In a child custody proceeding, the Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the case of Rayne Elizabeth O'Donnell-Lamont (deceased) and Michael David Lamont, Jr., alongside petitions from Christine and Patrick O'Donnell and intervenor Darrell Miller. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment, which awarded custody to the maternal grandparents instead of the father. The review focused on the legislative changes to the third-party custody statute after the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Troxel v. Granville. The court opted for a de novo review due to the Court of Appeals not addressing all relevant issues, emphasizing the importance of the trial judge's credibility assessments based on witness demeanor. Key facts included the parents' marriage in 1991, the birth of two children, and the family's close proximity to the grandparents, highlighting ongoing familial contact. The decision underscores the court's commitment to considering all pertinent legal standards and factual findings in custody cases.
The family relocated to be near the maternal grandparents due to the mother's congenital heart defect, which ultimately led to her death. The mother primarily cared for the children while the father worked as a long-haul truck driver and contractor, often being away from home. The parents' marriage deteriorated in 1997, leading to multiple separations and a restraining order obtained by the mother against the father in March 1998. Despite this order, both parents occasionally disregarded it, including a trip to Hawaii with their children shortly after the mother petitioned for divorce in April 1998, which was finalized in September 1998.
Following the divorce, the father did not fully utilize his parenting time and violated the restraining order on multiple occasions, resulting in his arrest. After the mother's death in March 1999, the children initially stayed with their grandparents while the father lived in inadequate housing. Although there was an expectation that the grandparents would care for the children long-term, the father later sought custody, leading to disputes and failed mediation attempts. In July 1999, the father unlawfully retained the children after a visit, prompting the grandparents to obtain a temporary custody order from the court.
Despite the court's order for the children to be returned to the father, he moved them to Montana without notifying the court or the grandparents, ultimately leading to a contempt ruling against him. The father later moved back to Oregon, and after a hearing in July 2000, the trial court awarded permanent custody to the grandparents while granting significant parenting time to the father, based on comprehensive findings that included expert testimony from a court-appointed psychologist.
The trial court concluded that the children had a strong bond with both their father and grandparents, recognizing the father's love and potential as a custodial parent. However, the court identified significant issues with the father, including dishonesty during testimony, an unstable employment and housing history, past substance abuse, domestic violence, and anger management problems. Despite the father's claims of having overcome these issues, the court found him unconvincing and lacking credibility, determining that he had serious deficiencies as a parent.
In contrast, the grandparents were found to have provided essential care and support for the children and had a more constructive interest in their well-being than the father. Nonetheless, the court noted the grandparents' tendencies to excessively spoil the children, attempt to control both the father and the children, and their wish to limit the father's involvement.
The court referenced ORS 109.119 (1999) to establish that the grandparents had demonstrated an emotional bond with the children sufficient to create a child-parent relationship. The father argued for a "supervening right" to custody as the biological parent, citing the case Hruby, which required a showing of unfitness for custody to be awarded to another party. The trial court rejected this "compelling threat" standard, indicating it was inconsistent with ORS 109.119 but acknowledged that a "compelling reason" was needed to favor a psychological parent over a legal parent when the latter's custody could be detrimental to the child.
Ultimately, the court found that while the father was not unfit to the extent of terminating his parental rights, his shortcomings warranted a custody decision based on the children's best interests. Applying the nonexclusive factors from ORS 107.137, the court awarded custody to the grandparents while granting substantial parenting time to the father. Additionally, the court considered the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel, which affirmed parents' fundamental rights regarding their children's care and custody.
The Court found that a Washington statute permitting visitation rights to nonparents based on the child's best interest unconstitutionally violated a parent's rights to determine their child's care. It emphasized that due process requires giving significant weight to a fit parent's views on visitation. The trial court believed its custody decision favoring grandparents aligned with the precedent set in Troxel, which rejected a broad harm standard for nonparents seeking visitation rights. The trial court asserted that Oregon's presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests was consistent with Troxel's requirements. It concluded that it properly applied this presumption and still determined custody with the grandparents was in the children's best interests.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, interpreting Troxel as raising the standard for nonparents to demonstrate a compelling threat to the child before prevailing over fit parents in custody disputes. It required nonparents to show that the parent could not or would not adequately care for the child or that the child would face undue harm in the parent's custody. The Court of Appeals found that the grandparents did not meet this burden of proof, leading to the reversal of the trial court's ruling and directing the award of custody to the father. The grandparents then sought reconsideration, arguing the Court of Appeals should have applied the 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119, which were enacted post-Troxel and modified the criteria for awarding custody to nonparents.
The 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119 created a statutory presumption that a legal parent acts in the child's best interest and outlined factors for courts to evaluate whether a nonparent seeking custody can rebut this presumption. Although these amendments were enacted after the trial court's decision but before the Court of Appeals hearing, the en banc Court of Appeals ruled that they are fully retroactive. The court was divided on how these amendments impacted the case; Judge Edmonds and three others maintained that the outcome would remain unchanged and opted not to remand for further proceedings under the new amendments. Five members of the court supported the modified panel decision, while five dissented, advocating for a remand to further develop the record. Due to the tie, the modified panel decision was upheld.
The case at hand involves a custody dispute between grandparents and a father, distinct from parental rights termination cases where the state is involved and parental fitness is questioned. The court acknowledges that awarding custody to a third party significantly affects parental rights, yet this is less severe than terminating parental rights or state intervention in cases of juvenile dependency. The decision on primary custody carries profound implications for the lives of the children and the involved parties. The amendments were largely a legislative response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Troxel, which is essential for understanding the context of the amended statute.
The Supreme Court reviewed a Washington Supreme Court decision challenging a state statute that allowed nonparents to seek visitation rights if deemed in the child's best interest. The Washington court found the statute unconstitutional, stating it interfered with parental rights without requiring a showing of harm to the child. It allowed any person to petition for visitation at any time, contrary to parental wishes. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this decision, asserting that the statute violated the fundamental right of legal parents, protected by the Due Process Clause, to make decisions about their children. There was no majority opinion; Justice O'Connor authored a plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice and Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, emphasizing that parental rights are fundamental but not absolute and that courts must give weight to a fit parent's decisions. The plurality did not define the full extent of parental rights or the evidence required to overcome the presumption in favor of parents, underscoring the need for a nuanced, case-by-case approach.
Justices Souter and Stevens also expressed opinions. Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, highlighting the statute's failure to recognize parental due process rights, deeming it unconstitutional. Justice Stevens agreed on the fundamental liberty interest of parents but dissented on the Washington court's requirement for showing harm to overcome the parental presumption. Overall, the case underscored the complex interaction between state visitation rights and parental authority.
Justice Kennedy dissented, asserting that the Washington court incorrectly applied a "harm" standard that undermined parental rights in child decision-making. Justice Thomas concurred, emphasizing that the Due Process Clause safeguards the "fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children," and any infringement warrants "strict scrutiny." He argued that the State of Washington lacked a legitimate governmental interest to challenge a fit parent's visitation decisions. Justice Scalia dissented, claiming the Due Process Clause does not confer protection for parental rights, allowing the Washington legislature to implement the contested "best interest" test.
The absence of a majority opinion in the case complicated the determination of the extent of parental rights protected under the Due Process Clause. However, it was established that, aside from Justice Scalia, all justices recognized some degree of constitutional protection for fit parents' decision-making regarding their children. Notably, Justice Thomas was the only one to advocate for strict scrutiny of state actions interfering with parental rights. Other justices suggested a less rigorous standard, with the plurality noting that parental decisions should carry "some special weight," but without clarifying the extent of this weight. Justices Stevens and Kennedy explicitly rejected the notion that a harm finding is required to challenge parental presumption.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Troxel prompted amendments to Oregon's third-party custody and visitation statute in 2001. The previous statute was deemed susceptible to constitutional challenges under the Troxel decision, as it did not adequately prioritize the legal parent's rights. Thus, the legislature sought to amend the statute to provide more protection for legal parents. The retroactivity of these amendments is now a pivotal issue, as the grandparents filed their custody petition in 1999, with the trial occurring in 2000.
Father contends that the 2001 amendments to custody laws apply only to cases where custody petitions were filed after July 31, 2001. However, the Court of Appeals unanimously disagreed, ruling that the amendments apply to all custody proceedings filed "before, on or after" that date. The court's analysis focuses on ORS 109.119, which governs custody determinations between legal parents and individuals, such as grandparents, who have established a child-parent relationship.
Under ORS 109.119, any individual who has formed emotional ties with a child may petition the court for custody. In custody proceedings, there is a presumption that the legal parent acts in the child's best interest, but this presumption can be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. If rebutted, custody may be awarded to the individual with the child-parent relationship, provided it aligns with the child's best interests.
The statute outlines five factors the court may consider to determine if the presumption has been rebutted, including the legal parent's ability to care for the child, the petitioner's role as the child's primary caretaker, and any detrimental circumstances if relief is denied. The parties agree that ORS 109.119 is constitutionally sound but differ in its interpretation and application to the case at hand. Grandparents argue that trial evidence supported all five rebuttal factors.
Grandparents present three main arguments regarding custody under ORS 109.119. First, they assert that they were the children's primary caregivers after the mother's death and that the father supported their relationship with the children. Second, they claim the father unreasonably restricted contact by relocating the children to Montana without notifying them and in violation of a court order. Third, they argue that the father is unable to provide adequate care, citing issues such as job and home instability, past substance abuse, anger management problems, and dishonesty, suggesting that these circumstances would harm the children if custody were awarded to him.
In response, the father contends that the trial evidence does not sufficiently rebut the presumption that he acts in the children's best interests. He argues that ORS 109.119 should only allow rebuttal of this presumption if it can be shown that a parent is unable to care for the child or that custody with the parent would be harmful. He insists that granting custody to the grandparents, without evidence of his inability to care for the children or potential harm, would violate his Due Process rights.
The document further explains that the 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119 aimed to align the statute with due process requirements established in Troxel, specifically emphasizing the need to respect parental rights without altering the custody standards. The legislative intent was to ensure that a parent's determination of the child's best interests holds significant weight, establishing a presumption that parents act in the child's best interest, which can be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence. The challenge lies in defining the burden on nonparents to overcome this presumption.
Father argues that the burden on a nonparent seeking custody is significant, requiring proof that a legal parent is unable to care for or may harm the child. In contrast, grandparents suggest that the parental presumption can be easily rebutted by any of the five nonexclusive factors listed in ORS 109.119(4)(b), although they do not specify a standard. The document clarifies that the legislature established a "preponderance of the evidence" standard for custody petitions involving nonparents with a parent-child relationship, whereas a "clear and convincing evidence" standard applies when someone with an ongoing personal relationship seeks visitation or rights. The five factors provided by the legislature can be considered nonexclusively, indicating that the presumption can be rebutted without demonstrating parental inability or harm. Furthermore, the legislature chose not to impose a stricter standard, supporting the idea that the presumption can be overcome without evidence of parental unfitness. The document emphasizes that while the parental interest is significant, it can be rebutted by showing that a parent does not act in the child's best interest, and it is up to the courts to determine if the evidence presented meets this requirement. The text notes the need to address what evidence a nonparent must present to demonstrate that the legal parent is not acting in the child's best interest, including evaluating the five rebuttal factors and whether evidence outside these factors is sufficient.
The statute presents five rebuttal factors in a disjunctive manner, indicating that a court may determine the presumption favoring a legal parent can be rebutted by evidence of just one factor, provided the nonparent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the legal parent does not act in the child's best interest. In extreme cases, a court might find the parental presumption rebutted even without evidence of the other four factors if the parent is clearly unfit. Conversely, a nonparent may present evidence for all five factors but still fail to prove the parent's inadequacy. The focus remains on whether evidence overall overcomes the presumption of the legal parent's actions being in the child's best interest, rather than on the presence of specific factors. This approach aligns with the court's interpretation of other statutes with nonexclusive factor lists, emphasizing the parent's conduct or condition rather than strictly adhering to enumerated factors. The court acknowledges that typically, a nonparent can rebut the presumption by demonstrating the parent's inability or unwillingness to provide adequate care, but this is not a mandatory requirement under ORS 109.119 or Troxel. In this case, it is noted that no party disputes the establishment of a "child-parent relationship" by the grandparents as defined in the statute.
The trial court determined that grandparents established sufficient relationships to seek custody under ORS 109.119, a conclusion affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The father is recognized as a "legal parent" entitled to a presumption that he acts in the children's best interests per ORS 109.119(2)(a). The dispute centers on whether the evidence presented at trial adequately rebutted this presumption.
The first rebuttal factor considers if the "legal parent is unwilling or unable to care adequately for the child" under ORS 109.119(4)(b)(A). A nonparent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent is "unwilling" or "unable" to care adequately for the child to rebut this presumption. The court emphasized that it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the parent based on perceived superiority of care. The term "adequate" suggests that a parent must provide more than minimal care. Grandparents argued that the father's job instability and personal issues indicated he was "unwilling or unable" to provide adequate care; the court disagreed, finding that the father demonstrated willingness and had not been proven unable to care adequately, as supported by evidence including a psychologist's report.
The grandparents' assertion that they could provide "better than adequate" care does not suffice to rebut the presumption of parental fitness. The court highlighted that only evidence showing the father’s inability or unwillingness is relevant to this rebuttal factor.
The next consideration is whether the grandparents have been the children's primary caretakers recently, as per ORS 109.119(4)(b)(B). While the grandparents had a significant and positive relationship with the children over the years, including a period of primary caregiving after the mother’s death in March 1999, this factor is evaluated in the context of continuity of caregiving and the existing relationship dynamics.
Grandparents have established that they have been the primary caretakers of the children. The statute (ORS 109.119(4)(b)(C)) outlines that a crucial factor in evaluating nonparent relief is whether "circumstances detrimental to the child exist" if the nonparent's request is denied. This term is defined in ORS 109.119(8)(b) as including situations that could potentially inflict psychological, emotional, or physical harm on a child. The grandparents argue that the father's living conditions could cause such harm, thus satisfying this rebuttal factor.
The father contends that the grandparents must demonstrate that current circumstances, under his custody, would present an immediate detriment to the children. He asserts that a broad interpretation of “detrimental circumstances” to include potential future harm could undermine the statutory presumption that a legal parent acts in the child's best interests, effectively reverting to a "best interest of the child" standard.
The analysis concludes that the statute's language implies that "circumstances detrimental to the child" refers specifically to serious present risks of harm. The purpose of this rebuttal factor is to guide the determination of whether a nonparent can overcome the presumption favoring the legal parent. Allowing evidence of merely potential future harm would dilute the presumption's significance.
To successfully rebut the presumption, the nonparent must prove that living with the legal parent poses a serious immediate risk of harm. The grandparents cite the father's substance abuse and anger management issues, alongside his relationship with Oliver, who has similar issues and previously lost custody of her children, as evidence supporting this factor.
The trial court determined that the father exhibits limited insight, dishonesty, insensitivity to his children's emotional needs, and a willingness to disrupt their established relationships with grandparents. The father's unstable lifestyle, characterized by frequent job changes and relocations, is highlighted, noting that during the nine months the children lived with him, they changed addresses four times, leading to Taryn attending three different schools in one year. Grandparents argue that denying them custody would create detrimental circumstances for the children. The court found, based on the preponderance of evidence, that granting custody to the father would pose a serious risk of psychological or emotional harm to the children due to his inability to understand their emotional and developmental needs, difficulty managing anger, and lack of self-awareness regarding parenting shortcomings.
Father failed to recognize the children's emotional ties to their grandparents and relatives, and he could not identify any potential weaknesses in Oliver, the caregiver, despite acknowledging her issues with substance abuse and past loss of custody. Dr. Vien indicated that the father would likely struggle with single parenthood and would depend heavily on Oliver, whose deficiencies further raised concerns about the children's well-being. While the court acknowledged that frequent changes of jobs and residences alone do not inherently indicate detrimental circumstances, the father's decisions to move were largely voluntary and motivated by a desire to escape problems rather than necessity. This pattern indicated a lack of insight into effectively resolving issues, further underscoring the risks associated with awarding him custody.
Father's custody of the children involved frequent, abrupt relocations that lacked planning and consideration for the children's welfare. Although typically, changes in employment or residence do not inherently harm children, in this case, father's motivations for moving—driven by personal desire rather than necessity and without regard for the children's well-being—were significant in evaluating his suitability as a custodian. The record indicates that granting custody to father would likely be detrimental to the children.
Regarding the relationship with nonparents, specifically the grandparents, father previously consented to their close involvement in the children's lives and agreed to their care following the mother's death. However, father contends that his consent should not negate the presumption of parental rights, as it was made out of necessity rather than a desire to facilitate the grandparents' role. The analysis focuses solely on whether father encouraged this relationship, which he did. Nonetheless, it is determined that this consent should not significantly counter the parental presumption in this case, as it does not reflect a lack of concern for the children's best interests.
The final statutory factor examines whether father unreasonably obstructed contact between the children and the grandparents. The grandparents assert that father limited this relationship by relocating the children to Montana, contravening a court order. The trial court noted father's conduct indicated a willingness to sever ties between the children and their grandparents. This finding was supported by the court's assessment of father's credibility during the trial, leading to the conclusion that father would attempt to further limit contact with the grandparents.
Father contends that penalizing him for limiting grandparents' contact with the children is unjust, given that the grandparents also sought to restrict his contact. He cites an incident in July 1999 when, after a two-week visit with the grandparents, they did not return the children as agreed and instead sought an ex parte court order for custody. Although the grandparents initially obtained a court order, it was vacated shortly thereafter, and the children were returned to Father. Father argues that his actions in taking the children to Montana were comparable to the grandparents' previous actions; however, he violated a court order, breached his promise to the judge, and failed to inform the grandparents or the court of his whereabouts. His actions were deemed to unreasonably restrict grandparents' contact with the children.
The determination of whether the grandparents have successfully rebutted the presumption that Father acts in the children's best interests involves evaluating the totality of circumstances. The grandparents' involvement as primary caretakers after Mother's death is emphasized, along with Father's actions that limited their contact and the potential risk of harm to the children if custody were awarded to him. The evidence supports four rebuttal factors, particularly highlighting the grandparents' significant role in the children's lives, the disruption caused by Father's relocation to Montana, and the potential for emotional or psychological harm to the children if custody is granted to Father.
Ultimately, the evidence demonstrates that the grandparents have rebutted the presumption that Father acts in the children's best interests, as required by ORS 109.119(3)(a). Following this conclusion, the statute mandates that custody must be granted to the grandparents if it aligns with the children's best interests.
Determining whether granting custody to grandparents serves the children's best interests is separate from assessing whether a parent’s presumption of acting in the child's best interest has been rebutted. After a thorough review of the evidence, it is concluded that custodial placement with the grandparents is indeed in the children's best interests.
Father raises constitutional arguments against this conclusion. He does not claim that ORS 109.119 is unconstitutional on its face but contends that its application in his case violates the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. He argues that the state cannot eliminate a common-law cause of action without providing a constitutionally adequate substitute; however, he fails to demonstrate how his rights are implicated by ORS 109.119, leading to no further discussion on this point.
In terms of federal constitutional arguments, Father claims the statute is unconstitutional in its application unless evidence shows he is unfit or that placement with him would harm the child. He cites the Troxel case, asserting it requires significant weight to be given to a fit parent's determination of the child's best interests. The court acknowledges that ORS 109.119 allows the presumption of a parent acting in the child’s best interest to be rebutted by lesser evidence. However, it clarifies that Troxel does not impose a requirement for proving harm or inadequate care, which Father misinterprets. Thus, the application of ORS 109.119 in this case does not violate the father’s due process rights.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Troxel establishes that a court cannot overturn a fit parent's decisions regarding a child's care or custody based solely on the court's assessment of the child's best interests. Instead, a presumption exists that a fit parent's choices align with the child's best interests, and this presumption can only be challenged by sufficient evidence. Troxel mandates that the state must give "some special weight" to a parent's interests in these matters.
In this context, the application of ORS 109.119 supports the father's due process rights by presuming that he acts in the best interests of his children. The court has considered a petition from grandparents, recognized as psychological parents under the statute, and evaluated statutory factors relevant to custody decisions. The conclusion reached is that the evidence presented sufficiently overcomes the presumption in favor of the father, leading to the custody of the children being awarded to the grandparents, while ensuring the father has parenting time as determined by the trial court.
The appellate court acknowledges the limitations inherent in reviewing an older record, which affects the perception of the current situation of the children and the parties involved. However, the necessity for finality in this case has led to a resolution without remanding for additional evidence, as both parties agreed that the existing record was adequate for decision-making. Consequently, the Court of Appeals' decision is reversed, and the circuit court's judgment is affirmed.
The court will grant custody, guardianship, visitation rights, or other parental rights to a person if it finds a child-parent relationship exists and determines, based on a preponderance of evidence, that such action serves the child's best interest. Temporary custody or visitation may be awarded pending a final order. The statute ORS 109.119 was amended by the 2001 Legislative Assembly, with additional amendments in 2003 that do not pertain to the current case. All references to ORS 109.119 will refer to the 2001 version unless specified. ORS 107.137 outlines factors for evaluating a minor's best interests in custody decisions, which this court has affirmed for use under the third-party custody statute. The document notes the lack of specific criteria in the Supreme Court's Troxel v. Granville decision regarding parental rights, indicating that while some constitutional protection exists, it is not strong. Lastly, the trial court confirmed that grandparents established a "child-parent relationship" under the statute, and the constitutionality of ORS 109.119 is not contested in this case. Legislative intent to address issues raised by Troxel was expressed by Representative Lane Shetterly during committee discussions.
The work group and subcommittee focused exclusively on issues stemming from the Troxel case, deliberately avoiding broader discussions on third-party visitation and related statutory changes. They encouraged others to propose legislation addressing these larger issues separately, emphasizing the need for a narrow scope to achieve their objectives efficiently. The juvenile court's jurisdiction is contingent upon assessing the totality of circumstances; it can assume jurisdiction if there is a reasonable likelihood of harm to the child's welfare. The term "legal parent," as per ORS 109.119(2)(a), encompasses biological and adoptive parents whose rights have not been terminated. The definition of "parent" includes biological and adoptive parents, with specific circumstances identifying a biological father as a legal father. Previous case law, such as State v. McMaster, illustrates that parental rights can only be terminated by demonstrating a significant level of detriment beyond typical parental conduct. Consent by a father to grandparents as primary caregivers does not automatically contradict the presumption that the father acts in the children's best interests. Lastly, Article I, section 10, mandates that justice must be administered openly, ensuring individuals have legal remedies for personal, property, or reputational injuries.
