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Busey v. Richland School District
Citations: 151 F. Supp. 3d 1135; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170834; 128 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1033; 2015 WL 9413105Docket: NO: 2:13-CV-5022-TOR
Court: District Court, E.D. Washington; December 21, 2015; Federal District Court
The Court addressed Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding the termination of James Busey, former Superintendent of Richland School District, who filed suit after his dismissal in 2013. Busey's claims include violations of procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), state wage law, and a request for a declaratory judgment asserting that his termination violated state law and that he remained employed until June 2015. Busey was employed under a contract beginning July 1, 2010. Evidence revealed that he engaged in a romantic relationship with para-educator Debbie Hamilton, which included off-campus meetings during work hours. They used district email and Busey’s district-issued cell phone to arrange these meetings, violating School Board Policy 9273, which prohibits using district resources for personal gain. Although Busey admitted this violation, he claimed that no prior disciplinary action had been taken against employees for similar conduct. On November 8, 2012, the district’s General Counsel informed Busey of concerns regarding his relationship with Hamilton, prompting Busey to disclose the relationship to Board Chair Rick Jansons, although he did not specify its sexual nature. Following this disclosure, Jansons and Human Resources conducted interviews related to Busey’s conduct. The Court reviewed the motion and supporting documents before issuing its order, which partially granted and partially denied the Defendants' request for summary judgment. In late November, Mr. Jansons informed Dr. Busey that an investigation concluded with no findings of contractual or policy violations related to Dr. Busey’s conduct. However, Dr. Busey had not revealed his off-campus meetings with Ms. Hamilton during school hours or their communications via district email and cell phone. By December 7, 2012, Dr. Busey had not disclosed these meetings to Mr. Jansons, nor was he aware if Mr. Jansons knew about the personal emails exchanged. Between December 7 and December 10, 2012, their relationship became public due to a leak to a local newspaper, prompting the Richland School District to place Dr. Busey on paid administrative leave on December 10, 2012. The District tasked Alan Key, an employee of a third-party administrator, to investigate allegations regarding Dr. Busey’s conduct. Key interviewed Dr. Busey on January 21, 2013, about his relationship with Ms. Hamilton and the use of district resources, emphasizing that the investigation was ongoing. Key later reported his findings to the School Board, which decided to terminate Dr. Busey’s employment on January 22, 2013. The District issued a press release confirming this unanimous decision, and statements from Mr. Jansons reiterated the immediacy of Dr. Busey’s termination. The parties involved do not dispute the termination date. Following this, on January 23, 2013, Dr. Busey was notified that his insurance would terminate on March 1, 2013. On January 30, 2013, Dr. Busey received a letter titled "Notice of Probable Cause for Discharge and Non-renewal," citing conduct that significantly impaired his ability to fulfill his role as Superintendent. The Board found multiple grounds for Dr. Busey's potential discharge: he engaged in a long-term extramarital affair with a subordinate, exhibited inappropriate conduct with another female professional while married, misused district equipment for personal matters related to the affair, disrupted Ms. Hamilton's workplace, threatened to damage the School District's reputation unless reinstated or paid, disclosed an issue to the press not presented to the Board, and created a conflict of interest that risked liability for the School District. The Board determined there was probable cause for Dr. Busey's discharge and informed him of his right to appeal, advising him to consult an attorney. Dr. Busey received this notice on February 4, 2013. On February 14, 2013, his attorney claimed Dr. Busey had not received a pre-termination hearing, asserting his continued employment. The School District's attorney acknowledged Dr. Busey's right to a hearing and invited him to request one. However, on February 25, 2013, Dr. Busey declined a hearing, stating it would be pointless, and subsequently filed a lawsuit. The document outlines the standards for summary judgment, emphasizing that a moving party must show no genuine dispute of material fact, and that the opposing party must present specific facts to demonstrate such a dispute, rather than relying on mere allegations or speculation. Summary judgment may be granted if the evidence does not allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-moving party. In ruling on a summary judgment motion, courts must view facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party, considering only admissible evidence. The plaintiff alleges that Board members violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by not providing an adequate pre-termination hearing. A valid § 1983 claim requires showing that a person acting under state law deprived another of constitutional rights. The defendants do not dispute their actions were under color of state law; thus, the court will determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the deprivation of the plaintiff’s right to procedural due process. The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process. A procedural due process claim consists of two elements: first, identifying if a liberty or property interest was interfered with, and second, evaluating if the procedures used for that deprivation were constitutionally adequate. Federal law, not state law, dictates what constitutes adequate due process. While state law may define property rights in employment, federal law determines the necessary procedural safeguards before depriving someone of those rights. The due process required under the Fourteenth Amendment is governed by federal law and does not change based on state procedural rules. Violations of state law alone do not support claims under Section 1983. While state law can define constitutionally protected interests, such as Dr. Busey’s interest in continued employment as a certificated employee protected by RCW 28A.405.210, the Constitution mandates that public employees with such interests receive pretermination due process. This includes notice of charges, an explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to respond prior to termination, as established in Loudermill. The necessity of a pretermination hearing balances the employee's interest in maintaining their job against the government's need to manage its workforce effectively. In this case, the Board terminated Dr. Busey on January 22, 2013. Defendants claim that an interview on January 21, 2013, provided adequate due process, but Dr. Busey contends he was not fully informed of the charges or evidence against him. The Court finds that a reasonable jury could determine that the pretermination process was insufficient, denying Defendants' request for summary judgment. A reasonable jury could conclude that Dr. Busey did not receive adequate notice regarding the charges against him related to his termination. The timing of Mr. Key’s interview, conducted during an ongoing investigation, raises questions about whether Dr. Busey was properly informed of the charges and the evidence against him. Information from this interview was later used to formulate charges against him, suggesting insufficient notification. Additionally, under Ninth Circuit precedent, notice of an employer's intent to terminate is crucial for pretermination due process. The requirements of Loudermill include pre-hearing notice about the potential dismissal and the specific charges, which Dr. Busey may not have received prior to his hearing, as the Board's letter outlining probable cause arrived after his termination. This lack of notice hindered Dr. Busey's ability to respond to the charges effectively. Moreover, without proper notification of the charges, Dr. Busey was not afforded an adequate opportunity to object to the dismissal. Subsequent notice and invitation for a hearing were inadequate to remedy the absence of pretermination process. Defendants failed to justify why pre-deprivation process was not constitutionally required, and prior case law indicates that a full post-deprivation hearing does not substitute for the necessary pretermination hearing. As someone with a property interest under the Due Process Clause, Dr. Busey was entitled to present his case before termination. Loudermill emphasizes that post-termination hearings are typically insufficient to meet procedural due process requirements in public employment. For a hearing to be meaningful, it must occur before a decision is made to deprive an individual of significant property interests, preventing erroneous deprivations that the due process clause seeks to avoid. A pretermination hearing is essential to address disputed facts and assess the necessity of termination; it provides the decision-maker a chance to exercise discretion before termination occurs. In Dr. Busey’s case, the Board's notification of probable cause for termination came weeks after announcing his immediate termination to the press, raising doubts about the meaningfulness of the subsequent process. Evidence suggests that Dr. Busey may not have received adequate notice or a fair opportunity to respond. Regarding qualified immunity, the individual Board members claim immunity from suit under section 1983, arguing that even if Mr. Key's interview did not meet due process standards, their actions were reasonable. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages unless their actions violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would know. A court evaluates this by determining if the plaintiff's view of the facts shows a constitutional violation and if that right was clearly established at the time. In this case, the court finds that Dr. Busey did not receive adequate pretermination process, and the Defendants' assertion that due process is flexible does not hold. The Supreme Court's decision in Loudermill established the right to a hearing prior to termination for employees with a protected property interest, necessitating notice of charges, an explanation of evidence, and an opportunity to defend against the termination. Pretermination processes for public employees, as established in Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, require oral or written notice of charges, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to present their case. Dr. Busey’s due process rights were clearly established by this precedent, and the court concluded that a reasonable official would not have deemed the process sufficient to warrant qualified immunity. Consequently, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Dr. Busey’s section 1983 claim was denied. Regarding state law claims, Dr. Busey seeks a declaratory judgment that the defendants violated RCW 28A.405.300, asserting he remained employed and entitled to compensation until June 30, 2015. This statute outlines the termination process for certificated school district staff, mandating written notification of probable cause for discharge, served personally or by certified mail. Employees can request a hearing within ten days of receiving notice. If timely notice or a hearing opportunity is not provided, the employee cannot be discharged for the stated causes during their contract term. If an employee fails to request a hearing within ten days, they may be discharged as stated in the notice. The Washington Supreme Court has clarified that the notice must indicate probable cause rather than a definitive conclusion. Although the statute does not define "timely notice," it implies that employees should receive at least ten days' notice before any discharge, during which they can request a hearing. Case law suggests that the necessity of timely notice may be questionable if the employee is not prejudiced by any deficiencies. In *Martin v. Dayton School District No. 2*, the Washington Supreme Court reversed an appellate court's decision that had reinstated a school district employee due to inadequate notice of discharge. The initial notice failed to inform the employee of his right to a hearing or present probable cause for the termination. A second notice was issued nine days later to address these deficiencies. The superior court found probable cause for the discharge after reviewing the charges. The Supreme Court ruled that the employee was not prejudiced since he had the opportunity to contest the probable cause before the superior court, thus affirming the trial court's decision in favor of the school district. The court noted that a defective discharge notice could be corrected by a valid notice, relevant to the statutory language currently at issue. Although the appellate court had relied on *Foster v. Carson School District 301*, where a similar notice defect was deemed timely, the *Martin* court did not address *Foster* directly. The *Foster* decision emphasized the importance of timely notice and a hearing opportunity to protect teachers from arbitrary dismissals. Ultimately, because the employee in *Martin* was not prejudiced by the deficient notice, the Supreme Court overturned the appellate ruling that awarded damages for the statutory violation. The Court referenced Pierce v. Lake Stevens School District, establishing that a deficient discharge notice does not infringe on an employee's rights if it does not cause prejudice. In Pierce, the employee was allowed a de novo hearing, which provided an opportunity to contest the probable cause for dismissal. A similar situation occurred in Martin, where an employee successfully challenged the cause for discharge. While RCW 28A.405.300 appears to grant certificated employees enhanced pretermination rights compared to Loudermill, Washington's Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to require strict compliance only when the employee is prejudiced. In this case, Defendants argued that their January 30 letter complied with the statute by notifying Dr. Busey of his rights and the basis for his termination, despite the Board's initial decision on January 22, 2013, being effective immediately. Dr. Busey did not appeal the Board's decision or request a hearing, indicating a lack of interest in disputing the probable cause. Although the initial notice was deficient, the subsequent communication provided adequate notice, and Dr. Busey was not prejudiced as he had ample opportunity to contest the termination but chose not to. Consequently, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. Additionally, Dr. Busey alleged marital status discrimination under WLAD, claiming his termination was due to his marital status, which is prohibited by the statute. Under RCW 49.60.180(2), a plaintiff must demonstrate that their protected status was a “substantial factor” in an employer's adverse action at trial, as established in Scrivener v. Clark College. For summary judgment, however, a plaintiff only needs to show that a reasonable jury could find that their protected trait influenced the employer's actions. Summary judgment is rarely granted in WLAD cases due to the challenges in proving discriminatory motivation. A plaintiff can provide either direct evidence of discriminatory intent or utilize the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Direct evidence includes discriminatory statements from decision-makers, which must demonstrate that the employer acted with a discriminatory motive that significantly impacted the employment decision. In this case, the plaintiff presented direct evidence of discriminatory intent related to his marital status, which the Board explicitly cited in their termination decision. The Board characterized the plaintiff's conduct as involving an "extramarital affair" and referenced his marriage in their reasoning. The decision-maker’s statements underscored the discriminatory motive. In response to the plaintiff's claims, the defendants argued they would have terminated him regardless of his marital status, citing his inappropriate relationship with a subordinate and violations of district policy. The plaintiff contested these reasons, asserting that his contract did not prohibit consensual relationships with district employees, and that his actions occurred during personal time outside of school hours. Plaintiff asserts that no individuals were disciplined or terminated for violating district equipment policies, suggesting a potential bias against Dr. Busey based on his marital status. A reasonable jury could conclude that this marital status significantly influenced the Board's decision to terminate Dr. Busey, despite Defendants' claims of legitimate reasons for his termination, including an undisclosed relationship with a subordinate. The jury is tasked with evaluating the evidence of discrimination against the backdrop of Defendants' reasoning. Consequently, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this discrimination claim is denied. In a separate claim, Plaintiff argues that Defendants unlawfully withheld his wages under Washington statutes RCW 49.48.010 and 49.52.070. The law mandates that employers must pay wages due to employees upon termination, with both civil and criminal remedies available for willful non-payment. A willful failure to pay is defined as a knowing and intentional act, while non-willfulness can result from carelessness or a bona fide dispute regarding wages owed. The determination of willfulness is typically a factual question, unless the evidence leads to only one reasonable conclusion. Defendants claim a bona fide dispute existed regarding Dr. Busey’s employment status during the wage withholding. However, Plaintiff questions the legitimacy of this dispute, citing alleged violations of RCW 28A.405.300. Ultimately, the Court concludes that reasonable minds could only arrive at one conclusion regarding the wage claim, granting Defendants summary judgment on this issue. A bona fide dispute exists regarding the employment relationship between the Defendants and Plaintiff. Under Washington Supreme Court precedent, strict compliance with RCW 28A.405.300 is deemed unnecessary when the employee has access to post-deprivation processes. Even favoring the Plaintiff’s evidence, a reasonable jury would conclude that the Defendants believed the Plaintiff's discharge was valid. The Plaintiff's claims for wrongful withholding of damages under RCW 49.52.050 are inapplicable because the statute’s key term, "obligated," indicates a pre-existing duty to pay specific compensation, which had not accrued prior to the jury verdict. The retrospective nature of the jury award does not trigger the statute, as established in Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., where WLAD damages are not considered wages the employer was obligated to pay. This reasoning also applies to claims under section 1983. Consequently, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted regarding the Plaintiff's claims for declaratory judgment under RCW 28A.405.300 and wage withholding under RCW 49.48.010 and 49.52.070, but denied for other claims. The District Court Executive is instructed to enter this order and distribute copies to counsel. Disputes regarding the meeting times between Dr. Busey and Ms. Hamilton remain unresolved, with objections raised by Defendants regarding the admissibility of certain statements in Dr. Busey’s declaration. Dr. Busey’s declaration contains inadmissible hearsay, which the Court does not consider for the summary judgment ruling; however, statements based on his personal knowledge are admissible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Affidavits must be based on personal knowledge, include admissible facts, and demonstrate the declarant's competency. Defendants reference Dr. Busey’s employment contract, which required him to devote full effort to his role as Superintendent. The Board concluded that certain conduct materially affected his performance, but did not cite this contractual requirement in its termination decision, leaving its influence on the discharge unclear. While the Complaint suggests an informal termination decision was made by December 11, 2012, the Plaintiffs' materials consistently mention January 22, 2013, as the termination date.