On September 16, 2010, the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the Court of Appeals and circuit court judgments in the case of Beth and Tim Dewsnup v. Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon. The central issue was the definition of "roof" in the context of the Dewsnups' homeowners' insurance policy, which generally excluded water damage except under certain conditions. The trial court had ruled against the Dewsnups on summary judgment, a decision later affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which argued that at the time of damage, the Dewsnups' roof was not a "roof" as defined by the policy since it was undergoing repairs.
The Dewsnups' roof consisted of a plywood sublayer and an outer layer of wood shakes, which were being repaired by Tim Dewsnup, a contractor. During repairs, he replaced the wood shakes with polyethylene sheeting, which was intended to protect the home temporarily. However, a storm caused part of the sheeting to detach, leading to water damage inside the home as it was left exposed. The insurance claim for this damage was denied by Farmers Insurance based on the exclusion clause. The Supreme Court's decision reversed the lower courts' rulings, remanding the case for further proceedings while considering the facts in favor of the Dewsnups.
Defendant sought summary judgment, asserting that plaintiffs' insurance policy excluded water damage unless caused by a windstorm or hail that created a roof opening. Defendant argued that the polyethylene tarp used by plaintiffs did not qualify as a "roof," and even if it were considered one, the damage resulted from "faulty or inadequate workmanship," thus also excluded. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, interpreting the insurance policy to cover only a "dwelling" as specifically described in the declarations, and concluded that once plaintiffs removed the wood shakes, the structure was no longer insured.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning that removing the wood shakes voided the insurance coverage, stating there was no reasonable interpretation of the policy to support that conclusion. The court maintained that policy declarations should not be seen as conditions of coverage and affirmed the trial court's judgment solely on the basis that the plastic sheet could not be considered a "roof." The court defined "roof" based on common understanding, clarifying that roofing refers to the outermost layer suitable for weather protection, and concluded that the tarp was merely a temporary covering, therefore not qualifying for coverage. The court did not address the defendant's alternative arguments due to its finding on the definition of "roof." The case was reviewed to determine what constitutes a "roof" under the insurance policy, noting that insurance policies generally include specific coverage and exclusion clauses, with particular focus on an exception related to water damage.
The plaintiffs' insurance policy includes coverage for their dwelling, separate structures, and certain personal property under the "LOSSES INSURED" section, while exclusions are detailed in "SECTION I. LOSSES NOT INSURED." Water damage is generally excluded, but the policy makes exceptions if such damage results from an initial peril covered under "LOSSES INSURED," specifically when wind or hail causes an opening in a roof, allowing rain or other elements to enter and damage personal property. This stipulation necessitates that the building has a roof for the exception to apply.
The definition of "roof" is contested, with plaintiffs arguing it does not require permanence, pointing to policy language that permits repairs. Conversely, the defendant asserts that a "roof" must be permanent and challenges the notion that temporary materials, like polyethylene sheeting, can qualify as a roof. To interpret the policy, the court emphasizes the intention of the parties, examining the policy terms and definitions. Since "roof" is not defined within the policy, both parties reference dictionary meanings, and if ambiguity persists, interpretations will favor the insured.
The term "roof" is defined as the outer cover of a building, encompassing all necessary materials and construction to maintain that cover. "Roofing" refers to materials used for roof construction designed to protect from weather, with examples such as slate and aluminum. The definitions imply that a roof must provide structural integrity and weather protection but do not require permanence. The argument that a roof must be permanent is countered by the cited case law.
In Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. New Buena Vista Hotel Co., the court ruled that a roof must be reasonably adequate to protect against anticipated weather risks, without holding that permanence is a requirement. The case illustrates that a roof’s adequacy is based on its ability to withstand elements over time, rather than its durability in a permanent sense. This functional perspective suggests that a roof can still be considered a roof if it meets the necessary protective criteria, regardless of its permanence.
The court determined that a layer or two of felt, without any sealing or securing, does not meet the functional definition of a roof. In examining the case of Camden, the court clarified that a roof does not require a permanent seal against weather elements. Instead, it emphasized the importance of the roof's construction and nature; in Camden, the "roof" was merely a pine sublayer, which alone or with an unsecured felt layer, failed to function as a roof, thus excluding the loss from water damage coverage.
The defendant's reliance on the California Court of Appeals case, Diep, appears initially supportive but lacks clarity due to its vague facts. The Diep court noted a contractor covered a warehouse roof opening with plastic sheeting but did not clarify whether this sheeting was securely attached or merely a temporary measure. The opinion suggests that the sheeting was not a structural solution, calling it a "nonstructural band-aid." Furthermore, Diep's definition of a roof, derived from dictionary definitions, noted that a roof is typically a permanent part of a structure, yet this notion of permanence is not substantiated in the context provided.
In the case of Aginsky, the court agreed with the insurer that a roof must be a permanent structure, concluding that a temporary tarp over a completely removed roof could not qualify as a roof. However, Aginsky’s reasoning closely followed Diep, lacking persuasive strength. The court ultimately found that neither Diep nor Aginsky effectively supported the argument that a roof must be permanent, and Camden contradicted this notion. Additionally, the defendant failed to specify what constitutes "permanence" for a roof, leaving the timeframe ambiguous.
The term "permanent" is deemed unhelpful in defining roof durability, which should instead focus on a roof's ability to protect a building from anticipated weather-related risks. The definition of "roof" is clear, requiring no further elaboration. The core issue is whether a reasonable juror could determine that the plaintiffs' roof met this definition. The trial court's record indicates that the plaintiffs' roof was not merely a "plastic tarp" but included a plywood sublayer and a polyethylene covering, which was secured adequately by various components. An expert opined that this setup could protect the home for one to two years, characterizing it as "functionally permanent." This evidence supports the conclusion that a reasonable trier of fact could find the roof durable enough for its intended purpose during repairs authorized by the insurance policy.
The defendant's arguments primarily reflect factual disagreements with the plaintiffs' expert. The defendant claims that a "plastic tarp" cannot adequately protect a structure, but the evidence contradicts this assertion. The defendant's reliance on Webster's definition of "roofing" misinterprets it, as the definition includes non-exhaustive examples of materials rather than strict requirements. The suitability of materials for roofing is a factual matter for the jury. The defendant also argues that wind damage on the first day of using polyethylene sheeting demonstrates its unsuitability. However, this reasoning improperly elevates a permissible inference to a legal standard, failing to account for potential multiple causes of failure. The record does not necessitate the inference suggested by the defendant.
The trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant was found to be in error, as the record suggests that a reasonable juror could determine that the polyethylene sheeting secured to the plywood sublayer qualified as a "roof" under the plaintiffs' homeowners' insurance policy. The defendant's primary argument for summary judgment was inadequate, leading to the conclusion that further factual issues regarding the roof's classification and the quality of workmanship must be resolved by a jury. The defendant also claimed that any damage was due to "faulty or inadequate workmanship or materials," which is excluded from coverage. However, the plaintiffs presented an expert opinion asserting that the workmanship was neither faulty nor defective, which, when taken as true for the purposes of the defendant's motion, undermined this alternative ground for summary judgment. Consequently, the case is remanded for further proceedings, and the ruling of the Court of Appeals is reversed. A dissenting opinion argued that the term "roof" should not encompass the temporary plastic sheeting, suggesting that a reasonable juror would not conclude that it fits the policy's definition of a roof. The dissent emphasized the need for clarity regarding the intentions of the parties when interpreting the insurance policy.
The term "roof" in a homeowner's insurance policy is analyzed through the lens of "permanency" and "functionality." The distinction is made between durable materials suited for long-term use, such as wood shakes or shingles, and temporary coverings like plastic tarps. The majority opinion adopts a "functional approach," suggesting that as long as a material serves the basic function of protecting a dwelling, it qualifies as a roof. However, the context of the insurance policy—specifically its intent and the definition of "roof"—is emphasized as critical. It argues that both parties likely did not intend for the term to encompass temporary materials like tarps or plywood, as these do not align with the policy's description of a roof. Evidence is presented that the plastic tarps failed to adequately protect the home immediately after installation, underscoring their temporary nature. Despite expert testimony claiming the tarps were "functionally permanent," the court contends that they were not intended for long-term use but rather as a temporary measure while awaiting proper repairs. Thus, the court concludes that the insurance policy's coverage does not extend to such temporary solutions.
The insurer is not liable for losses related to a temporary covering used in place of the damaged roof, as the policy does not cover such risks. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer. The expert affidavit regarding the thickness of the polyethylene sheeting is noted, but the distinction between "six mils" and "six millimeters" is not critical to the case. The polyethylene layer was composed of several sheets that completely covered the plywood sublayer. The policy's "Falling Objects" clause excludes coverage for personal property unless the roof is first damaged by a falling object. The plaintiffs claimed that Tim Dewsnup, who fell from the roof, constituted a falling object, but this point was not adjudicated as the insurer did not contest it. The decision references that even the plaintiff in a related case acknowledged that leaving the plastic sheeting exposed for an extended period would not sufficiently protect against wind and rain. Additionally, a contractor's use of a tarp in a similar situation is described, noting the lack of clarity on structural support for the tarp. The contractor eventually created a temporary roof structure over the tarp. The insurer has not presented other policy provisions that would alter the understanding of "roof."
Adopting the interpretation favoring the insured is a guiding principle from Hoffman, even if alternative meanings exist. The defendant argues that the insurance policy necessitates actual damage to the building, claiming no damage occurred, or that any damage was caused by Tim Dewsnup's actions in removing wood shakes, not by wind. These arguments incorrectly assume that the polyethylene sheeting attached to the plywood sublayer either does not qualify as a roof or is not part of the building. On summary judgment, the defendant cannot succeed by asserting that the loss stemmed from faulty maintenance or defective materials.
The homeowner's complaint indicates he removed the shakes as part of a roof replacement. While the insurer might have covered the dwelling despite the temporary use of plastic sheeting, it would likely have required a higher premium due to increased risk. The dissent argues against the majority's assertion that whether a material is suitable for roofing is a factual issue for the jury, asserting instead that insurance policy interpretation is a legal question for the court. The court has previously established that the determination of what constitutes a "roof" within the insurance policy should not be left to the jury when there are no factual disputes.
The majority's dismissal of cases cited by the insurer is critiqued for focusing on "permanency" as a characteristic of a roof, which was previously rejected. The dissent notes that courts have generally concluded that temporary coverings installed while a permanent roof is under repair do not qualify as a "roof" for insurance purposes. Additionally, an expert witness inaccurately described the thickness of the plastic sheeting, significantly misrepresenting its measurement.
