State v. Daniels

Citations: 234 P.3d 976; 348 Or. 513; 2010 Ore. LEXIS 507Docket: CC 200621759; CA A136901; SC S057832

Court: Oregon Supreme Court; July 9, 2010; Oregon; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the case of State v. Devin Jacob Daniels, reversing the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the defendant's conviction for possession and distribution of methamphetamine. The case originated from the Lane County Circuit Court and was presided over by Senior Judge Pierre L. Van Rysselberghe. 

The primary issue was whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to conclude that Daniels had actual or constructive possession of methamphetamine found in his girlfriend's bag. The evidence included observations by police of unusual activity at the residence shared by Daniels and a roommate, leading to a search warrant. During the search, police discovered drug-related items in both Daniels' and his roommate's rooms, including a pink bag containing methamphetamine.

Despite Daniels' claims of the bag belonging to his girlfriend, he confessed to previously selling methamphetamine and using it regularly. The state charged him with possession and distribution of methamphetamine. During the trial, Daniels moved for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds of insufficient evidence regarding both charges; the court granted his motion to reduce the distribution charge, but denied the motion on possession. The jury convicted him on both counts.

On review, the Supreme Court determined that the evidence was inadequate to support the possession conviction, leading to a reversal of the trial court's judgment and a remand for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction for delivery of methamphetamine, but clarified that the jury's decision did not establish that the defendant delivered methamphetamine to Perdune on September 21, 2006. Instead, the delivery in question occurred approximately 30 days earlier. The indictment included two counts: possession of methamphetamine on September 21, 2006, and delivery of methamphetamine between August 1 and September 21, 2006. During the trial, the judge sought clarification on the delivery charge, indicating that the jury should be informed whether the delivery stemmed from the defendant's prior statement to police or an event connected to the informant’s purchase. The state indicated the delivery charge was based on the defendant's prior statement, leading the court to instruct the jury accordingly.

The jury was instructed that the possession charge related solely to whether the defendant possessed methamphetamine at the time of the search on September 21, 2006. The central issue for the appellate court was whether sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's finding that the defendant possessed the methamphetamine discovered in Perdune's bag on that date. In evaluating this, the court needed to determine if a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the essential elements of the crime were proven. The state presented two arguments supporting the sufficiency of the evidence, with the first being that the defendant had actual possession of the methamphetamine found in Perdune's bag, defined as having physical control over it. Although the defendant was not in direct control at the time of discovery, the state argued there was evidence suggesting he had controlled the methamphetamine just prior to the police finding it.

The state presents several points to argue that the defendant had possession of methamphetamine found in his girlfriend Perdune's bag. These points include the defendant's prior admission to selling methamphetamine, the presence of paraphernalia suggesting an active sales operation, and the discovery of methamphetamine in Perdune's bag, which was in a small plastic baggie identical to others found in the house. The state claims the jury could infer that the defendant was the source of the methamphetamine and had physical possession of it on September 21, 2006, either by supplying it to Perdune or placing it in her bag to avoid detection. However, while these scenarios are possible, they are based on speculation rather than reasonable inferences. Evidence shows the defendant supplied methamphetamine to others a month prior and that Perdune had methamphetamine, but there is insufficient evidence to conclude he was the source on that specific date. The defendant had no methamphetamine in his possession, and no other drugs were found in the house.

The state also argues for constructive possession, which extends possession beyond physical control. Under ORS 161.015(9), "possess" includes exercising dominion or control over property. The state contends that the jury could infer that the defendant shared control of the methamphetamine with Perdune, supported by their romantic relationship and the location of the bag in the defendant's bedroom. However, the court rejects these arguments for two reasons: proximity to property owned by a social guest does not imply control, and the evidence did not support a reasonable inference that Perdune was anything more than a social guest. The court references a similar case (State v. Casey) to underscore that mere proximity does not establish dominion or control over another's property.

No reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant had dominion or control over a gun without evidence that he knew a guest was carrying it. When the guest placed the gun on a counter in the defendant's residence, this action, even with the defendant's knowledge, did not establish constructive possession. Guests retain control over their property while visiting another's home, and merely placing an item in the host's residence does not imply intent to cede control. The court referenced Minnesota v. Olson, emphasizing that guests maintain privacy rights despite not having legal interests in the premises. 

Furthermore, the defendant's brief proximity to the gun upon reentering the residence was insufficient to establish constructive possession. The evidence did not support an inference that the defendant knew about a pink bag containing methamphetamine in his bedroom, as there was no indication he had seen inside the bag or that its contents were visible. The state's argument suggesting that a jury could infer the defendant's awareness of the methamphetamine due to a prior sale was deemed unsupported by the facts.

The relationship between the defendant and the guest, Perdune, was romantic, but there was no evidence to suggest any shared control over property. The court concluded that the evidence did not reasonably support a finding of constructive possession of the methamphetamine, resulting in an error by the trial court in denying the defendant's motion for acquittal. The Court of Appeals decision was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Participants at trial referred to a container as a 'pink bag,' 'purse,' or 'backpack,' while the police officer identified it solely as a 'bag' or 'pink bag.' The container was not entered into evidence. Viewing the evidence favorably for the state, there was some indication that Perdune was present during the execution of the search warrant, with the officer testifying that Perdune claimed the bag as hers. The officer was uncertain about the order of interviews conducted, suggesting that another individual was questioned who was also present at the search. Therefore, a reasonable inference could be drawn that Perdune was present and acknowledged ownership of the bag.

According to ORS 475.894(1), it is illegal for a person to knowingly possess methamphetamine unless obtained through a valid prescription or authorized by specific statutes. The defendant sought appellate review regarding the necessity of a unanimous jury verdict, but the court declined to address this issue, limiting the review questions.

During a jury instruction conference, the trial court expressed the need for clarity regarding the charge, highlighting multiple potential bases and dates for the charge, including the informant's entry into the house, the search warrant execution date, and a date related to an alleged sale. The indictment claimed the defendant possessed methamphetamine 'on or about' September 21, 2006. However, the jury was instructed to find possession on that specific date, with no objection from the state. The state's argument did not challenge the need for evidence of possession on that specific date, focusing instead on whether a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the defendant possessed the methamphetamine found in the pink bag on September 21, 2006.