On July 24, 1998, the Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the case State of Oregon v. Gloria Jean Johnsen, originally from the Coos County Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals had previously ruled that payment of a civil penalty under ORS 30.875 does not constitute "satisfaction for the injury" under the civil compromise statutes (ORS 135.703 et seq). The Supreme Court reversed this decision, affirming the Circuit Court's judgment that such payment does meet the criteria for satisfaction of injury.
The case stemmed from a charge against Johnsen for second-degree theft involving merchandise worth $102.98. Johnsen moved to dismiss the charge, citing a civil compromise and submitting a receipt confirming a payment of $252.98 to Fred Meyer. The trial court granted her motion without a hearing or state response. Subsequently, the state sought to overturn this dismissal, arguing that no civil compromise had occurred, and referenced previous case law indicating that payment under ORS 30.875 does not fulfill the requirements for civil compromise. The trial court denied the state’s motion to set aside the dismissal, leading to the state's appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal based on Johnsen's payment, reversing the Court of Appeals’ prior holding.
Defendant cited State v. Dumond, asserting that a written acknowledgment of payment of a civil penalty under ORS 30.875 suffices as evidence of satisfaction for civil compromise. The defendant contended that the trial court did not err in denying the state's motion to set aside the judgment and argued that the state failed to preserve its claim regarding insufficient opportunity to respond to the dismissal motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, indicating an error in finding that payment of a civil penalty is adequate evidence for civil compromise under Ha. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, focusing on whether payment under ORS 30.875 meets the satisfaction requirement in the civil compromise statutes. The analysis is grounded in statutory construction, beginning with the relevant statutes. ORS 135.703(1) allows for compromise when a misdemeanor is charged and a civil remedy exists, while ORS 135.705(1) stipulates that the injured party must acknowledge satisfaction in writing before trial for the court to dismiss the case. In Dumond, "satisfaction" was interpreted as the injured party confirming full payment for the injury. ORS 30.875, enacted five years after Dumond, establishes civil liability for shoplifting, allowing for recovery of actual damages and specified penalties. The state argued that Dumond's interpretation of "satisfaction" is irrelevant due to the introduction of ORS 30.875, but the court disagreed, noting that the new statute did not alter the definition of "satisfaction" established in Dumond.
Enactment of ORS 30.875 did not alter Dumond's interpretation of "satisfaction" under ORS 135.705, which remains valid. "Satisfaction for the injury" requires written acknowledgment from the victim of full payment for the stolen amount. The state accepts that a civil penalty under ORS 30.875 includes the full retail value of stolen merchandise. Consequently, a merchant's acknowledgment of receipt of the civil penalty constitutes "satisfaction" for civil compromise purposes. In this case, prior to the defendant's trial, the merchant confirmed receipt of the civil penalty, providing evidence of "satisfaction" per ORS 135.705. The state did not contest the misdemeanor status of theft in the second degree, the existence of a civil remedy, or the defendant's payment of costs and expenses, thereby satisfying the first three requirements for civil compromise. The state’s argument regarding the trial court's alleged abuse of discretion in dismissing the case without adequate opportunity for response was not preserved for appeal. The supporting affidavit claimed the trial court acted prematurely without consulting the district attorney’s office, but this did not convey a belief that the state lacked a reasonable opportunity to respond. Therefore, the appeal on this point was not addressed. The Court of Appeals' decision is reversed, and the circuit court's judgment is affirmed.
