The Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the case of State of Oregon v. Eduardo Tinoco Rangel, with the Court of Appeals' decision affirmed and the circuit court's judgment reversed, remanding the case for further proceedings. The central issue was the constitutionality of Oregon's stalking statute, ORS 163.732, which defines stalking as knowingly alarming or coercing another through repeated unwanted contact, where such contact is objectively reasonable to alarm the victim and causes reasonable apprehension for personal safety.
Rangel was charged with stalking for repeatedly threatening a victim at her workplace. Prior to trial, he demurred, asserting that the statute was overbroad and violated both the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions. The trial court agreed, ruling the statute overbroad and incapable of being judicially narrowed. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this, likening ORS 163.732 to a previously upheld harassment statute and narrowing its interpretation to require proof of a threat and intent to alarm.
On review, Rangel contended that the statute's alarm element did not necessitate proof of a threat and lacked a requirement for intent to harm, rendering it facially overbroad. He further argued that the Court of Appeals' narrowing of the statute did not accurately reflect legislative intent. The court ultimately held that ORS 163.732 was not overbroad under either constitution.
Defendant contends that ORS 163.732 infringes upon First Amendment rights, while the state defends that the statute is not overbroad due to a narrowing construction established by the Court of Appeals, consistent with constitutional standards outlined in Moyle. The court reviews the interpretation of constitutional provisions for legal errors, prioritizing state law issues before federal constitutional concerns. Under the analytical framework from Robertson, the court assesses whether Article I, section 8 prohibits ORS 163.732. This section bars statutes that restrain free expression unless confined within historical exceptions. Laws may target forbidden effects of expression without infringing on the substance, but if speech is included among the proscribed means, overbreadth scrutiny is warranted.
The Court of Appeals and parties agree that ORS 163.732 targets unwanted contacts, yet the law’s inclusion of expression as a means to these effects raises potential overbreadth challenges under Article I, section 8. For a statute to be deemed overbroad, it must prohibit constitutionally protected speech or conduct. The law must be examined to determine if it encroaches on privileged communication or if it can be interpreted to avoid overbreadth. The statute requires at least two unwanted contacts, which can consist solely of communication, thereby necessitating an evaluation of its scope concerning overbreadth considerations.
ORS 163.730(3)(d)-(i) outlines methods of 'contact' related to communication, but the statute is not limited to these forms. The focus is on the state's use of communication-based contact to establish the element of repeated and unwanted contact in stalking cases. If the state's evidence does not include communication, no overbreadth issue arises. Stalking requires that the victim's apprehension comes from repeated, unwanted contacts that cause reasonable fear. A single contact, regardless of severity, does not meet the criteria for stalking. However, if communication occurs alongside at least one additional contact that is repeated, unwanted, and causes reasonable apprehension, it may constitute stalking. The statute does not necessitate that speech or writing must explicitly involve prohibited content or cause a specific illegal effect. The statute can restrict speech by criminalizing the act of inducing alarm through repeated contacts, which may include speech. The court's decision in Moyle indicates that some threats, although criminalized, may still be considered protected speech. Therefore, the broad nature of 'contact' in ORS 163.730(3) raises concerns about potential overbreadth, necessitating careful interpretation to align with legislative intent while avoiding constitutional issues. The court emphasizes that any law targeting harmful effects of speech must clearly define the serious and imminent threats it seeks to prevent.
The court in Moyle determined that it could interpret the harassment statute in a way that aligns with the legislature's intent and adheres to Article I, section 8, which prohibits laws that restrict speech based on its content due to perceived undesirability or adverse effects. Laws must focus on preventing harmful outcomes rather than suppressing speech itself. The Court of Appeals found that ORS 163.732, relating to stalking, is analogous to the harassment statute in Moyle and applied similar narrowing constructions.
The Court of Appeals identified that while ORS 163.732 does not explicitly require a 'threat' to the victim, it indicated that a threat or its equivalent must be present for a stalking charge. The primary concern in stalking is the knowingly alarming or coercing of another through repeated unwanted contacts, and if these contacts involve speech, they must constitute a threat as defined by ORS 163.730(2). The definition of 'alarm' in ORS 163.730(1) necessitates that any speech-based contact must be a threat for it to be prosecutable under stalking laws.
Moyle clarified that a proscribable threat is one that instills a fear of imminent serious violence, is unequivocal, and likely to provoke unlawful actions, excluding hyperbolic or rhetorical expressions of frustration. This understanding of a threat aligns with the legislature's intent as reflected in the harassment statute. Additionally, the Court of Appeals addressed the defendant's argument about the stalking statute's requirement for the actor to induce alarm 'knowingly' instead of 'intentionally,' concluding that evidence must demonstrate that both the alarm and the threatened act were intended by the speaker, although the court adopted a slightly different interpretation.
Defendant argues that any judicial narrowing of a statute to address constitutional overbreadth must adhere to the legislative intent and preserve the legislature's role in creating laws that respect free speech rights. The defendant contends that the Court of Appeals improperly replaced the mental state of "knowingly," as defined in ORS 163.732(1)(a), with "intentionally," which the legislature did not authorize, suggesting the Court exceeded its authority. The defense emphasizes that "intentionally" and "knowingly" represent distinct mental states under ORS 161.085(7) and (8). The defendant refers to the case Moyle, where the court determined that the absence of a specific intent requirement did not violate legislative intent due to the statute's silence on this matter. In contrast, the stalking statute explicitly requires the mental state of "knowingly," indicating awareness of the conduct's nature and the predictable outcome of causing fear through repeated unwanted contacts. The statute also necessitates that the perceived danger be "objectively reasonable," which establishes foreseeability and predictability regarding harm. Thus, while ORS 163.732(1) does not mandate proof of specific intent or present ability to carry out a threat, it does require proof of actual alarm and the reasonableness of that alarm, mirroring the analytical framework used in Moyle to limit the statute's applicability to unequivocal threats.
ORS 163.732(1) is interpreted to limit threats to those that are unambiguous, unequivocal, and specific to the addressee, clearly expressing an intention to be carried out, while maintaining the mental element of 'knowingly.' The statute requires that any communication must convincingly express the intention to execute the threat and that the actor possesses the ability to do so. Consequently, the analysis aligns with prior rulings, notably in Moyle, leading to the rejection of the defendant's arguments regarding overbreadth under Article I, section 8.
The defendant contends that the statute violates First Amendment rights by lacking proof requirements for intent to harm, actual threats, and exemptions for constitutionally protected activities. However, the court finds these arguments unpersuasive, noting that the narrowing constructions applied to ORS 163.732 incorporate necessary elements of genuine threat and intent. The absence of an explicit exemption for all forms of protected speech does not render the statute unconstitutional, especially since it does exempt conduct protected under labor laws.
The court cites Broadrick v. Oklahoma, establishing that overbreadth doctrine should be applied cautiously, particularly where conduct is concerned. It concludes that ORS 163.732 is constitutionally valid, not facially overbroad, and does not infringe upon protected speech. The court affirms the Court of Appeals' decision, reverses the circuit court's judgment, and remands the case for further proceedings, allowing for potential 'as applied' constitutional challenges.
Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution prohibits laws that restrict free expression but holds individuals accountable for abuse of this right. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to states via the Fourteenth Amendment, also protects freedom of speech. Oregon law (ORS 163.730) defines "alarm" as fear from perceived danger and "coerce" as compulsion by force or threat. "Contact" encompasses various forms of interaction, including physical presence, communication, and actions affecting the individual or their relationships.
The term "threatening" suggests a communicative act, indicating potential constitutional concerns regarding speech rights. Analysis of ORS 166.065(1)(d), which criminalizes harassment through threats intended to alarm another, raises questions of overbreadth, especially since it may criminalize speech that does not cause actual harm.
In State v. Spencer, the court found a disorderly conduct statute unconstitutional due to its vagueness about causing public inconvenience or alarm, as it criminalized speech without requiring proof of actual effect. ORS 161.085 clarifies the meanings of "intentionally" and "knowingly" in relation to criminal conduct. Judicial precedent indicates that while laws may inadvertently deter protected speech, they should not be invalidated if they serve legitimate state interests in regulating harmful conduct.
