Greens of Rock Hill, LLC v. Rizon Commercial Contracting, Inc.

Citations: 411 S.C. 152; 766 S.E.2d 876; 2014 S.C. App. LEXIS 309Docket: Appellate Case No. 2012-213563; No. 5281

Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; December 2, 2014; South Carolina; State Appellate Court

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Rizón Commercial Contracting, Inc. appeals the circuit court’s decision to vacate its mechanic’s liens and dismiss its counterclaim for foreclosure. The court erroneously ruled that Rizón did not qualify as a "laborer" under South Carolina Code section 29-5-20(A), which defines eligibility for mechanic’s liens. The case involves the Riverwalk development project, where Rizón was contracted by Celriver Services, LLC to crush scrap concrete from a demolished facility for use as a paving base, a task central to the improvement of the property. Despite completing the contracted work and incurring related expenses, the owners contested Rizón’s mechanic’s liens, arguing it did not contribute to the improvement of real estate. The circuit court agreed, concluding that crushing concrete alone did not constitute improvement. However, mechanic’s liens are statutory rights meant to protect those who provide labor or materials for property improvements, regardless of their direct contractual ties to the property owner. The circuit court's ruling followed a procedure permitting it to evaluate the validity of the mechanic’s lien akin to a summary judgment standard. The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for foreclosure proceedings, asserting that Rizón’s work did indeed qualify for mechanic’s lien protection under the statute.

The circuit court's decision to vacate Rizón's mechanic's liens was found to be erroneous. Evidence viewed favorably towards Rizón establishes that it qualifies as a "laborer" under section 29-5-20, having performed necessary work for the improvement of real estate. Rizón was contracted to remove demolition debris and convert concrete blocks for use in paving, actions deemed essential to the development project. The court emphasized that the mechanic's lien statute is broadly interpreted to include vital labor contributing to property development, even if that labor does not directly attach to the real estate. Legislative intent supports recognizing various contributors to construction projects as laborers under the statute. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for foreclosure proceedings consistent with this ruling.

Owners submitted a petition to vacate mechanic’s liens, including a 2010 contract between Celriver and Rizón. However, Rizón's owner asserted in an affidavit that the 2010 contract was not applicable to the current work. During oral arguments, Rizón clarified that while the initial hiring in 2010 was for crushing scrap concrete, there was no written contract for the 2011 work relevant to this case. Despite the lack of a written agreement for 2011, Rizón acknowledged that the terms of the oral agreement were "substantially the same" as those in the 2010 contract. This assertion was corroborated by an affidavit from Celriver's Vice President, which used identical language from the 2010 contract to describe the 2011 work. The circuit court determined that (1) Rizón did not supply materials for property improvement, as their role was solely to process supplied scrap concrete into usable stone, and (2) Rizón was not considered a subcontractor regarding the property improvement since the contract with the Owners did not necessitate concrete crushing for road and sidewalk construction. The court emphasized that Rizón qualifies as a laborer under subsection 29-5-20(A), which supports the finding without needing to review the circuit court's additional findings or the issue of discovery.