Citation Mortgage, Ltd. v. Ormand Beach Associates Ltd. Partnership (In re Ormand Beach Associates Ltd. Partnership)

Docket: No. 3:00-CV-2111(JBA); Bankruptcy No. 94-21524

Court: District Court, D. Connecticut; May 24, 2002; Federal District Court

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An appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut challenges a final order imposing $73,463.45 in sanctions against appellants. The District Court reverses this imposition of sanctions. The case originates from a mortgage held by Citation Mortgage Co. on the Ormand Beach Retirement Center, owned by Ormand Beach Associates Limited Partnership and its General Partners. In 1992, Citation initiated a foreclosure in Florida, leading the court to order an accounting and impose a daily fine for non-compliance. Following a bankruptcy filing by Ormand Beach, the automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code halted the Florida proceedings. Citation sought to modify this stay, explicitly stating it would not pursue contempt sanctions against Ormand Beach but would against the General Partners. The Bankruptcy Court allowed the modification for the foreclosure action but denied including the General Partners in the stay. Subsequently, Citation communicated its intent to pursue sanctions against the General Partners to the Florida court. The defendants, including Ormand Beach and the General Partners, contested the sanctions and sought a conference to argue that a supplemental accounting purged any contempt. Notably, Ormand Beach's counsel proposed language for a court order that indicated the hearing would consider whether the supplemental accounting resolved the contempt issues.

The order's use of the term 'defendants' did not distinguish between Ormand Beach and the General Partners, indicating that the main issue was the sufficiency of supplemental accounting rather than which parties faced sanctions due to an intervening bankruptcy. During a hearing, a dispute arose regarding the status of a stay on sanctions. Mr. Russell asserted that the stay had been unconditionally lifted concerning contempt sanctions, while Mr. Campbell contended that the stay had only been modified for liquidation purposes, not fully lifted. Russell acknowledged that the stay remained in place regarding the creation of a security interest by the plaintiff in the funds. 

The hearing revealed that the Debtor could not pay the contempt fine due to bankruptcy, but the General Partners remained liable. The Florida court had ordered a contempt fine of $2.4 million to be paid to Volusia County, listing all five defendants as liable but noting that Ormand Beach's liability was conditional on bankruptcy court jurisdiction. The Florida court rejected Russell's caveat, issuing the order without differentiation among the defendants.

Subsequently, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that the Florida court's order violated the automatic stay, vacated the fine, and imposed $73,462.45 in sanctions against Russell and Citation for pursuing the contempt citation. However, this ruling was reversed on appeal, reinstating the Florida court's liquidation order and confirming that the contempt orders did not violate the automatic stay. After the bankruptcy concluded, the issue of sanctions was revisited. The Bankruptcy Court found that Russell had made reckless misrepresentations to the Florida court, justifying sanctions under its inherent power and 28 U.S.C. 1927. Russell and Citation then filed an appeal against these sanctions.

The standard of review for the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to impose sanctions is based on the abuse of discretion. An abuse occurs if the decision is founded on a legal error or if it falls outside the range of reasonable choices. The Second Circuit emphasizes that while the bankruptcy court has unique authority in sanctioning, reviewing courts must ensure such decisions are made with caution. Findings of fact from the Bankruptcy Court are reviewed for clear error, which occurs when the reviewing court is firmly convinced a mistake has been made, despite supporting evidence. If the lower court's findings are plausible based on the entire record, they will not be overturned even if the reviewing court would have weighed the evidence differently.

In this case, the underlying bankruptcy has concluded, and the contempt sanctions against Ormand Beach were previously found not to violate the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions. These sanctions were later vacated by a Florida appellate court, rendering them non-existent. The central issue is whether the appellants' actions in pursuing sanctions against Ormand Beach (instead of the General Partners) in state court constituted sanctionable conduct, especially after assuring the Bankruptcy Court that no sanctions would be sought against Ormand Beach. It is acknowledged that the appellants had the right to seek sanctions against the General Partners, who were not in bankruptcy, and any sanctions would benefit Volusia County rather than the appellants.

The Bankruptcy Court sanctioned Russell and Citation based on its inherent authority and under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The distinction between these two sources lies in who can be sanctioned; awards under § 1927 apply only to attorneys, while inherent authority allows for sanctions against attorneys, parties, or both. Sanctions related to litigation conduct require a finding of bad faith, which necessitates clear evidence that the actions were unfounded and aimed at harassment or delay, along with precise factual findings. A claim is considered colorable if it has some legal and factual support based on the reasonable beliefs of the claimant.

The Court found no adequate grounds for bad faith concerning Russell's statement to the Florida court about the automatic stay being lifted regarding sanctions against Ormand Beach. Although Russell's assertion was factually incorrect, the record shows he and Citation consistently communicated that no sanctions could be imposed on Ormand Beach due to its bankruptcy in Connecticut. During the same hearing, Russell mentioned that sanctions could not be pursued against Ormand Beach because of its bankruptcy filing. Additionally, Citation proposed a limitation in the sanctions order, indicating any sanctions against Ormand Beach would be subject to the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, a point not made in the order submitted by Ormand Beach’s counsel.

Russell's misstatement about the stay does not demonstrate bad faith since he clarified during the hearing that Ormand Beach was protected from sanctions due to its bankruptcy status. The hearing primarily focused on whether the supplemental accounting addressed the contempt, which did not necessitate distinguishing between parties. The liability of the General Partners for contempt sanctions was connected to the sufficiency of the accounting, and any reference to sanctions against them was permissible given the context.

Moreover, while Russell submitted an order indicating that contempt sanctions had been 'liquidated' and listed both Ormand Beach and the General Partners as liable, it remains unclear if 'liquidating' a fine constitutes 'pursuing' sanctions in violation of the Bankruptcy Court’s order. Nonetheless, it is evident from the record that Russell and Citation informed the Florida court that any sanctions against Ormand Beach would be subject to the Bankruptcy Court and the Bankruptcy Code.

Russell and Citation did not demonstrate an improper intent to collect sanctions against Ormand Beach without Bankruptcy Court authorization. During Florida state court proceedings, both parties used the term 'defendants' interchangeably, failing to distinguish between Ormand Beach and the General Partners. The court found insufficient evidence of bad faith, noting there was no motive for the appellants to seek sanctions against Ormand Beach, as any sanctions would benefit Volusia County rather than Citation. Furthermore, pursuing sanctions would harm Citation by reducing the funds available to pay its claims as a creditor in the bankruptcy case. Citation had previously assured the Bankruptcy Court that it would not seek sanctions against Ormand Beach, making it highly unlikely they would engage in such conduct shortly thereafter. This would be seen as dishonest and easily detectable, warranting sanctions by the Bankruptcy Court. The conduct displayed was characterized more by carelessness than by a lack of legitimate purpose. The Bankruptcy Court's judgment imposing $73,463.45 in sanctions against Citation Mortgage, Ltd., Citation Mortgage Corp., and Terrence Russell was reversed and vacated. Additionally, the court vacated a sanction order related to a violation of the automatic stay, confirming that no such violation occurred, while acknowledging that the Bankruptcy Court could still potentially sanction based on a pattern of apparent dissemblances, although no findings were made in that context. The court emphasized that attorneys who unreasonably multiply proceedings may be required to cover excess costs and legal fees incurred due to such conduct. Ultimately, the evidence did not support a conclusion of bad faith in Russell's misstatements.