Court: District Court, E.D. Washington; July 28, 2015; Federal District Court
The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. The case involved Charles Wright, a member of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers Local 55, who served as a Union Organizer from March 2010 to July 3, 2014. Wright's position was subsidized, with salary contributions from both the local and international unions. He was an at-will employee with a one-year, renewable contract, and he understood his employment would be renewed annually based on performance.
Wright claimed to have been informed about a 2009 policy regarding local union subsidized organizers, which included provisions for training and potential disciplinary actions for underperformance. However, defendant John Merk asserted that Local 55 did not create or distribute this policy and did not inform employees of its applicability. The policy emphasized the importance of the organizer's role and the need for impartial selection.
During his tenure, Wright engaged in various organizing activities with oversight from Merk and International Organizer Sean Mahoney. While he played a key role in developing Local 55's organizing strategy, Merk characterized Wright's position as one of policy implementation rather than policy-making. In May 2014, Wright ran for the position of Business Manager, Financial Secretary, against Merk.
Mr. Wright campaigned for a union position under the slogan "New People with New Ideas," alongside candidates Mark Born and Tracey Henderson. During his campaign, he criticized incumbent Business Manager Mr. Merk for his performance, accusing him of being unfit for the union, speaking negatively about members, weakening the organizing program, making poor budget decisions, reducing organizing costs, and failing to adequately manage union communications. Wright promised to hire more union organizers, enhance field presence of business representatives, improve phone support, conduct regular staff meetings, and add staff.
Despite his efforts, Wright lost the election to Merk on June 24, 2014. Subsequently, on July 3, Merk terminated Wright's employment, stating that Wright's campaign against him indicated disloyalty and a lack of confidence in Wright's ability to work within his administration. Merk acknowledged that Wright's job performance was satisfactory but felt that Wright's opposition had undermined his leadership. Wright claimed he had never been warned that running against Merk could lead to termination.
Wright filed a complaint on August 21, 2014, alleging wrongful termination, breach of implied contract, and discriminatory discharge under Washington law. The defendants sought summary judgment on all claims, arguing they were preempted by federal labor law. Wright conceded that the first and third claims were preempted but maintained that the second claim regarding breach of implied contract was valid. He also sought to amend his complaint to include federal claims under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).
Summary judgment is warranted when there are no genuine issues of material fact, shifting the burden to the non-moving party to demonstrate such issues exist through admissible evidence.
Evidence admissible at the summary judgment stage includes depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits, stipulations, admissions, and interrogatory answers. The court will not make assumptions about missing facts, and vague affidavits cannot adequately support or undermine a claim. In evaluating summary judgment motions, the court must favor the non-moving party when drawing reasonable inferences. However, if opposing parties present conflicting narratives, one of which is clearly contradicted by the record, the court will not adopt that implausible version.
In Mr. Wright's first cause of action, he alleges that his termination violated the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act and a Washington statute prohibiting discrimination based on political activism. His third cause of action similarly claims discriminatory discharge under the same statute. The defendants argue that Mr. Wright's claims are preempted by federal labor law, particularly citing the NLRA and relevant case law indicating Congress's intent to keep certain areas unregulated. Mr. Wright concedes that his first and third claims are preempted and withdraws them.
In his second cause of action, Mr. Wright asserts that his termination breached an implied contract of continued employment formed through the adoption of the International's Constitution and Policy for the Local Union Subsidized Organizers Program by SMART Local 55. He contends that these documents created an expectation of annual renewal of his employment based on satisfactory performance and that he could not be terminated without good cause or for political reasons. He claims detrimental reliance on this implied contract when he accepted a nomination for Business Manager. The defendants contend that this claim is preempted under Section 301 of the LMRA, as it necessitates interpretation of labor contracts. Mr. Wright disputes this, arguing that his claim is based on an implied contract rather than on enforcing the constitution or policy as formal contracts.
Mr. Wright asserts that constitutional and policy language should be interpreted indirectly as part of the implied contract with Local 55. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 185(a)) sets the venue for labor organization lawsuits in any U.S. district court with jurisdiction. The Supreme Court mandates that federal law governs these suits (Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448) and prohibits state law from applying to collective bargaining agreements (Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95). Congress intended federal labor law to take precedence over conflicting local laws. The Supreme Court clarified that state court claims involving labor contract violations must be pursued under Section 301 and resolved through federal law, as state rules that attempt to define labor contract terms are preempted (Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202). Issues regarding parties' intentions in labor agreements must be addressed using uniform federal law, meaning state-law rights that depend on private agreements are also preempted unless they can be resolved independently of the agreement (Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399). International union constitutions and bylaws are recognized as contracts under Section 301 (Wooddell v. Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93). Although no case law directly classifies a labor union policy as a contract under Section 301, the court will consider it similar to a union's bylaws for this analysis. Mr. Wright references Derrico v. Sheehan Emergency Hosp., arguing that a state law implied contract claim is not preempted by Section 301; however, this case is inapplicable as it involved an expired collective bargaining agreement, which Section 301 does not cover. The court concluded that a contract between an employer and an individual employee does not fall under Section 301, undermining Mr. Wright's argument that the constitution and policy should be analyzed indirectly.
Mr. Wright claims that Sean Mahoney, an employee of International, presented him with provisions from the constitution and Subsidized Union Organizers’ Policy relevant to his role, leading to an implied contract between him and SMART Local 55. He argues that the absence of a written employment contract means the union's actions and statements create an implied agreement, with the constitution and policy being integral to this claim. The Court must review these documents to ascertain the provisions that supposedly form this contract.
However, under legal precedents from Lucas Flour Co. and Allis-Chalmers Corp., the Court is restricted from analyzing the constitution and policy in relation to Mr. Wright's claim under state law. Defendants assert that his second cause of action is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because it stems from his engagement in protected concerted activities linked to his termination. The Garmon ruling dictates that when an activity is arguably covered by the NLRA, both state and federal courts must defer to the National Labor Relations Board to prevent state interference with national labor policy.
Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA safeguard workers' rights to organize and protect them from employer interference. The Court has previously ruled in Kirwin v. Teamsters Local Union No. 609 that state law claims related to employment and union activities are encompassed by NLRA protections, leading to the preemption of wrongful termination claims.
In contrast, Mr. Wright references Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, arguing that independent state law contract claims are not preempted by the NLRA. In Belknap, the Supreme Court ruled that claims concerning misrepresentation and breach of contract regarding replacement workers were permissible under state law, as they were peripheral to the NLRA's primary concerns. This indicates a potential avenue for Mr. Wright's claims if they can be framed as peripheral to the NLRA.
The Court referenced three precedential cases to support the ruling that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not preempt certain state actions: Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, which addressed false and malicious statements; Farmer v. Carpenters, concerning intentional infliction of emotional distress; and Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Carpenters, related to trespass. The Court emphasized that the core question under the Garmon rules is whether the controversy is identical to what could be presented to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). It concluded that Mr. Wright's claim of an implied contract is preempted because it could have been brought before the NLRB, which he opted not to do, despite similar actions taken by a former co-plaintiff. The Court noted that Mr. Wright's claim does not meet the criteria for an exception under Belknap, as his claim is not peripheral to the NLRA like the referenced cases. Additionally, the Court indicated that Mr. Wright's claim would likely fail on its merits due to insufficient specificity regarding the implied contract under Washington law. Consequently, the Court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim, deeming it preempted by federal labor law.
Regarding Mr. Wright's motion to amend his complaint to include two new federal labor law claims, the Court recognized the necessity for him to demonstrate good cause due to his failure to adhere to the previously set deadline for amendments. The Court confirmed that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), a party must establish good cause for modifications to a scheduling order.
Rule 16(b) requires a party seeking to amend a complaint to demonstrate diligence, contrasting with Rule 15(a), which emphasizes bad faith and prejudice. Defendants argue Mr. Wright lacked diligence in his amendment efforts, noting he was aware of the necessary facts for an LMRDA violation when he filed the original complaint, and that his attorney had previously communicated the LMRDA theory in a letter. They also assert that Mr. Wright's attorney, an experienced lawyer, should have known the applicable law. Mr. Wright did not respond to these claims, and during oral argument, his attorney failed to justify the delay, only asking for leniency due to similar past cases. The Court found insufficient justification for Mr. Wright's attorney's inaction and noted potential futility in allowing the amendment, which would necessitate further discovery and could delay the trial, prejudicing Defendants.
Mr. Wright's proposed amendment seeks to add claims under sections 101 and 102 of the LMRDA, which guarantee voting rights and civil action rights for violations of those rights. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Finnegan v. Leu established that section 101 does not apply to union officers or employees, leaving open the possibility for non-policy-making and non-confidential employees. Mr. Wright claims his role as a union organizer qualifies him under this exception, while Defendants contend he was a policymaking employee, citing non-binding precedent from other circuits.
The Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Rutledge indicates that the Finnegan decision applies to both policy-making and policy-implementing union employees. The Defendants leverage Rutledge to argue that Finnegan precludes claims from employees who implement policies, as evidenced by Mr. Merk's acknowledgment of Mr. Wright's role. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's Childs case determined that wrongful discharge claims under the LMRDA were barred when an employee's membership rights were not impacted by termination, without addressing whether the employee had a policy-making or implementing role. Similarly, in Lynn, the court found that the discharged business representative could not pursue a claim under sections 101 and 102 of the LMRDA, as his employment termination did not infringe upon his membership rights. The Lynn ruling emphasized that only violations of membership rights, not those derived from employment status, are actionable under section 101. While the court noted that it could not define the scope of a section 102 claim, it recognized that the LMRDA aims for democratic governance within unions. The Lynn court ultimately concluded that the removal of an elected official could suppress dissent and impede democratic processes, allowing for a legitimate claim under section 102.
The Ninth Circuit has clarified that Lynn's ruling applies specifically to the removal of elected officials, not appointed ones. The primary goal of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) is to ensure that unions are governed democratically, reflecting the will of their members through open elections. Consequently, newly elected officials should be permitted to dismiss appointees of their predecessors, as these appointees’ authority is derived from the elected official. In contrast, the removal of elected officials is not supported by this rationale, as their authority comes directly from union membership, which should retain its oversight over elected positions.
In the case of Mr. Wright, his free speech rights were not violated by his termination, as he actively participated in the election process against incumbent Mr. Merk. Thus, his claims under section 101 of the LMRDA are not viable, and amending his complaint to include such a claim would be futile. Additionally, Mr. Wright was an appointed employee, making the Lynn precedent inapplicable to him with regard to section 102 of the LMRDA, rendering any amendment for that claim also futile.
Mr. Wright seeks to include a claim under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Defendants argue he cannot bring this claim as he is an employee, not a member of the union. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Wooddell allows union members to sue local unions for violations of the union’s constitution under section 301, recognizing collective-bargaining agreements as contracts that individual members can enforce. The Defendants' attempt to differentiate between members and employees lacks binding authority in this jurisdiction. Furthermore, a Seventh Circuit case, Korzen, supports Mr. Wright's position by illustrating that employees can indeed bring claims under section 301 in similar contexts.
Union employees alleged a violation of the international union's constitution under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The Seventh Circuit determined that federal jurisdiction exists for claims alleging breaches of the international's constitution, with the plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries. However, upon examining the constitution's provisions, the court concluded that it did not confer any employment rights that were violated by the plaintiffs' termination, resulting in the dismissal of the claim on its merits.
The court referenced precedents, including Korzen, which indicates that union employees may assert claims as beneficiaries of a Section 301 contract based on its specific terms, and Canez, where the Ninth Circuit allowed a union employee to sue a local union under its constitution. In this case, Mr. Wright’s termination raised potential material factual issues regarding whether the International Constitution and the Subsidized Organizer Policy conferred employment rights, necessitating further discovery.
However, the court decided against allowing Mr. Wright to amend his complaint, citing the unfair prejudice to the defendants given the discovery deadline of April 17, 2015, and the scheduled trial date of October 5, 2015. Consequently, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. Additionally, co-plaintiff Tracey Henderson was dismissed by stipulation on January 29, 2015. The court also noted that Mr. Wright chose not to file a charge with the National Labor Relations Board, and the authority of Mr. Mahoney, who is not an employee of SMART Local #55, to bind the union was left unaddressed. The distinction between claims under local and international constitutions was emphasized, with the Seventh Circuit indicating that local constitution claims may be considered state law claims, allowing for potential supplemental jurisdiction.
