit report generation, which would hinder public benefits. The majority's failure to adhere to established precedent, such as Rowland and other significant cases, raises concerns about the court's trend of disregarding prior rulings. The injured plaintiff did not meet the statutory requirement of providing notice within 120 days as mandated by MCL 691.1406, warranting a denial of the motion for reconsideration. Dissenting justices express concern over the majority's apparent hostility to governmental immunity and the legislative authority to dictate conditions for suing the state. Historically, sovereign immunity has provided substantial protection to government entities from civil suits, with the court traditionally enforcing statutory notice requirements as a precondition for litigation against the state.

Governmental immunity has a long-standing history, yet recent judicial trends have challenged its foundations. Starting in 1970, courts began to question the fairness of treating lawsuits against governmental entities differently from those against private entities, ultimately concluding that such differentiation violated equal protection rights. The Court recognized the inconsistency in its approach to governmental immunity and allowed for a notice provision to be constitutionally valid if it aimed to prevent prejudice against governmental defendants. This led to the creation of an "actual prejudice" requirement in notice provisions, which was upheld by the Court until 1996, despite it not being explicitly stated in statutory language. The Court argued that the Legislature had accepted this interpretation by not amending the statutes. 

The evolving legal rationale reflected a policy inclination to facilitate lawsuits against government entities, even as the language of the statutes remained clear. Recent jurisprudence has affirmed the constitutionality of governmental immunity laws, emphasizing their role in protecting government interests, allowing for claims to be investigated, and safeguarding public funds from potentially fraudulent claims. Despite acknowledging the necessity of such provisions, some justices express a general disfavor towards statutes limiting court access, which they believe undermines the legislative process and represents judicial overreach. The new majority has reverted to previous case law that challenges the principles of governmental immunity, introducing a "substantial compliance" exception to notice requirements, contrary to established legal principles. Members of this majority have openly rejected the idea of governmental immunity as inherent to government, instead suggesting that the government should bear the burden of raising immunity as a defense.

Members of the new majority have expressed disapproval of various legislative limitations on causes of action, including statutes of limitations, notice and tolling provisions, and defined legislative parameters. Justice Corrigan notes that this shift suggests a judicial power exercise that could undermine established precedents. The dissent emphasizes the failure of the majority to adhere to prior rulings, specifically regarding the case of Rowland, which led to the vacating of a previously supported order. Several justices dissent on issues surrounding governmental immunity, suggesting it should be treated as an affirmative defense and requiring governmental defendants to substantiate immunity claims. Dissenting opinions also advocate for adherence to common-law principles over statutory schemes in determining claim accrual dates and standards of care in medical malpractice cases. The dissenters argue against legislative overreach into judicial domains, particularly regarding expert witness qualifications. The document concludes with certification from the Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, affirming the accuracy of the order dated June 12, 2009.