Court: District Court, E.D. Washington; August 12, 2016; Federal District Court
The Court grants Christobal Miguel Rios’s motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which seeks re-sentencing. Rios was indicted for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and pled guilty on June 4, 2013. His plea agreement suggested a Base Offense Level of 20, leading to a recommended sentence of 60 months, which the Court imposed on October 1, 2013, without an appeal being filed. Rios filed the motion on May 4, 2016, arguing that the Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson v. United States invalidated the residual clause used to enhance his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). The Supreme Court's upcoming decision in Beckles v. United States would address the retroactive application of Johnson, prompting the Court to initially halt proceedings on Rios’s motion and seek further briefing. The legal standard for relief under § 2255 includes claims of constitutional violations, lack of jurisdiction, exceeding maximum authorized sentences, or sentences subject to collateral attack. Errors must reflect a fundamental defect leading to a miscarriage of justice.
Under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1, a defendant convicted of unlawful firearm possession faces an enhanced Base Offense Level of 20 if they have a prior felony conviction for a "crime of violence" or a "controlled substance offense." A "crime of violence" includes any crime punishable by over a year in prison that involves the use or threat of physical force, certain enumerated offenses, or conduct posing a serious risk of physical injury, the latter defined under the 'residual clause.' The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States deemed the residual clause of a similar statute unconstitutionally vague, impacting its interpretation across related guidelines.
Mr. Rios contends that post-Johnson, his residential burglary conviction should not qualify as a "crime of violence," rendering his 60-month sentence unlawful. The government counters his motion on two grounds: first, by asserting that Rios waived his right to challenge his conviction and sentence; and second, by arguing that Johnson is a non-retroactive procedural rule regarding the Guidelines, based on Teague v. Lane.
Plea agreements are treated as contracts enforceable as written, provided the waiver is clear and made knowingly. A waiver of appellate rights is enforceable unless specific conditions are met, such as violations of Rule 11, misleading information from the judge, or if the sentence is illegal or does not align with the plea agreement. The determination of whether Rios's waiver is enforceable and whether his constitutional claim under Johnson is valid hinges on whether his sentence violates the Constitution. The Court concludes that Rios’s sentence is unconstitutional, thereby allowing his claim to proceed despite the waiver.
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane establishes the framework for retroactivity in federal collateral review cases. Generally, new constitutional rules do not apply retroactively to final convictions at the time of the rule's announcement, with two exceptions recognized by Teague: new substantive rules of constitutional law and new watershed rules of criminal procedure that affect fundamental fairness and accuracy. Both parties acknowledge that Johnson announced a new rule, as it was not dictated by existing precedent at the time of the defendant's final conviction. The central issue is whether Johnson's rule, as it pertains to the Guidelines, is retroactive under Teague.
Mr. Rios asserts that Johnson is retroactive as a substantive rule, which alters the range of conduct or class of persons the law punishes. In contrast, procedural rules only affect how culpability is determined and do not change the class of punishable conduct. The government argues that Johnson should be viewed as a non-watershed procedural rule when applied to the Guidelines, claiming it does not change statutory sentencing limits but merely influences judicial discretion within an established sentencing range. The government cites Mistretta v. United States to support the assertion that the Guidelines operate within the legislative framework set by Congress rather than altering it.
Two critical flaws undermine the argument presented. First, a new rule can be considered substantive and retroactive even if it does not change the statutory minimum or maximum penalty. This principle was upheld by the Supreme Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana, which confirmed that the rule from Miller v. Alabama, prohibiting life without parole sentences for juveniles without considering their youth, was substantive and retroactive, making certain penalties unconstitutionally excessive for specific offenders. Second, Ninth Circuit precedent prevents the government’s proposed as-applied approach to retroactivity. In Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, the Ninth Circuit ruled that its earlier decision in United States v. Grisel, which found Oregon’s second-degree burglary statute not equivalent to 'generic burglary' under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), was retroactive. Mr. Reina-Rodriguez challenged a sentence enhancement based on a burglary conviction, arguing that Grisel's ruling meant his conviction should not be categorized as a crime of violence, regardless of when it was finalized. The court determined that substantive changes, like those in Grisel, do not fall under Teague's restrictions for retroactive application. Similarly, the ruling in Johnson, which invalidated the ACCA’s residual clause for vagueness, is considered substantive because it narrowed the definition of violent felonies. Following Reina-Rodriguez, Johnson’s substantive rule also applies retroactively to the corresponding Guidelines provision. Consequently, the Court concludes that Johnson’s retroactive application extends to Mr. Rios’s conviction for Washington residential burglary. Rios contends that without the residual clause, his conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence, thus nullifying his eligibility for an enhanced Base Offense Level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), and the government has not countered this claim.
In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court established a 'formal categorical approach' for assessing whether prior convictions qualify as predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), focusing solely on statutory definitions rather than the underlying facts of the convictions. If a prior conviction's elements match or are narrower than those of a generic offense, it qualifies as a violent felony. Conversely, if a statute is 'overbroad'—criminalizing conduct beyond the generic offense—courts must determine if it is divisible or indivisible. An indivisible, overbroad statute precludes any convictions from serving as predicate offenses. However, if a statute is overbroad yet divisible, a 'modified categorical approach' allows courts to examine specific documents from the conviction record to ascertain the elements involved. A statute is considered divisible if it lists multiple alternative elements, creating distinct crimes, while alternative means of committing a single crime render it indivisible. The divisibility determination depends on whether the jury must unanimously agree on the specific alternative committed by the defendant. In the case of Washington’s residential burglary statute, it defined burglary based on unlawful entry into a dwelling with intent to commit a crime, outlining the legal definitions of 'dwelling' and 'building' relevant to the case.
The statutory definition of residential burglary under Washington law (Wash. Rev. Code 9A.52.025(1)) does not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person, aligning with U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). A conviction can occur if the defendant unlawfully entered or remained in a dwelling with intent to commit a crime, regardless of force. With the residual clause invalidated, Mr. Rios's conviction qualifies as a crime of violence only if it aligns with generic burglary definitions under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). Generic burglary involves unauthorized entry into a building or structure with criminal intent, where the structure must be a dwelling.
The case of United States v. Wenner establishes that Washington's residential burglary statute is categorically overbroad, as some dwellings (e.g., fenced areas, railway cars, cargo containers) do not meet the federal definition of buildings or structures necessary for generic burglary convictions. Washington law permits convictions for residential burglary in circumstances that would not be classified as burglary under federal law, indicating that the Washington statute is broader than its federal counterpart. Furthermore, since the statute is indivisible regarding the building requirement, jurors may not need to agree unanimously on the type of building involved.
To convict for residential burglary, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully entered or remained in a dwelling. Given the overbroad and indivisible nature of the statute, a conviction for residential burglary cannot be classified as a crime of violence. Therefore, the court ordered the following: Mr. Rios’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 Motion to Vacate Sentence is granted; his sentence under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is vacated; a resentencing hearing is set for October 4, 2016; and an expedited Amended Presentence Investigation Report is to be prepared within 30 days, omitting the offense level enhancement based on the residential burglary conviction.
Objections or memoranda concerning sentencing must be submitted within 14 days following the Amended Presentence Investigation Report. Probation is required to provide its recommendations to the Court at least 7 days before the Defendant's resentencing. The U.S. Marshals Service is instructed to transport the Defendant to Spokane, Washington for this resentencing. The District Court Executive is tasked with entering and distributing this Order to relevant parties, including counsel, U.S. Probation, and the U.S. Marshals Service.
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that the Teague standard applies to federal prisoners seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, comparable to state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. However, recent opinions express uncertainty about its application to federal prisoners, despite Sanchez-Cervantes being cited as valid law. The Supreme Court has only assumed, not affirmed, Teague’s applicability to § 2255 motions. The parties involved in this case operate under the assumption that the Teague framework is relevant for federal collateral challenges, aligning with Ninth Circuit precedent that advocates for uniform application of new rules to avoid inconsistency.
Additionally, the Lopez-Valencia case illustrates the distinction between divisible and indivisible statutes, using the example of a law prohibiting assault with either a gun or an axe. If a unanimous jury must agree on the specific weapon used, the statute is deemed divisible, allowing for a modified categorical approach. Conversely, if a conviction can occur with split juror opinions on the weapon, the statute is classified as indivisible.
