State v. McNeely

Citations: 8 P.3d 212; 330 Or. 457; 2000 Ore. LEXIS 615Docket: CC 93-05-33276; SC S41941

Court: Oregon Supreme Court; August 3, 2000; Oregon; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the case of State of Oregon v. Michael James McNeely, where McNeely was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death by the Multnomah County Circuit Court. The court affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence. The victim, who went missing in March 1993, was later found dead, having died from strangulation. McNeely faced a total of seven counts of aggravated murder and 12 additional felonies related to the case. 

During the review, McNeely raised 18 assignments of error, seeking either reversal of his conviction or vacating of his death sentence. In the guilt phase, he contested the trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress testimony from Thompson, a jail inmate who reported incriminating statements made by McNeely. McNeely argued that Thompson acted as a state agent by attempting to gain a benefit from his disclosures to law enforcement. The trial court rejected this argument, asserting that Thompson acted as a private citizen without state direction. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling and the overall judgment in McNeely's case.

The court determined that the exclusionary rule does not apply in this case, as there is no evidence to suggest that the informant, Thompson, was directed or involved with law enforcement in any capacity while obtaining information from the defendant. The potential benefits Thompson might have received later do not categorize him as an agent of the State at the time of the initial contact. The defendant's constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel were not violated, as there was no indication of police involvement in Thompson’s activities. The trial court's refusal to suppress Thompson's testimony was upheld, despite his inability to identify the defendant at trial. The court ruled that Thompson's testimony was conditionally relevant and allowed it based on the evidence presented. The admissibility of evidence under Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) 104 requires the judge to determine if there is sufficient foundation for the jury to find the relevance condition met. In this case, the trial court found sufficient foundation evidence to allow the jury to consider Thompson's testimony regarding its weight and credibility.

Thompson testified at trial that he had conversed with a man in jail who claimed to have choked and killed the victim. This testimony was deemed relevant if that man was the defendant. Evidence indicated that Thompson and the defendant had met in jail in 1993, with Thompson stating he spoke to someone claiming to be the defendant. Despite Thompson's failure to identify the defendant in court, the trial court concluded that a reasonable juror could determine he was speaking to the defendant, supporting the admissibility of Thompson's testimony. The court found that Thompson's inability to identify the defendant affected the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. 

The defendant claimed the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial during the guilt phase, particularly during the prosecutor's closing argument. The prosecutor's comments aimed to evoke the jury's memory of the victim rather than create sympathy for the defendant. The defense objected, referencing a precedent where a similar argument was curtailed to prevent potential prejudice. However, the trial court found that the prosecutor's remarks did not cross a prejudicial line and allowed them to continue, concluding there was no abuse of discretion in denying the mistrial.

In the penalty phase, the defendant raised twelve assignments of error, three of which were discussed. He argued that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial during the state's closing argument when the prosecutor criticized the defense's attempts to attribute the defendant's behavior to excuses and provocation, emphasizing the defendant's failure to take responsibility for his actions.

Dr. McGovern's evaluation of the defendant revealed mixed responses regarding the defendant's accountability for his actions. The defendant occasionally acknowledged his thefts, but he consistently denied responsibility for engaging in prostitution and for abusing former partners. Testimonies indicated that the defendant characterized his past relationships as problematic due to misunderstandings rather than acknowledging any personal issues. The defendant's motion for a mistrial, based on the prosecutor's comments perceived as an infringement on his right not to testify, was denied by the trial court. The court justified that the prosecutor's remarks were relevant to Dr. McGovern's testimony and the defendant's historical failure to accept responsibility, which ties into the assessment of the defendant's future dangerousness, a critical aspect of the penalty phase.

The defendant also contested the trial court's decision to allow the prosecution to argue related to the fourth jury question regarding the imposition of a death sentence. The defendant claimed that, under ORS 163.150, since there is no burden of proof associated with this question, the state should be barred from making any arguments related to it. The trial court disagreed, concluding that the statute permits such arguments. The distinction was made that the first three questions require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while the fourth question is more about discretionary judgment. The interpretation of ORS 163.150 is guided by discerning legislative intent through examination of statutory text and context, with clear legislative intent negating the need for further inquiry.

ORS 163.150(1)(a) allows the state to argue for a death sentence, affirming that both the state and the defendant can present arguments regarding the death penalty and life sentences. The defendant contends that the state cannot provide rebuttal arguments on the fourth question during the penalty phase since it bears no burden of proof on that issue. The state counters that it retains the right to conclude arguments in both phases of a criminal trial, citing ORCP 58 B(4), which applies to criminal cases and permits the plaintiff to commence and conclude jury arguments. The court agrees with the state, asserting that ORCP 58 B(4) allows for rebuttal on any matters raised by the defendant in the penalty phase. The defendant's claim that this violates his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights is dismissed due to a lack of specific argumentation. Additionally, the court notes that previous cases have already addressed and rejected the constitutional challenges to the death penalty raised by the defendant. The trial court's decision not to declare the death penalty unconstitutional is upheld, and all defendant's assignments of error have been considered and found unmeritorious or previously resolved.

The judgment of conviction and death sentence is upheld. Automatic reviews of such judgments are mandated by ORS 138.012(1), which, while renumbering the statute governing death penalty case reviews, did not alter the court's substantive authority. The defendant's convictions include murder, manslaughter, two counts of kidnapping, rape, attempted rape, two counts of sodomy, attempted sodomy, two counts of abuse of a corpse, and unauthorized vehicle use. 

The Oregon Constitution, Article I, sections 11 and 12, ensures rights to self-representation and protection against self-incrimination, paralleling the U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Sixth Amendments applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant has not argued, nor is there evidence to suggest, that outcomes would differ under these constitutional provisions. The defendant must prove that police actions went beyond passive listening to informants in order to elicit incriminating statements.

OEC 104 addresses the court's role in determining witness qualifications and evidence admissibility, allowing flexibility with evidence rules except for privileges. Conditional relevancy is defined, where evidence's relevance depends on the establishment of another fact. OEC 401 defines "relevant evidence" as having any tendency to affect the likelihood of a fact’s existence, establishing a low threshold for relevance. Additionally, both the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth Amendment guarantee the accused the right to confront witnesses in criminal prosecutions.