Court: District Court, E.D. Washington; February 10, 2014; Federal District Court
Plaintiff Jeffrey B. Morse applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits in December 2010, citing various physical and psychological disabilities. The Commissioner of Social Security denied his application, prompting Morse, represented by the Law Office of Dana C. Madsen, to seek judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3). The case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Victor E. Bianchini on January 3, 2014.
The procedural timeline indicates that Morse filed for benefits on December 16, 2010, claiming disability since December 1, 2008. After initial denial, he requested a hearing, which took place on January 4, 2012, before ALJ R-J. Payne. During the hearing, testimonies from two medical experts and a vocational expert were recorded, with the hearing continuing on May 5, 2012. On May 25, 2012, ALJ Payne issued a decision denying benefits, concluding that Morse was not disabled as per the Social Security Act, a determination finalized on August 24, 2012, after the Appeals Council declined review.
On October 15, 2012, Morse filed a Complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The Commissioner responded on December 17, 2012, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment in 2013. Ultimately, the Commissioner’s motion was granted, Morse's motion was denied, and the case was dismissed.
The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity due to medically determinable impairments lasting at least twelve months. A plaintiff is deemed disabled if their impairments prevent them from performing previous work and engaging in any other substantial work available in the national economy, considering their age, education, and work experience.
The Commissioner employs a five-step process to assess disability claims under 20 C.F.R. 404.1520 and 416.920.
1. **Step One**: Evaluates if the individual is engaged in substantial gainful activity. If so, benefits are denied.
2. **Step Two**: Assesses whether the individual has a medically severe impairment. If not, the claim is denied.
3. **Step Three**: Compares the impairment to listed impairments. If it meets or equals a listed impairment, the individual is presumed disabled.
4. **Step Four**: Determines if the impairment prevents the person from performing past relevant work, considering their residual functional capacity (RFC). If they can perform past work, they are not deemed disabled.
5. **Step Five**: If unable to perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the individual can engage in other substantial gainful activity, considering the RFC, age, education, and experience.
The burden of proof initially lies with the claimant to demonstrate that an impairment hinders previous work. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the availability of a significant number of jobs the claimant can perform.
Judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is limited under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). A court must uphold the decision if there is no legal error and if it is backed by substantial evidence, which is defined as evidence adequate for a reasonable mind to accept as support for a conclusion. The court reviews the entire record and cannot replace the Commissioner's judgment regarding conflicting evidence.
A decision supported by substantial evidence may still be overturned if the proper legal standards were not applied in evaluating that evidence. The ALJ found that the Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 16, 2010, and identified several severe impairments including degenerative disc disease and various mood and personality disorders. However, the ALJ concluded that these impairments did not meet the criteria of listed impairments. The ALJ assessed that the Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) for light work with specific restrictions, including limited public contact and the ability to work independently. Although the Plaintiff could not perform past relevant work as a construction worker, the ALJ determined that there were significant job opportunities in the national economy suitable for the Plaintiff, leading to the conclusion that he was not disabled from December 16, 2010, to May 25, 2012. The ALJ's decision became final on August 24, 2012, when the Appeals Council denied further review.
The Plaintiff argues for reversal of the Commissioner’s decision based on three points: the ALJ's failure to properly consider Dr. John Arnold's opinion, challenges to the RFC determination, and perceived flaws in the ALJ’s step five analysis. In disability cases, a treating physician's opinion is given more weight than that of an examining physician, which in turn is favored over a non-examining physician's opinion. If the opinions of treating or examining physicians are not contradicted, they may only be rejected for clear and convincing reasons; if they are contradicted, rejection requires specific and legitimate reasons backed by substantial evidence. Dr. Arnold's October 2011 assessment diagnosed the Plaintiff with major depression, anxiety, and paranoid personality disorder, predicting a poor prognosis and indicating extreme limitations in social interactions and maintaining schedules.
Dr. Arnold identified significant limitations for the Plaintiff in sustaining routine tasks and completing a normal work schedule, as well as moderate to extreme limitations in social interactions, including accepting instructions and interacting with supervisors and peers. He noted marked limitations in maintaining socially appropriate behavior and setting realistic goals. However, the ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Arnold’s assessment due to a lack of supporting evidence, noting that Dr. Arnold found indications of symptom exaggeration in Plaintiff's psychological testing, which raised concerns about the validity of the results.
Dr. Joyce Everhart, a consultative psychiatric examiner, corroborated the ALJ's decision by finding signs of malingering in the Plaintiff's behavior and questioned his credibility. She diagnosed him with mood disorder and personality disorder, assigning a Global Assessment of Functioning score of 55, indicating moderate functional difficulties. Dr. Everhart concluded that while the Plaintiff could understand simple directions, he would struggle with public interactions.
Dr. Donna Veraldi, a non-examining medical expert, further supported the ALJ's findings, stating that the Plaintiff had no restrictions in daily living activities, moderate social functioning difficulties, and no issues with concentration. She indicated that the Plaintiff could perform basic tasks if limited in contact with others, acknowledging he tended to overreport symptoms but did not endorse Dr. Everhart's malingering diagnosis.
Overall, the ALJ's assessment aligns with substantial evidence from multiple medical opinions, highlighting concerns about the credibility of the Plaintiff's self-reported symptoms and the validity of Dr. Arnold's conclusions, which were largely based on a single examination without corroborative treatment records.
Dr. Arnold identified issues with the Plaintiff's psychological test results, noting over-reporting, which led to questions about their validity. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) may dismiss a medical opinion if it heavily relies on a claimant's self-reports deemed incredible, as established in Tommasetti v. Astrue and Sandgathe v. Chater. The ALJ found the Plaintiff's self-reports to be exaggerated, thus determining Dr. Hayes’ report to be unreliable. The ALJ has the authority to evaluate evidence and resolve conflicts in testimony, and if multiple rational interpretations exist, the court cannot override the Commissioner’s judgment. The ALJ's decision to give more weight to assessments from Dr. Everhart and Dr. Veraldi was supported by substantial evidence, as their findings aligned more closely with the medical records.
The Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) reflects what an individual can still do despite limitations, and the ALJ considers physical and mental abilities along with symptomatology when making this determination. The ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff could perform light work with restrictions on public interaction and necessitating independent work, applying the correct legal standard and supporting this with substantial evidence. Dr. Hutson, an orthopedic specialist, stated that the Plaintiff had no disabling orthopedic issues and could perform light work with some limitations. Dr. Veraldi assessed the Plaintiff as having no restrictions on daily activities, moderate social functioning difficulties, and no significant concentration issues, indicating he could manage basic work tasks with limited social interaction. The Plaintiff's reported daily activities, such as library visits and personal care, further supported the ALJ's RFC conclusion, which this Court finds to be error-free and properly substantiated.
At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the Commissioner must demonstrate that the claimant is capable of performing other substantial gainful activity and that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy for the claimant. If a claimant cannot return to their previous job, the Commissioner is required to identify specific jobs that are available in substantial numbers. This burden can be met by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert based on a hypothetical scenario that accurately reflects the claimant's limitations.
In this case, the ALJ relied on the testimony of vocational expert Deborah Nelson Lapoint. Although the plaintiff contested the specificity of the hypothetical regarding social interaction limitations, the ALJ's question adequately encompassed the claimant's moderate limitations in social skills. The vocational expert identified the position of housekeeper and cleaner, stating it involved fairly close supervision initially, but limited contact with supervisors thereafter, which aligned with the claimant's Residual Functional Capacity (RFC).
The vocational expert also confirmed that there were 5,000 housekeeper/cleaner jobs available in Washington State and 250,000 nationally, meeting the Ninth Circuit's standard for a "significant number" of jobs, as established in prior cases. The Court found substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision and concluded that there were no reversible errors in the ALJ's analysis. Consequently, the Court granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion. The order required the filing of this decision and the closure of the case.
