Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; June 27, 2018; Federal Appellate Court
Jeffrey Jones, a Capitol Police officer, has filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for injuries sustained when retired officer Julian Mitchell allegedly grabbed him by the neck. The case involves a motion to dismiss by the Defendant for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Jones' motion to amend his complaint to include his wife as a plaintiff.
Jones' amended complaint describes an incident on November 30, 2015, when Mitchell, unescorted in a restricted area, approached Jones from behind and forcefully grabbed his neck. This sudden act caused Jones to experience pain and discomfort, leading to medical treatment and significant expenses, alongside lost work for the entirety of 2016.
Jones initially filed his claims for premises liability and negligence on July 26, 2017, and later sought to add a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and include his wife as a plaintiff. However, the court dismissed his wife's claims due to jurisdictional deficiencies regarding the FTCA's exhaustion requirement. The Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss Jones' claims, arguing that they are precluded by the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA). Jones then filed another motion to amend his complaint to re-add his wife as a plaintiff. The court ultimately decided to grant the Defendant's motion to dismiss and deny Jones' motion to amend.
Federal courts operate under limited jurisdiction, requiring a thorough examination of jurisdictional authority. A party asserting jurisdiction must demonstrate it exists, as claims are presumed to be outside this jurisdiction. In motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Courts can dismiss such motions based solely on the complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true.
In this case, the Court agrees with the Defendant regarding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Jones' remaining claims and will dismiss them. The United States cannot be sued without its consent, and sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, meaning claims barred by it cannot proceed. Although the federal government may waive its immunity, such waivers must be explicitly stated in law.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) allows for the waiver of sovereign immunity in tort cases involving federal employees; however, the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) excludes certain claims, providing an administrative remedy for work-related injuries and preventing federal employees from suing for damages related to those injuries. The text of FECA explicitly states that its provisions are the sole liability of the United States regarding employee injuries, designed to protect the government from FTCA claims. This reflects a legislative compromise where employees receive guaranteed benefits while relinquishing the right to sue the government for work-related injuries.
Jones' tort claims against the United States are barred under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) due to the exclusivity provision of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), which precludes claims for work-related injuries. His alleged injuries occurred during his employment with the United States Capitol Police (USCP) when he was on duty and in uniform. Although Jones experienced significant pain following an incident on November 30, 2015, and his physician confirmed that his injuries were sustained in the performance of duty, he previously sought compensation under FECA for these injuries.
While Jones acknowledges that his premises-liability and negligence claims fall under FECA, he contends that his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) should not be precluded by FECA, arguing it does not pertain to covered injuries. The D.C. Circuit has not settled whether FECA encompasses IIED claims, leading to uncertainty that ultimately disadvantages Jones. Other circuits have varied in their rulings on this matter. Given the lack of binding authority and the substantial question regarding FECA's coverage of IIED claims, such claims are not properly before the court until the Secretary of Labor makes a determination on their coverage. Consequently, the court concludes that Jones' FTCA claims must be dismissed due to their preclusion by FECA, resulting in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), a party may amend their pleading with the opposing party's consent or with the court's permission once they can no longer amend as of right. Courts are inclined to grant such requests unless the amendment is deemed futile, meaning the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss. In this case, Jones seeks to amend his complaint to include his wife, McMahon, as an additional party concerning three tort claims. However, the court denies the motion on the grounds of futility due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) excludes McMahon's proposed Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claims related to her husband's injuries, as FECA's exclusivity provision establishes that liability under FECA is the sole remedy for both the employee and their spouse. Consequently, all of McMahon's claims, including the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim, are precluded. As a result, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims, leading to the conclusion that the defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted and Jones' motion to file a second amended complaint will be denied, resulting in the dismissal of the action.
