State v. Drayton

Docket: Appellate Case No. 2012-213295; No. 5294

Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; February 3, 2015; South Carolina; State Appellate Court

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Darryl L. Drayton appeals his murder conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the consideration of circumstantial evidence, (2) the admission of evidence obtained via a search warrant lacking probable cause, and (3) limitations placed on his cross-examination of the pathologist regarding the victim’s toxicology report. The court affirms the conviction.

The facts reveal that Michael Bartley, the victim's fiancé, testified about the victim, Alexis Lukaitis, who had a history of taking unprescribed medication from Drayton in exchange for driving him. On August 8, 2010, Bartley prepared to take their twin boys to his mother's house while Lukaitis stayed behind due to an allergic reaction. Bartley last spoke to her at 8:19 p.m., during which she indicated she was with Drayton. Later, Bartley attempted to contact her multiple times, ultimately leading him to report her missing the next day.

Detective Todd Calhoun responded to the missing person's report and attempted to reach Drayton, who initially agreed to meet but failed to show. Bartley and Hooper searched for Lukaitis’s vehicle, and Bartley learned from an online report that a body had been found in Charleston. He provided police with descriptions of Lukaitis and contact information for relevant parties, including Drayton. Witness Tina Johnson testified to her connection with Lukaitis and Drayton, indicating they had met at a self-help facility near Drayton’s residence. Johnson's son later reported seeing Drayton, prompting her to inform the police.

During the trial, the son testified that Drayton was present in a parking lot at a self-help facility, appearing with facial scratches, a bandaged finger, and a hospital bracelet. Jackie Seward, a logger, reported finding the victim's body on the roadside on August 9, 2010, prompting police notification. Forensic investigator James Thomas Milz noted the victim had a significant throat laceration and charred clothing, suggesting she had been moved, as evidenced by a bloody handprint on her ankle. Milz documented footprints and tire marks, taking cast impressions; however, Vicki Hallman from SLED indicated the tire impressions could potentially match either the victim's 2001 white Pontiac Grand Prix or another vehicle with similar tires. Paul McManigal, another forensic expert, confirmed that no usable fingerprints were found on the victim.

Drayton’s cousin, Stephen Edwards, recounted that Drayton arrived at his home on the morning of August 9, seeking a ride to the hospital with a bloody, wrapped hand, claiming he had fought with three men. After failing to initially provide a ride, Edwards later drove Drayton to the hospital, where Drayton sought treatment for a finger injury. Edwards noted Drayton's request to visit a jewelry store and their subsequent check-in at a motel. On August 10, Edwards took Drayton to further medical treatment before dropping him off at a library.

Upon returning home on August 11, Edwards discovered bloodied items on his porch, including personal belongings linked to the victim. He reported this to the police, and Detective Calhoun collected the items, which were identified by Bartley as belonging to the victim, while others did not. Dr. Luca Delatore treated Drayton for a finger laceration that morning, revealing a fracture and prescribing medication. Maggie Mae Furchak, a pharmacy worker, confirmed Drayton's visit to fill prescriptions, during which he claimed to have cut his finger at work. Christopher Golis from a local jewelry store testified that Drayton sold him an engagement ring that day, asserting he found it at a gas station.

Golis observed Drayton's bandaged finger, which Drayton attributed to a saw injury while working at a fence company. Golis later identified Drayton in a photographic line-up and turned over a ring, which Bartley confirmed as belonging to the victim. On August 10, 2010, Sargent DiCarlo responded to a report from the Bluffton Police about the victim's vehicle found parked on Wharf Street, where he noted blood near the trunk. Bartley identified the vehicle as the victim's. Kimberly Dinh from SLED processed the vehicle, discovering suspected blood on various surfaces and strands of hair. The trunk had been partially cleaned, lacking a spare tire and containing water. Dinh collected twenty-one DNA swabs, including from the steering wheel and driver-door pull. Drayton was arrested on August 11, and Investigator Adams documented injuries on Drayton's body, noting scratches and an injured finger but no marks on his face. Forensic scientist Catherine Leisy found Drayton's DNA on the victim's vehicle and belongings, with a probability of one in 3 million and one in 1.9 trillion that it matched DNA from the driver’s side. DNA from the victim's shoes had matching probabilities of one in 340 million and one in 1.9 quadrillion. A CVS bag contained Drayton's DNA as the major contributor. The parties agreed to stipulate Drayton's cell phone number despite his objections. Kenneth Ray Aycock, Jr. analyzed the cell phone records, indicating that the victim's phone was active in Bluffton on August 8, with calls made between 8:19 and 9:49 p.m. to and from Bartley’s number. After 9:49 p.m., calls went unanswered or to voicemail, and no cell-site data was available.

Aycock testified that Drayton’s cell phone registered calls in Bluffton on August 8th, with movement detected towards Charleston and specific locations along Highway 17 between 7:20 and 7:52 p.m. The phone's signal was detected near the victim’s body at 9:13 p.m., and subsequent calls were logged closer to Charleston until the last call at 11:38 p.m. On August 9th, the phone registered back in Bluffton at 6:48 a.m. Text messages from Drayton’s phone on August 10th indicated a desire to secure a hotel room and to leave the area.

Dr. Susan Erin Presnell conducted the victim's autopsy, noting multiple abrasions, lacerations, and significant injuries, including puncture wounds from a sharp object. Key injuries included a severed carotid artery and gaping neck cuts, which Presnell identified as the cause of death, along with signs of potential strangulation. Thermal injuries observed were likely post-mortem.

During cross-examination, Drayton’s counsel raised questions regarding the victim's toxicology report, which showed various drugs, including amphetamines and opiates. The defense argued these substances undermined the State’s circumstantial evidence, while the State objected, asserting that only a toxicologist could appropriately address the timing of the drug ingestion. The trial court excluded the evidence based on Rule 403, SCRE. Drayton was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, leading to the current appeal.

In criminal appeals, the reviewing court examines only legal errors and adheres to the trial court's factual findings unless they are deemed clearly erroneous. The court's role is to assess whether the trial court abused its discretion, which occurs if the decision lacks evidentiary support or is influenced by legal error. The appellate court does not reassess evidence but verifies if the trial court's ruling is backed by any evidence.

Drayton contested the trial court's refusal to provide a 'reasonable hypothesis' jury instruction regarding circumstantial evidence. The trial court defined direct and circumstantial evidence, stating that both types are equally valid and that jurors must find the defendant not guilty if there is any reasonable doubt of guilt. Drayton argued that the instruction was misleading and inconsistent with legal precedents advocating for the 'reasonable hypothesis' standard, specifically citing State v. Edwards and State v. Grippon. The trial court denied Drayton's request for this specific charge.

In evaluating potential errors in jury instructions, the appellate court reviews the charge comprehensively, considering its alignment with the evidence and legal issues presented. A jury charge is deemed correct if it sufficiently explains the law when read in its entirety. Previous rulings, including Grippon and Logan, upheld the trial court's discretion in omitting the 'to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis' language, affirming that a charge can be substantially correct without necessitating reversal.

Erroneous jury instructions are evaluated under a harmless error analysis, and the Logan court determined that the overall jury instructions adequately communicated the law. The court specified that defendants are entitled to a charge on circumstantial evidence and reasonable doubt upon request. It distinguished between direct evidence, which proves a fact without deduction, and circumstantial evidence, which requires inference from a series of facts. While both types of evidence are equally weighted in legal consideration, circumstantial evidence must collectively point to the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; mere suspicion is insufficient for a conviction. The State bears the burden of proof regardless of the type of evidence used.

The Logan ruling does not prevent trial courts from providing the circumstantial evidence charge established in previous cases (Grippon and Cherry) but clarifies that such a charge cannot be given in isolation against a defendant's objection. The court recognized that while Grippon and Cherry aimed to clarify jury confusion regarding circumstantial evidence, additional language may be necessary for proper jury analysis if requested by a defendant. 

In the case of Drayton, the court agreed he should benefit from the Logan rule since his case was under direct review at the time of its publication. However, even though the Jenkins court affirmed an application of harmless error analysis and noted the absence of the "reasonable hypothesis" language in the circumstantial evidence instruction, it found that the trial court’s instructions sufficiently conveyed the law. The jury was correctly instructed on reasonable doubt prior to the circumstantial evidence charge, and overall, the instructions were deemed adequate, leading to the conclusion that there was no reversible error in the jury charge.

Drayton contested the trial court's admission of historical cell service location data from his provider, arguing that the court mistakenly treated the warrant as a court order and lacked probable cause. The court clarified that five warrants were issued covering Drayton's primary and alternate cell numbers, as well as records related to the victim, Bartley, and Hooper. It found that Drayton had standing to challenge the warrant and upheld the constitutionality based on a lack of expectation of privacy in records. The warrants were deemed valid under the Federal Stored Communications Act, which requires only "specific and articulable facts" for issuance, not probable cause. The warrants sought extensive data from Drayton's Verizon number, including subscriber details and call logs relevant to a homicide investigation initiated after the discovery of a deceased female. The court ruled that Drayton did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his historical cell site data, citing that federal courts generally agree that such data does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections, although there is some disagreement on the need for probable cause versus specific facts.

Drayton contends that, despite lacking a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding historical cell site location information under the Federal Constitution, he did possess such an expectation under the South Carolina Constitution, which offers greater privacy protections. The South Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that state courts can provide more expansive rights than those granted by federal law. Notably, the state's right to privacy was formulated with concerns about new electronic technologies that enhance government surveillance capabilities. Recent rulings from both the U.S. and South Carolina Supreme Courts reflect a more stringent approach to electronic surveillance in terms of privacy rights. However, in Drayton's case, the evidence sought was classified as business records from Verizon, not obtained via electronic surveillance. Consequently, the South Carolina appellate courts have not yet addressed historical cell site location data under the state constitution. The court concluded that Drayton lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy since he voluntarily provided his location data to the cellular provider, thus relinquishing any privacy claim over those records. As a result, the court did not need to consider Drayton's argument regarding probable cause for the warrant. Additionally, the court found no merit in Drayton's claim that the trial court improperly labeled the search warrant as a court order, affirming that errors without prejudice do not warrant reversal. Finally, the Court of Appeals deemed certain points raised by Drayton to be without merit and unnecessary for discussion.

Drayton contended that the trial court incorrectly limited his cross-examination of the pathologist regarding the victim's toxicology report. The court determined that the evidence was not relevant under Rule 403, SCRE, which allows for exclusion when the probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. The circuit court’s decision on evidence admission is discretionary and not subject to reversal unless there is an abuse of discretion. The court found no error in excluding the evidence, noting that any potential error was harmless since it was cumulative to other evidence of the victim’s drug use. Consequently, Drayton's conviction and sentence were affirmed, with concurrence from Justices Huff and Konduros.