On July 24, 1998, the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case of State of Oregon v. Desmond Uther Smith, originating from the Curry County Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals had ruled that police needed a warrant to use a drug-detecting dog to sniff a locked storage unit, interpreting this action as a search under Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. The state petitioned for review, positing that such a dog sniff does not constitute a search, thus not requiring a warrant.
The Supreme Court concluded that using a dog to sniff the exterior of a storage unit does not qualify as a search under the constitutional framework, affirming the legality of the action without prior judicial authorization. The Court also rejected the defendant's claim that evidence obtained from the storage unit should be suppressed due to unlawful seizure when police "secured" the unit in anticipation of obtaining a warrant. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and upheld the circuit court's judgment. The case involved police actions following a tip from a confidential informant regarding the defendant's marijuana operation and confirmed that he was using a specific storage unit in Brookings, which the storage facility manager would not allow the police to search without a warrant.
Officers requested the manager of a storage unit to secure the defendant's unit while they sought a search warrant. The manager complied, and later, Officer Plaster obtained a warrant based on his affidavit detailing interactions with an informant and the Klamath Falls police, alongside results from a dog sniff. During the search, officers seized marijuana and cultivation equipment. The defendant faced charges for manufacture, possession, and delivery of a controlled substance under ORS 475.992. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause due to an unlawful warrantless dog sniff and that the padlocking of the unit constituted an unjustified warrantless seizure. The trial court denied the motion, asserting the dog sniff did not require a warrant as it wasn't considered a search, and that any potential illegality in padlocking was unrelated to the subsequent warrant-based search. The defendant was convicted and appealed, claiming the trial court erred by denying his suppression motion. The Court of Appeals found reversible error, ruling the warrantless dog sniff violated Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, agreeing that such searches require a warrant and probable cause, based on precedent from State v. Juarez-Godinez, which had established that dog sniffs are constitutionally significant searches. The Court of Appeals did not address the seizure argument. The state contested both the Juarez-Godinez ruling and the Court of Appeals' interpretation that dog sniffs require probable cause. The key issue revolves around whether a trained dog sniffing a private enclosed space constitutes a search under Article I, section 9. The Court of Appeals referenced that police observations must align with what a private individual could perceive; since dogs detect odors imperceptible to humans, their use constitutes a search. The state argued this interpretation improperly broadens privacy protections under Article I, section 9, asserting that odors escaping a private space into accessible areas should be subject to police observation without restriction.
The state asserts that Article I, section 9, focuses on the police's attention rather than the methods of their observations. It challenges the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of relevant precedents, particularly regarding the use of enhancements in searches. The state contends that the Court incorrectly inferred from Campbell that any enhancement constitutes a search based solely on its use. It highlights that previous cases, such as State v. Wacker, have clarified that the constitutionality of using enhancements does not create a blanket rule. The state also disputes the Court's view that a dog sniff's lack of invasion into protected spaces is irrelevant, noting that some form of invasion is typically a key element in determining a search's constitutionality. It references various cases to illustrate that searches often involve encroaching on private spaces, while reiterating that the fundamental purpose of Article I, section 9, is to protect individuals from excessive governmental scrutiny. The relationship between privacy interests and private spaces is emphasized, stating that privacy often manifests through the presence of barriers that signify a private area. Thus, privacy interests are typically defined by the context of physical and sensory barriers that denote private spaces.
Qualifying as a "search" does not necessarily require a physical intrusion; technological invasions also fall under this definition. Article I, section 9 must be interpreted in light of modern methods of information gathering, encompassing physical, electronic, and technological invasions. The case at hand involves a dog sniff detecting odor molecules outside a private space, which does not constitute a physical invasion. The central question is whether this method results in a constitutionally significant invasion.
While dog sniffs suggest information about the contents of a private space, they do not provide direct access to that space's interior. Unlike high-powered telescopes or infrared cameras, which extract imperceptible information from within an enclosed area, dog sniffs operate on ambient air, leading only to an inference about the presence of substances without directly accessing the interior. Consequently, dog sniffs are not considered invasive and do not amount to a "search" under Article I, section 9, thus not triggering its protections, including the warrant requirement. The Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion in Juarez-Godinez, as did its reliance on the interpretation in the present case. The defendant's argument regarding the dog sniff's legality under the United States Constitution, based primarily on the case United States v. Thomas, is unpersuasive.
Thomas's legal validity is questioned based on several Supreme Court and federal circuit decisions indicating that dog sniffs do not constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment. Notable cases include United States v. Place, which ruled that a dog sniff of luggage at an airport is not a search, and several others confirming similar conclusions in public spaces. Even if Thomas were considered valid law, it specifically pertains to dog sniffs of dwellings, making it inapplicable to the current situation involving a storage unit, which is more akin to the sniff in Lingenfelter deemed not a search.
The trial court appropriately denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence based on the dog sniff argument, affirming that the police acted lawfully without a warrant. The defendant's secondary argument concerns the unlawful seizure of his storage unit due to its padlocking without a warrant or exigent circumstances. Although the state acknowledges that padlocking constituted a seizure, it argues that the action was lawful due to minimal intrusion on possessory rights, suggesting that securing premises from the outside is permissible without a warrant.
However, the analysis disputes the state's position, asserting that possessory rights warrant equal protection under Article I, section 9, as privacy rights. The document emphasizes that, with limited exceptions, a warrant is necessary even for possessory rights. Thus, the padlocking of the storage unit, executed without a warrant, is deemed an unlawful seizure.
The state argues that even if the initial seizure was unlawful, it did not cause the evidence obtained from a subsequent search of the storage unit, and thus, the evidence should not be suppressed. The state asserts that the evidence was collected pursuant to a valid warrant, and the locking of the unit did not affect its discovery. The defendant agrees that suppression is warranted only with a causal connection but contends that such a connection exists because the evidence was seized when the police padlocked the unit. He cites *State v. Hansen*, where the court ruled that evidence obtained after an unlawful seizure must be suppressed if it was the evidence sought at the time of the unlawful act. The defendant argues that the circumstances in his case mirror those in *Hansen*, asserting that the evidence was effectively under police control from the moment of the padlocking.
While the defendant acknowledges *State v. Sargent*, which reversed a suppression order in a similar context, he argues that it does not alter the court's position and that the cases are distinguishable regarding police interference with privacy versus property rights. The court expresses skepticism about the ease of distinguishing between *Sargent* and *Hansen*, noting that the outcome in *Sargent* hinged on the lack of effect from the unlawful seizure on the subsequent valid search, despite recognizing an unlawful seizure had occurred.
The analysis presented indicates a departure from the rationale established in Hansen, specifically regarding the timing and nature of seizures in relation to evidence obtained during searches. The court clarifies that no seizure of evidence occurred until the police directly seized it during the search, suggesting that the reasoning in Sargent implicitly rejects Hansen's assertion that any unlawful seizure automatically leads to the suppression of related evidence.
Historically, Hansen aimed to uphold the deterrence rationale of the Fourth Amendment, which sought to prevent police from benefiting from unlawful seizures made in anticipation of obtaining warrants. However, the court has since recognized that Oregon's exclusionary rule is designed to protect individuals from unlawful searches and seizures rather than simply deter police misconduct. It is sufficient to suppress evidence obtained from illegal searches or seizures, rather than evidence discovered following unlawful actions.
In the case discussed, the unlawful securing of property (the padlock) was deemed irrelevant because the police would have obtained the evidence regardless, as no one attempted to access the unit prior to the execution of the search warrant. The court states that the mere discovery of evidence after unlawful conduct does not necessitate its suppression, affirming the circuit court's judgment and reversing the Court of Appeals' decision.
The excerpt also addresses several legal principles, including the acceptance of factual findings by lower courts, the distinction of certain surveillance techniques as non-searches, and the acknowledgment of possessory rights even when individuals cannot exercise them due to incarceration. Overall, the court maintains that adherence to constitutional protections must be balanced with practical realities of law enforcement.
