Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina; January 23, 2011; South Carolina; State Supreme Court
Petitioner Darrick Jackson, Mayor of Timmonsville, sought a declaratory judgment asserting that Governor Sanford's veto of specific appropriations to the State Budget and Control Board was unconstitutional. Jackson also contested the Board's actions in using budget provisos to transfer funds from the Rural Infrastructure Bank Trust Fund to address the funding shortfall caused by the veto. The court deemed the Governor's veto unconstitutional, thus rendering Jackson's challenge to the Board's fund transfers unnecessary to address.
The appropriations bill for fiscal year 2010-2011 allocated $248,882,042 to the State Budget and Control Board, with $25,234,009 sourced from the General Fund. While the bill detailed the General Fund allocations, it did not specify amounts from other funding sources. Governor Sanford's Veto 52 aimed to nullify the entire General Fund allocation, justifying it by stating the Board had over $1 billion in carry-forward funds and could manage through cost-cutting. Following the veto, the Board utilized flexibility provisos in the appropriations act to reallocate $13.3 million from the Rural Infrastructure Bank Trust Fund for payroll and essential costs.
Article IV, section 21 of the South Carolina Constitution mandates that all appropriations bills must specify their funding purposes and amounts. If the Governor disapproves certain items within a bill, the remaining approved items become law, and the Governor must return the bill with his objections for reconsideration by the originating house.
Veto power is constitutionally limited and must be strictly interpreted, allowing for a complete nullification of distinct legislative items rather than their modification. In Drummond v. Beasley, it was emphasized that the Governor cannot alter legislation by removing conditions while keeping expenditures intact. The veto is meant to nullify, not amend legislative intent, as supported by Florida case law, which asserts that a veto must effectively destroy the designated fund. The interpretation of appropriations bills requires a “common sense construction” to define items or sections eligible for veto. The court must determine whether Veto 52 constituted a nullification or a modification of legislation; a complete veto is valid, while a partial veto is unconstitutional. The term “item” in the context of appropriations encompasses a specific sum of money along with its intended purpose. The court rejects the argument that the spatial format of an appropriations bill dictates the definition of an “item,” clarifying that the constitution permits vetoes of “items or sections” regardless of their arrangement.
The arrangement of information in a column is deemed irrelevant; however, there is disagreement regarding whether the column indicating the General Funds amount constitutes a standalone item that can be vetoed independently from the associated objects and purposes. The Governor's veto targeted one source of appropriated funds while leaving the overall appropriation and its specified purposes intact, resulting in a reduction of funding for the Board’s programs without eliminating them. This action is viewed as an improper modification of legislation, as established in case law which maintains that a veto must nullify rather than modify legislation. The Florida Supreme Court's precedent indicates that if the legislature intends to allocate a specific amount for a singular purpose, the Governor cannot unilaterally reduce that amount by vetoing one funding source; he must veto all or none. Allowing the veto of individual funding sources would undermine legislative authority over appropriations. Historical practices of previous South Carolina Governors in executing vetoes do not adequately justify the Governor's actions in this case, as the practice of vetoing one funding source without addressing the related purposes is not as deeply rooted as claimed. The net effect of the Governor's Veto 52 is therefore characterized as unconstitutional, as it improperly modifies a distinct appropriation item.
The Governor's veto of only the General Fund portion of an appropriation to the Budget and Control Board was deemed unconstitutional, as it exceeded his authority under Article IV, Section 21 of the South Carolina Constitution. This provision allows the Governor to veto "items," which includes both the designated funds and the specific purposes for which appropriations are made. The Governor's action of vetoing only part of an appropriation conflicted with this authority. The court upheld the General Assembly's appropriation of General Funds, declaring it effective and lawful.
Petitioner argued the veto violated the separation of powers by allowing the Budget and Control Board to transfer and use funds for purposes not authorized by the General Assembly, and contended that the budget provisos represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The standing of the Petitioner was established based on the Town of Timmonsville's need for financial assistance for infrastructure improvements, with no challenge to standing from the Respondents.
The court noted that there was no dispute regarding compliance with constitutional mandates for appropriations. The Governor's assertion that he could not veto an entire amount due to the inclusion of federal funds was rejected, as the constitutional provision grants him veto authority over all appropriations, regardless of funding sources. The Governor's limited veto of funding rather than entire programs further highlighted the constitutional violation.
