Cranford v. Hutchinson Construction

Citations: 399 S.C. 65; 731 S.E.2d 303Docket: Appellate Case No. 2010-157846; No. 4939

Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; February 7, 2012; South Carolina; State Appellate Court

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Beau Cranford appeals the Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation Commission's decision, which denied him temporary disability compensation, permanent partial disability compensation, and additional medical treatment for injuries sustained while working for Hutchinson Construction. Cranford argues that the Appellate Panel failed to explicitly determine whether he had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and implicitly concluded he had. The court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands for further proceedings.

Cranford was employed by Hutchinson on June 26, 2007, and sustained multiple injuries from a fall while working on July 20, 2007. After receiving immediate medical attention, he was instructed to avoid heavy lifting or strenuous activity. He was out of work for three weeks, during which Hutchinson provided him with temporary disability benefits. Upon return, he was assigned light-duty work but was terminated on August 31, 2007, for unsafe practices. Hutchinson claimed Cranford was ineligible for further temporary compensation, citing a minimum work period prior to termination.

After his termination, Cranford found temporary work at a greenhouse but experienced a resurgence of back pain. He sought further medical treatment, leading to restrictions on lifting and referrals to specialists. An orthopedic surgeon concluded on June 3, 2008, that Cranford had reached MMI with no permanent impairment and could return to work. However, a subsequent evaluation by another physician contradicted this finding, stating Cranford was not at MMI and required further treatment, which Hutchinson declined to provide.

Cranford worked as a machine operator from September 12, 2008, to November 7, 2008, earning $469.98 weekly without heavy lifting duties. Following his layoff, he filed a Form 50 on January 15, 2009, seeking a hearing for additional medical treatment for his back and arms, as well as temporary disability benefits, in response to Hutchinson's refusal for further treatment. Hutchinson filed a Form 51, acknowledging injuries to Cranford’s arms and back but asserting he had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and denying temporary disability benefits. Cranford returned to Dr. Zgleszewski on April 23, 2009, complaining of recurring back pain and numbness, leading to Dr. Zgleszewski assigning a 10% impairment rating for the back and a 9% whole person impairment rating for arm scars. 

A hearing was held on May 14, 2009, resulting in a September 28, 2009, order from the single commissioner, which awarded Cranford compensation for arm disfigurement but found no permanent back impairment and denied temporary disability benefits and further medical treatment. Cranford appealed, and the Appellate Panel upheld the commissioner’s decision. The standard for judicial review of workers' compensation decisions, as established by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), allows for reversal or modification if substantial rights were prejudiced due to legal error or if the decision is clearly erroneous based on substantial evidence. The Appellate Panel serves as the ultimate finder of fact, with the final determination of witness credibility and evidence weight reserved to them, meaning their factual findings are conclusive unless there is no reasonable basis for them.

Cranford contends that the Appellate Panel incorrectly denied his claim for temporary disability benefits from Hutchinson. The South Carolina Code specifies that disability is defined as an employee's inability to earn wages due to an injury, with employers required to provide temporary compensation during this period. Temporary benefits are activated if an employee is unable to work due to a work-related injury for at least eight days. Once initiated, these benefits can be suspended if the employee returns to work for a minimum of 15 days; however, if the employee does not maintain employment for that duration, benefits must resume immediately.

Hutchinson claimed that Cranford was ineligible for benefits after working for 15 days, asserting no temporary partial compensation was due. The document references the case of Grayson v. Carter Rhoad Furniture as a precedent. In Grayson, the employee was initially released to work but experienced ongoing pain and difficulties, leading to a termination of employment. The findings concluded that Grayson was still disabled and entitled to benefits, ultimately resulting in a judicial review that reversed the initial denial of temporary total disability benefits.

The analysis indicates that Cranford's situation parallels Grayson's, suggesting that despite Hutchinson's claims, Cranford may still be entitled to temporary disability compensation due to his ongoing disability following his return to work.

The Supreme Court determined that Grayson’s temporary total disability benefits were never properly terminated, as he was released to work under restrictions. Consequently, his benefits should be reinstated. Similarly, Cranford, who suffered an injury at work and had also been receiving temporary compensation, was discharged with medical instructions to avoid heavy lifting and strenuous activity. Both Grayson and Cranford were terminated shortly after returning to work while still under work restrictions. Grayson was dismissed due to a lack of a driver’s license, while Cranford was let go for perceived unsafe practices. 

Grayson had signed a Form 17 indicating his ability to return to work, whereas Cranford’s benefits were terminated unilaterally by his employer, who claimed he had returned to work for over fifteen days without needing temporary compensation. The court noted that under Regulation 67-504, the employer must continue to provide temporary disability benefits unless a physician confirms the employee can return to work without restrictions or has reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). Cranford was not released to return without restrictions until June 3, 2008. Although Cranford contended that Dr. Edwards’ caveat regarding careful lifting indicated ongoing restrictions, the court concluded that Dr. Edwards’ approval signified Cranford could return without restrictions.

Consequently, Hutchinson was mandated to pay Cranford temporary disability benefits from September 1, 2007, until he achieved MMI on June 3, 2008. The case was remanded to the Appellate Panel for the calculation of Cranford’s temporary disability compensation. Additionally, the court partially agreed with Cranford's claim regarding the Appellate Panel's finding of MMI, clarifying that MMI indicates no further treatment will reduce impairment and is determined at the Appellate Panel's discretion.

In Godson v. Mikasa Corp., the single commissioner did not explicitly determine whether Cranford reached Maximum Medical Improvement (MMI) regarding his back but accepted Dr. Edwards' 0% impairment rating, concluding Cranford had a 0% disability. The commissioner ruled that further medical treatment would not reduce Cranford's period of disability, implicitly indicating he had achieved MMI. Substantial evidence suggested Cranford attained MMI by June 3, 2008, as he maintained two jobs post-injury, despite reporting limitations and a lack of medical treatment for nearly six months. When he sought treatment, normal X-rays were found, and Dr. Edwards identified a minimal disc protrusion of no clinical significance, also stating it was acceptable for Cranford to return to work with proper techniques. Cranford argued that Dr. Edwards' prescription of Flexeril indicated he had not reached MMI; however, the commissioner could reasonably interpret this as evidence that while the medication may alleviate symptoms temporarily, Cranford's condition would not improve further.

Regarding Cranford's arms, the single commissioner awarded compensation for disfigurement due to keloid scars but did not find MMI for them. It is noted that disfigurement awards should generally follow an MMI determination, yet both parties agreed to this award, and Cranford did not contest it. Nevertheless, an explicit MMI finding is crucial for determining Cranford's eligibility for permanent disability, leading to a remand for specific findings on this issue.

Cranford argues that the Appellate Panel incorrectly denied him permanent partial disability benefits related to his back, arms, and skin injuries. The single commissioner determined that Cranford did not have permanent partial disability for his back, citing his six-month delay in seeking treatment and a ten-week lack of follow-up, despite medical advice. Dr. Edwards conducted an MRI which showed no fracture, a minimal disc protrusion deemed clinically insignificant, and diagnosed a lumbar sprain, recommending temporary use of Flexeril and confirming that Cranford could return to work with proper lifting techniques. 

Although both Cranford and the employer presented conflicting medical evidence, the Appellate Panel's discretion in weighing this evidence is upheld. However, the single commissioner failed to address whether Cranford sustained permanent disabilities to his arms or skin, necessitating a remand to the Appellate Panel for specific findings regarding these potential impairments and related benefits.

Additionally, Cranford's claim for further medical treatment for his back was rejected. According to South Carolina Code section 42-15-60, medical treatment is available for up to ten weeks post-injury and may continue if it helps reduce the disability period. The employer may still be liable for future medical treatment even if the claimant has returned to work, as supported by case law, which found substantial evidence for claims of maximum medical improvement despite ongoing treatment.

O’Banner establishes that the receipt of prescriptive medications after reaching maximum medical improvement (MMI) can serve as substantial evidence for a commissioner to determine that such medications temporarily alleviate symptoms, despite not improving the underlying medical condition. The focus is on whether additional treatment will reduce the claimant's period of disability, rather than on whether MMI has been achieved. In Dodge, it is noted that MMI is separate from the entitlement to permanent disability benefits. Given conflicting medical evidence, the Appellate Panel's deference to the Commission's findings is warranted. Dr. Edwards diagnosed Cranford with a lumbar strain/sprain and prescribed Flexeril without indicating permanent impairment, leading to a 0% disability ruling for the back. Although Dr. Zgleszewski noted muscle spasms and suggested further treatment, the Appellate Panel favored Dr. Edwards’ conclusion that further treatment would not reduce the disability period. The decision by the Appellate Panel is affirmed regarding the denial of permanent partial disability benefits for the back, but the issues of temporary disability benefits and permanent disability for the arms and skin are remanded for determination. The panel's conclusion that Cranford was not entitled to additional medical treatment is also upheld. The decision is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part, with particular attention to the procedural requirements for suspending compensation benefits once MMI is achieved.

Hutchinson terminated Cranford on August 31, 2007, citing safety concerns as the reason for the dismissal, despite Cranford's claim that the termination was due to Hutchinson's fear of potential harm to him. The court's review does not address the validity of Cranford's termination. According to 25A S.C.Code Ann. Regs. 67-502(D) (Supp.2011), "return to work without restriction" requires a statement from an authorized health care provider confirming the claimant's ability to meet job demands when their condition is stable. Cranford contends that he was improperly denied temporary benefits due to Hutchinson's failure to properly manage his benefits, but the court has reversed and remanded his entitlement to temporary compensation, thereby not addressing this claim. Additionally, under S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-30(23) (Supp.2011), an employee may receive both disability and disfigurement awards for injuries resulting in keloid scars, with specific provisions for compensation for serious disfigurement of exposed areas. Benefits for permanent disfigurement are capped at fifty weeks, and disfigurement can include compensation for serious burn scars. The precedent set in Mason v. Woodside Mills establishes that an employee can receive both types of compensation for injuries resulting in significant disfigurement.