Doe v. Brown University

Citation: 270 F. Supp. 3d 556Docket: C. A. No. 16-614-M-LDA

Court: District Court, D. Rhode Island; September 6, 2017; Federal District Court

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A private right of action under Title IX has been recognized to address gender discrimination in federally-funded educational institutions. Jane Doe seeks to expand Title IX's protections to individuals who are neither students nor staff at the institution involved. Doe's case against Brown University and its administrators was met with a motion for judgment on the pleadings from the defendants. The court ruled that Doe's proposed expansion of Title IX is not supported by the statute or relevant case law, granting the defendants' motion.

In 2018, while a freshman at Providence College, Doe was drugged and sexually assaulted by three Brown University football players. Following the assault, she reported the incident to both local police and Brown University, leading to investigations that uncovered evidence supporting her claims. Brown agreed to conduct a disciplinary inquiry but later abandoned the investigation, leading to Doe feeling unsafe and ultimately withdrawing from Providence College.

Doe alleges that Brown University, through its administrators, failed to protect her under Title IX and acted with deliberate indifference to her situation, resulting in a hostile educational environment that interfered with her access to educational opportunities. She also claims violations of the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act and the state constitution. The defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), which requires the court to view the facts favorably to the nonmovant and draw reasonable inferences.

A motion to dismiss is utilized to evaluate the adequacy of a complaint. A plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss if they can show entitlement to relief based on plausible facts that go beyond mere labels or formulaic statements. If the complaint presents facts that are vague or conclusory, it risk dismissal. The court employs a two-step analysis to assess plausibility: first, it disregards conclusory assertions, and second, it determines whether the remaining facts support a reasonable inference of the defendant's liability.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex-based discrimination in federally funded educational programs, ensuring students are free from sexual harassment that impairs their access to education. Title IX provides a mechanism for relief through an administrative process linked to compliance with nondiscriminatory mandates, but the Supreme Court has recognized an implied private right of action for damages under Title IX. This allows individuals to seek monetary damages against schools and their programs for violations of their rights. 

To establish a claim for sexual harassment under Title IX, a plaintiff must prove: 1) they experienced "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" harassment from a peer; 2) the harassment deprived them of educational opportunities; 3) the funding recipient was aware of the harassment; 4) the harassment occurred within its programs or activities; and 5) the recipient's response was deliberately indifferent and unreasonable given the circumstances. These elements assume the plaintiff is part of the protected class under Title IX.

Two categories of protected individuals under Title IX are identified: students and school employees. Brown University contends that Ms. Doe, not being a student at their institution and not receiving educational benefits from it, does not qualify for Title IX protections. They argue that protections apply only to student-on-student harassment involving students enrolled at the same school. Ms. Doe, however, asserts that Title IX protects all individuals from gender discrimination, including campus guests, as indicated by the statute's general language. She claims that Brown officials were aware of the incident involving her and a Brown student in February 2014 but failed to act, which compelled her to withdraw from her educational programs at Providence College.

The central issue is whether a Providence College student who was assaulted by a Brown student on Brown's campus can pursue a Title IX damages claim against Brown for depriving her of educational opportunities. The court must consider the intent of Congress and the language of Title IX. Legislative history indicates that Title IX was designed to address discrimination related specifically to students within educational programs at the institution in question. Statements from Senator Birch E. Bayh, the author of Title IX, suggest that the protections were intended primarily for students admitted to the offending institution. Existing case law reinforces this interpretation, indicating that Title IX protections are generally limited to students attending the accused school. Additionally, a funding recipient, like Brown, may only be held liable under Title IX if it directly engages in harassment or exhibits deliberate indifference that subjects its students to harassment.

The court reviewed the issue of a school's liability under Title IX concerning a non-student, referencing the case K.T. v. Culver-Stockton College, which established that a non-student cannot bring a Title IX damages claim if they are not among those Congress intended to protect. The court determined that since Ms. Doe, a high school student visiting Brown University as a potential recruit, was not a student there, she could not establish a Title IX claim. The court emphasized that Ms. Doe's lack of enrollment at Brown meant the university's actions did not affect her access to education at Providence College, where she was a student. It noted that Title IX applies only to discrimination occurring within the educational programs or activities of the school in question, as established in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District.

The court found no persuasive support in the cases cited by Ms. Doe, highlighting that the Supreme Court's decision in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell dealt with employment discrimination, not the rights of non-students at different educational institutions. Consequently, Ms. Doe's status as a non-student was deemed to exclude her from Title IX’s protections, leading to the dismissal of her federal claim.

Additionally, the court considered Ms. Doe's state law claims under RICRA and the Rhode Island Constitution, noting the need to decide whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over these claims given the dismissal of the federal claim.

Whether a court should decline supplemental jurisdiction is based on a pragmatic evaluation of factors such as fairness, judicial economy, convenience, and comity. After reassessing these factors, the court decides to dismiss two state law claims to avoid unnecessary state law decisions, promoting justice and comity. The RICRA claim presents significant state law questions best addressed in state court, and the First Circuit advises caution in interpreting state constitutional issues. Consequently, the court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.

In the conclusion, the case involves serious allegations of student misconduct at a Rhode Island college. However, Title IX, which protects students from sexual discrimination, does not cover all instances of sexual assault in educational settings. While Ms. Doe argues that schools may act with deliberate indifference to sexual harassment, Title IX is primarily an administrative enforcement statute, and her case does not fall within the limited legal precedents that allow for a private right of action for damages. The court grants the defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings regarding the federal claims and dismisses the remaining state law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

The court accepts Ms. Doe's allegations as true at this stage, but has not verified their accuracy. Ms. Doe has a pending complaint with the OCR against Brown University, believing it must address her concerns under Title IX. Notably, she does not claim common law premises liability or any other non-statutory claims. The court highlights that sexual harassment constitutes gender discrimination, and most cited case law involves Title IX claims from students who have been harassed by peers or faculty within the same educational institution. In such cases, schools have the authority to manage harassment and protect students' educational opportunities.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision in K.T. v. Culver-Stockton College on merits but did not determine the applicability of Title IX to non-students, assuming it applied for the sake of the district court's analysis regarding the plaintiff's failure to state a claim. It noted that if K.T. had been a Brown University student, the institution would have been aware of the incident by February 2014 and could have taken actions such as changing her classes or living arrangements to ensure her educational opportunities. Ms. Doe's cited cases do not bolster her argument: 

1. **Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder** involved assaults by both students and non-student recruits, where Title IX was applicable due to the assaults arising from an official athletic recruiting program, reflecting the university's failure to exert control.
   
2. **Crandell v. New York College of Osteopathic Medicine** established that a school can be liable for harassment of its students by non-students during required educational programs, but this was not relevant in Ms. Doe’s case as she was not a Brown student, and the assault did not occur in a required educational context.

3. **Kauhako v. State of Hawaii Board of Education** involved a student-on-student assault where the school had notice of prior incidents but failed to act, highlighting a lack of protective measures. This case was not applicable to Ms. Doe's situation since it involved two students from the same institution. 

Overall, the document emphasizes that Title IX's applicability hinges on the student status of the victim and the context of the alleged harassment or assault.