Court: District Court, W.D. Texas; February 24, 2019; Federal District Court
The legal document involves a case where the League of United Latin American Citizens and several individuals (Plaintiffs) are challenging Texas' winner-take-all (WTA) system for appointing presidential electors against Texas officials Greg Abbott and Rolando Pablos (Defendants). The Plaintiffs argue that this system violates the Fourteenth Amendment by disproportionately amplifying the votes of a plurality while disregarding those for losing candidates, thus undermining electoral fairness. They also claim violations of the First Amendment, stating the WTA system restricts the right to associate and participate meaningfully in presidential elections, and of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, asserting that the system disadvantages Hispanic and African-American voters similar to at-large voting districts.
The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the Court granted after considering both sides' arguments and legal standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal for failure to state a claim. The Court's decision followed a hearing where legal representatives for each side presented their cases. The case was filed on February 21, 2018, with subsequent motions and responses leading to the ruling on February 13, 2019.
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts accept well-pleaded facts as true and evaluate them favorably towards the plaintiff. To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff must present sufficient factual content to establish a plausible claim, allowing for a reasonable inference of the defendant's liability. The U.S. Constitution grants state legislatures the authority to determine how Electoral College Electors are selected, which means citizens do not possess a federal constitutional right to vote for these Electors. However, once a state legislature allocates the right to vote for President to its citizens, that right becomes fundamental. Plaintiffs in this case challenge Texas's method of choosing Electors based on the political party receiving the most votes, asserting violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Defendants seek dismissal on two grounds: that plaintiffs' claims are barred by established precedent and, alternatively, that the claims fail on their merits. They reference prior Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit decisions, particularly McPherson v. Blacker, which upheld a district-based system for electing Electors. However, McPherson does not directly address winner-takes-all (WTA) systems and its precedent predates significant changes in voter equality jurisprudence, notably the 'one person, one vote' principle established in the 1960s and 1970s.
The concept of political equality, underscored by pivotal historical documents and amendments, asserts the principle of "one person, one vote." The Supreme Court case Baker v. Carr established that malapportionment claims under the Fourteenth Amendment are justiciable, affirming that every citizen's right to vote must be equal without discrimination. However, the criteria for determining equal voting rights have evolved, as demonstrated in Reynolds v. Sims and Wesberry v. Sanders, which mandated proportionality in state and federal legislative districts, respectively. The core issue in the current case is whether Texas's Winner-Takes-All (WTA) electoral system causes unequal voting among its citizens.
Plaintiffs argue that their votes are effectively diminished because they have not had Electors representing their preferred candidates in decades. However, these claims do not establish an Equal Protection violation since precedent, specifically the Hitson case, indicates that minority groups do not have a constitutional right to electoral control over specific offices. The plaintiffs' assertion that the Texas system undermines their voting strength is countered by the fact that the structure does not inherently violate Equal Protection rights. Additionally, the Williams case supports this view, where a similar challenge to Virginia's WTA system was rejected, affirming that such a method does not contravene constitutional principles. The court in Williams found no constitutional issues with the WTA system, maintaining that it aligns with established legal doctrines.
The Williams Court articulated that the deprivations caused by the Winner-Take-All (WTA) rule do not equate to violations of the one-person, one-vote doctrine or other constitutional protections. It emphasized that the WTA system does not undermine the influence of an individual's ballot or privilege one vote over another. While the rule may disadvantage minority voters by favoring the majority, it is not considered invidious discrimination, as all citizens enjoy equal voting rights without losing their franchise.
The court addressed the plaintiffs' argument that Williams is not applicable because voters in Texas directly select presidential candidates, unlike Virginia's system where voters selected candidates for Electors. The court noted that both systems function similarly as voters support a political party's slate, thus presenting no significant factual difference.
Plaintiffs further claimed that Williams failed to address their primary constitutional concern regarding the WTA's potential to discard presidential votes, akin to issues in Gray v. Sanders. However, the Williams court had already considered a similar argument and concluded that Virginia's WTA system, like Texas's, did not fall under the precedent set by Gray.
Plaintiffs also cited White v. Regester, asserting that it altered the legal landscape by invalidating multi-member districts that diluted the voting power of racial groups. The White ruling, however, clarified that multi-member districts are not inherently unconstitutional and that challenges must demonstrate intentional discrimination. The court found that the principles established in White align with Williams, which permits WTA elector selection under the condition that discrimination is not invidious, thereby reinforcing the idea that the majority must govern in a democratic society.
The Court acknowledges Texas's history of electoral discrimination but notes that Plaintiffs fail to provide evidence that the Winner-Takes-All (WTA) system was implemented to undermine any specific group's voting power. WTA has been the prevalent method for electing Presidential Electors in Texas since 1848 and is used by 48 states and the District of Columbia, including many states without a history of discrimination. The WTA system serves a legitimate purpose by preventing other states from diluting a state's electoral influence through divided representation.
Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore altered the standards for proving violations of equal protection, suggesting that it now suffices to show arbitrary and disparate treatment rather than invidious discrimination. However, the Court finds the precedential value of Bush unclear, as its ruling was limited to its specific circumstances and did not explicitly overrule prior cases like Williams. The Court emphasizes that the Supreme Court typically does not overturn or limit earlier rulings without direct acknowledgment. Additionally, both pre- and post-Bush cases indicate that proving invidious discrimination is still a requirement for Equal Protection claims. The Court highlights that a valid claim can be established based on either invidious discrimination or arbitrary treatment, consistent with earlier rulings.
In Hunter v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, the 6th Circuit applied an 'arbitrary and disparate' standard, indicating that prior Supreme Court rulings did not necessitate a showing of intentional discrimination. Legislation inherently involves classifications, and only those that are invidious, arbitrary, or irrational violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has instructed lower federal courts to adhere to established precedents, even when subsequent decisions seem to weaken them, leaving any overruling to the Court itself. Consequently, the Court found no significant factual or doctrinal differences to challenge the precedents set by Hitson and Williams, leading to the dismissal of the Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim. However, Hitson and Williams were limited to challenges under the Equal Protection guarantee regarding the selection of presidential electors and did not address First Amendment claims or those under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).
The discussion then shifts to freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, affirming that the right to associate for promoting beliefs is fundamental to the liberty assured by the Due Process Clause. While voter rights are fundamental, not all state-imposed restrictions are constitutionally suspect. Courts must evaluate the injury to First and Fourteenth Amendment rights claimed by the plaintiff against the state's justifications for its election laws. This evaluation is complex and requires careful judgment. Plaintiffs argued that Texas' winner-takes-all (WTA) system burdens their associational rights by diluting minority party votes, discouraging participation in minority parties, and eliminating effective avenues for non-dominant party voters. However, the Court concluded that these claims did not present a recognizable burden on the Plaintiffs' associational rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The election process is primarily designed to select candidates, as stated in Burdick v. Takushi, without compromising the fairness and efficiency of elections. The current case differs from those cited by the Plaintiffs, as it does not involve ballot access issues or the ability to vote for preferred candidates, since the Democratic candidate was on the ballot and all individual plaintiffs confirmed their ability to vote for him in past elections. Additionally, the case does not restrict a political party's associational opportunities during primaries, as the plaintiffs successfully translated their shared principles into collective voting action for Democratic candidates.
The Petition Clause, relevant in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, is not at issue here, as the existence of this lawsuit itself demonstrates the exercise of such rights. The case also does not relate to the Equal Protection Clause, as discussed in Reynolds v. Sims. The Plaintiffs fail to cite relevant case law supporting their claims of associational harms under the First Amendment. Justice Kagan's concurrence in Gill v. Whitford highlights that significant First Amendment concerns arise when a state subjects a political group to unfavorable treatment, which can damage the party's political strength and operational capacity. However, such harms must stem from discriminatory treatment based on political views, which is not demonstrated in this case.
Plaintiffs' alleged harms are attributed not to their views but to the numerical superiority of Republican voters over Democrats in Texas, leading to their electoral defeat. The First Amendment does not guarantee successful advocacy or persuasion; rather, the election process is designed to determine a winner among candidates, as established in prior case law. Plaintiffs’ votes were counted equally to all others, and their dissatisfaction arises from the natural outcome of democracy, which does not constitute a First Amendment violation. The inability of Plaintiffs' candidate to secure Electors does not render their voting ineffective, as no group is constitutionally entitled to design electoral systems to guarantee control over elections. Even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate First and Fourteenth Amendment violations, Texas's interest in maintaining a unified bloc of Presidential Electors to maximize electoral power is justified and historically supported, as recognized by figures like Thomas Jefferson. The widespread implementation of winner-takes-all (WTA) systems by 47 states further legitimizes this interest. Consequently, Plaintiffs' claims regarding violations of their freedom of association must be dismissed. Additionally, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits electoral practices that deny or abridge voting rights based on race or language minority status, requiring an assessment of whether political processes are equally accessible to all citizens.
Minority voters alleging a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) must demonstrate that a multimember electoral structure diminishes their ability to elect preferred candidates. Plaintiffs claim Texas' winner-takes-all (WTA) method for selecting Presidential Electors infringes this right, drawing parallels to the Supreme Court's Gingles framework regarding North Carolina's multimember districts. The court agrees that Section 2 applies to presidential elections, as it is broadly defined to encompass all elections where registered voters participate.
However, the court finds that Plaintiffs have not adequately stated a claim under Section 2. It clarifies that multimember districts are not inherently discriminatory against minority voters. According to Gingles, to challenge an at-large system, plaintiffs must prove: (1) the minority group is sufficiently large and compact to form a majority in a single-member district; (2) it is politically cohesive; and (3) the white majority votes as a bloc to usually defeat the minority's preferred candidates.
Plaintiffs' data from the 2008 and 2016 elections show that a significant portion of white voters supported Democratic candidates, undermining the argument of uniform white bloc voting. Additionally, a considerable number of Hispanic voters supported Republican candidates, suggesting that the electoral challenges faced by minority voters stem more from partisan dynamics than racial bloc voting. The court cites Fifth Circuit precedent indicating that proving significant racial bloc voting requires demonstrating that electoral failure is not merely a product of political defeat but rather indicative of racial discrimination.
Judicial intervention in electoral processes requires evidence of racial vote dilution or built-in bias, not merely a lack of electoral success among minorities. The Fifth Circuit, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Whitcomb, emphasizes that failures at the polls attributed to partisan politics do not warrant relief under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This section protects against racial discrimination, not political defeats, meaning that minority groups must show their electoral losses stem from race-based discrimination rather than partisan affiliations. The court highlights that similar electoral failures experienced by Democrats or other groups do not demonstrate a unique disadvantage for minorities. Additionally, even if plaintiffs meet the Gingles' three preconditions, they must prove that they lack the same political participation opportunities as other voters. The plaintiffs’ electoral defeats were not unique to their racial group; rather, they mirrored the experiences of other Democratic voters in a predominantly Democratic state, suggesting that the losses were due to a lower number of Democratic voters overall, rather than systemic racial disenfranchisement. Thus, the evidence indicates that approximately 40% of Hispanic voters successfully elected their preferred candidates, while the issue of representation reflects broader political trends rather than racial discrimination.
Vote dilution requires a comparison to an 'undiluted' voting practice, necessitating that plaintiffs propose a reasonable alternative benchmark. The plaintiffs claim their primary remedy is for the state to create its own constitutional scheme for selecting Electors. However, this vague remedy does not define a clear 'undiluted' practice for comparison against Texas's current system. They dismiss the alternative of Congressional district-based selection as unrepresentative. Consequently, the burden of presenting a benchmark cannot be shifted to the defendants.
The plaintiffs also suggest that if state authorities fail to implement a valid method for selecting Electors, the Court should order a proportional distribution of Electors based on statewide votes. Nevertheless, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) does not establish a right to proportional representation for racial or political minorities. The intent of Section 2 is to uphold the Fifteenth Amendment, ensuring no voter is denied rights based on race or color. Allowing or requiring proportional representation in the Electoral College would not align with the constitutional violations asserted, which is necessary for remedial legislation.
As a result, the Court dismisses the plaintiffs' claims under Section 2 of the VRA, along with their Fourteenth Amendment claim regarding "one person, one vote," which is precluded by precedent. The Court finds that amending claims related to the First Amendment and the VRA would be futile, leading to their dismissal with prejudice. The ruling aligns with recent decisions in Massachusetts and California, affirming similar challenges to the winner-take-all system for selecting Presidential Electors. The Court concludes that the plaintiffs' prudential arguments are irrelevant to the matter at hand.
WTA (Winner-Takes-All) systems for selecting Presidential electors may influence campaign strategies and potential external election interference, but these factors are irrelevant to the court's assessment of their constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Voting Rights Act (VRA). If WTA systems are constitutional, their merits reside with state legislatures; if deemed unconstitutional or contrary to statute, they cannot be implemented regardless of perceived wisdom. The Michigan system cited allowed each congressional district to select one elector, along with two "at large" electors from the state’s Senate representation.
The plaintiffs' proposal for proportional elector selection faces significant legal obstacles, as the Supreme Court has rejected claims for a constitutional guarantee of proportional representation. The Court affirmed that the one person, one vote principle applies when congressional representatives are chosen statewide. Texas' WTA system is deemed compliant with the Fourteenth Amendment based on existing precedents. The plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim is likely to fail, as their focus on electors overlooks that votes are primarily for presidential candidates. The court recognizes that invalidating WTA systems nationwide could negate the plaintiffs' interests, but this case only challenges Texas' system without requesting broader remedies.
Additionally, the court questions whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated sufficient evidence for their Equal Protection claim regarding Hispanic voters, noting that significant portions of Hispanic voters did not support the Democratic candidate in recent elections, suggesting that a minor shift in voting patterns could have influenced election outcomes.
