Court: Supreme Court of Vermont; August 31, 2007; Vermont; State Supreme Court
Plaintiffs Danny L. DeGraff, Nancy R. DeGraff, and MBS Hardware Lumber, Inc. appeal a trial court's order in a quiet-title action concerning a twenty-seven-foot-wide triangular easement on property owned by defendant Norman Burnett. The court ruled that the plaintiffs had the right to use this easement for garage space and lumber storage. Plaintiffs contest the court’s interpretation of their deed, the denial of damages, and the refusal of a jury trial, but the appellate court affirms the trial court's decision.
Plaintiffs own Lot 5 in Milton, Vermont, purchased from William and Lois Warren in 1990, and operate a lumber business on this property. Their deed includes two easements, one of which burdens Lot 3, now owned by defendant Burnett. This easement, as per the deed, allows for lumber storage and garage space, extending from Lot 5 and following an existing fence line.
Defendant Burnett acquired Lot 3 in 2002, and the deed explicitly noted the easement's existence without guaranteeing its size or exact location. After Burnett took possession, plaintiffs made improvements to the easement area but were met with resistance when Burnett removed their enhancements. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed for a quiet-title action, seeking clarification of the easement's boundaries, compensation for the damage to their property, and the right to use the easement for truck access.
Defendant filed for partial summary judgment, arguing that the easement description in the deed was clear and should not be challenged with extrinsic evidence. Plaintiffs countered with a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that the fence line should be considered as the controlling monument for the easement, thereby claiming a wider easement than specified. They also contended that their easement included ingress and egress rights from Town Highway 47.
In April 2003, Judge Dennis Pearson denied both parties' motions regarding the interpretation of a deed related to an easement. The defendant's motion was deemed inadequately supported, while the plaintiffs' request was denied due to the need for extrinsic evidence to clarify ambiguities regarding the easement's allowed use and location. The court determined that the deed did not grant plaintiffs a right of ingress and egress, stating that the easement was specified for "storing lumber and garage space." The court noted that Mr. Warren, the grantor, was capable of clearly articulating rights when intended, and recognized that plaintiffs had access to the storage area via their own property.
Regarding the easement's location, the court found that the deed provided two precise descriptions: a width of twenty-seven feet measured from the southeasterly corner of Lot 5 and that it "follows an existing fence line." Plaintiffs argued that the easement should extend to the fence line, suggesting a width of approximately sixty-five feet at the edge of TH 47, conflicting with the deed's language. The court acknowledged both interpretations but favored the defendant’s construction, which aligned with the deed's terms and the physical boundaries on the ground. The court concluded that material factual disputes prevented a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
Following a three-day trial before Judge Richard Norton, the court issued a final order that partially incorporated Judge Pearson’s earlier findings. It considered extrinsic evidence, including the contract formation circumstances and hearsay from the grantor, ultimately adopting the defendant’s interpretation of the deed. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence, including Danny DeGraff's testimony about a promise to convey an easement to the fence line, noting that the deed explicitly stated the easement’s width and dimensions. A 1998 survey map indicating a sixty-five-foot easement was deemed inconclusive as it was based on the area’s appearance in 1998, and the surveyor testified it did not reflect the deed's terms accurately.
The court found that the defendant provided credible evidence supporting his claim that Mr. Warren indicated the sixty-five-foot easement boundary shown on the 1998 survey map encroached onto Lot 3. Defendant's testimony was corroborated by Steve Jangraw, who testified that Mr. Warren clarified that the existing fence was not the boundary line; rather, the plaintiffs' easement extended twenty-seven feet south from a pin near the mailbox, as reflected in the plaintiffs' deed. The court deemed Jangraw's testimony persuasive and factual.
Additionally, David Bowers, an experienced surveyor, testified about marking the easement's boundaries starting from a pin at Lot 5's southeast corner, extending twenty-seven feet southerly, and then along the existing fence line. The court found Bowers' testimony compelling, leading to the conclusion that the phrase "follows an existing fence line" in the deed meant to run alongside the fence line, logically narrower than it. This interpretation harmonized all deed terms and was uncontradicted by any evidence from Mr. DeGraff, whose self-serving testimony was given less weight. The court considered Mr. Warren's hearsay statements credible in explaining the twenty-seven-foot language's existence in the deed.
The court concluded that the easement area described by Mr. Bowers was a triangular area with a base of twenty-seven feet, running parallel to the fence line, consistent with the deed language. While the court acknowledged the fence line as a monument indicating the easement's direction, it did not control the boundary, which was defined by clear metes-and-bounds.
Regarding the easement's permissible use, the court noted that the DeGraffs presented evidence of its use as a commercial driveway and storage area but failed to clarify the deed's language or original intent. The court determined that the plaintiffs' mixed use contradicted the deed, which only permitted storing lumber and using the easement for garage services. There was no support for using the easement as access to the rear of Lot 5, leading to the conclusion that such use could not continue. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claims for damages related to the loss of a gate or structures in the encroached area. An appeal followed.
Plaintiffs contend that the court misinterpreted their deed, arguing that it is unambiguous and that the term "follows an existing fence line" should solely indicate that the fence line is the boundary. They assert that any measurement discrepancies should favor the fence line and claim the court erred by considering extrinsic evidence and overlooking the parties' intent during the conveyance. Additionally, plaintiffs argue that the court wrongly excluded evidence pertinent to this intent.
The court found no error, asserting that the trial court correctly evaluated extrinsic evidence to clarify ambiguities in the deed. The guiding principle in deed interpretation is that the intent of the parties governs, necessitating a holistic reading of the deed to achieve a consistent meaning. A deed is deemed ambiguous if reasonable interpretations vary.
In this case, the deed's description of the easement as "27 feet in width" and "follows an existing fence line" was found ambiguous, as it could imply either that the easement extends directly to the fence line or runs parallel to it. Plaintiffs' reliance on dictionary definitions for "follows" is insufficient, as the phrase's contextual use allows for multiple interpretations. Furthermore, the deed's reference to a monument was also ambiguous, meaning that the plaintiffs' interpretation rule did not dictate the deed's terms. The trial court noted that the references could be harmonized without conflict.
The court addressed the ambiguity in the deed by considering extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent, referencing applicable legal precedents. Although the plaintiffs claimed the grantor intended to convey an easement to the fence line, they could not clarify the inclusion of a twenty-seven-foot measurement in the deed. Conversely, the defendant presented credible evidence indicating that the grantor intended to convey a twenty-seven-foot-wide easement, consistent with the deed's language. The court emphasized that it was not required to accept the plaintiffs' evidence regarding intent.
The plaintiffs contested the admissibility of evidence that did not directly relate to the grantor's intent at the time of conveyance. However, the defendant's evidence was pertinent to Mr. Warren's intentions and admissible under a hearsay exception. The court concluded that the phrase "follows the existing fence line" meant "running in a line parallel to," a decision supported by the evidence and consistent with the deed's overall language.
The plaintiffs' assertion that a right of ingress and egress was implicit in their easement was rejected, as the deed language was unambiguous and did not grant such rights. The court found the language clear and indicative that the grantor understood how to convey specific rights when intended, thus upholding the plain meaning of the deed without resorting to construction aids. The trial court's interpretation of the easement's location and allowed uses was deemed proper and supported by the record, with the Supreme Court indicating it would not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they were clearly erroneous.
Plaintiffs' argument for reversing the court's judgment based on the exclusion of evidence regarding the intent of their grantors in conveying an easement is rejected. The court had excluded testimony from witnesses including Mr. DeGraff, Ms. Strong, attorney Roger Kohn, and Mr. Bowers, believing it was inadmissible due to the doctrine of merger. However, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate any harm from this exclusion, as required by V.R.C.R 61, which states that errors not affecting substantial rights may be disregarded.
Despite the excluded testimonies, the witnesses still conveyed the intent behind the deed, but the court was unconvinced, particularly regarding a specific twenty-seven-foot measurement included in the deed. The court found that additional evidence would likely not have changed the outcome.
Specific instances of evidentiary error were examined: Mr. DeGraff's attempt to explain Mr. Warren's intentions regarding wider easement access was curtailed by an objection, but he still described past usage of the access point, rendering any exclusion harmless. Ms. Strong's testimony about the easement intended "to the fence line" was also restricted, with the court determining that the deed's terms were clear and unambiguous. Attorney Kohn was allowed to testify about statements made by Mr. Warren regarding the easement's boundaries, which indicated that the language in the deed did not align with Mr. Warren's understanding. Overall, the plaintiffs failed to show that the court's rulings negatively impacted their case, including the exclusion of Mr. Bowers' testimony.
Mr. Bowers’ testimony was upheld as reliable despite plaintiffs' claims that he lacked proper expert qualification and that his statements indicated unreliability. The trial court allowed Mr. Bowers to provide expert testimony after assessing his qualifications and offering plaintiffs the opportunity to depose him, to which they did not object. The court noted that it is responsible for evaluating witness credibility, and no reversible evidentiary errors were found.
The plaintiffs' claim for damages due to the destruction of a fence, gate, and driveway was denied, as the court determined these structures were outside the easement's bounds. Evidence presented supported the defendant's actions as minimal self-help to remove trespassing structures and to replace a fence at the easement boundary.
The plaintiffs committed trespass by making improvements on the defendant’s property without a valid access right, particularly after the easement boundaries were disputed, thus negating their entitlement to remedies.
Additionally, the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' request for a jury trial was affirmed, with evidence showing that the plaintiffs waived this right in open court as required by the rules. The plaintiffs’ late assertion regarding the interpretation of their deed and a related purchase-and-sale agreement was also rejected, as the trial court found no easement for the yard fence was conveyed in the warranty deed, emphasizing that the assessment of evidence weight remains with the trial court.
