Court: District Court, E.D. Washington; March 15, 2016; Federal District Court
The Court has denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, which was considered without oral argument. Defendants raised two main arguments for dismissal: lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
In addressing personal jurisdiction, the Court applied Washington’s long-arm statute, which extends to the full extent of federal due process. The analysis focused on specific jurisdiction, requiring the Court to determine if Defendants had purposefully established minimum contacts with Washington. This involved assessing whether Defendants directed their activities at Washington residents and if the litigation arose from injuries related to those activities.
The Court found that the Plaintiffs, specifically Hall, demonstrated sufficient contacts with Washington, as he applied for employment, was interviewed, hired, and paid while in the state. Additionally, Hall’s claimed injury, related to L-3’s failure to schedule him for work, arose from these contacts. The Court concluded that exercising specific jurisdiction in this case would align with fair play and substantial justice, as L-3 should have anticipated potential legal disputes arising from its activities in Washington.
Due process and fair play principles allow for flexibility in holding commercial entities accountable for obligations assumed in other states. In this case, specific jurisdiction is established due to L-3's substantial and ongoing employment relationship with Hall in Washington. Personal jurisdiction is affirmed over L-3/Vertex and L-3/CIS, although L-3/CC claims it had no employment involvement with Hall. Hall's verified complaint alleges L-3/CC is a parent company to L-3/CIS and L-3/Vertex, and the court accepts these allegations for the purpose of the motion, noting that the extent of L-3/CC's control remains unclear at this stage. Despite L-3/CC's potential lack of control, personal jurisdiction is deemed appropriate due to the close relationships among the entities and their shared legal representation.
Plaintiff Kay's claim, based on L-3's failure to hire him, is supported by minimal contacts L-3 had with Washington, including recruitment activities. The court recognizes that personal jurisdiction over L-3 is justified despite Kay never having been employed by them, as his claim arises from those contacts. The determination of personal jurisdiction is not strictly mechanical but considers fairness under due process given the defendants' ongoing recruitment of Washington residents.
The defendants also move to dismiss the complaint for improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Venue is primarily governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which outlines three criteria for appropriate jurisdiction: residency of defendants, location of significant events related to the claim, or any district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Notably, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) provides its own venue provision, allowing actions against private employers in any district where they maintain a business presence.
Defendants argue that their provision supersedes 28 U.S.C. 1391(b), claiming none have a business presence in the Eastern District of Washington, countering Plaintiffs' assertion regarding L-3/Vertex. They further assert that L-3/CC is not classified as a private employer under USERRA. The USERRA venue provision is interpreted as permissive, allowing for additional venues beyond those specified in 28 U.S.C. 1391(b). The phrasing 'may proceed' indicates that it does not impose strict venue limitations for service-members. The Court concludes that a significant portion of events related to the claim occurred in the Eastern District of Washington, including Plaintiffs' service with the Washington Air National Guard, making venue appropriate under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2). Consequently, the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue is denied. The Court orders that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is denied, and the District Court Executive is instructed to file this Order and notify counsel.
