City of North Myrtle Beach v. East Cherry Grove Realty Co.
Docket: No. 27113
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina; April 11, 2012; South Carolina; State Supreme Court
Appellant East Cherry Grove Realty Co. LLC appeals a jury verdict affirming that the State of South Carolina holds title to certain disputed canals in North Myrtle Beach. The jury considered three theories: the establishment of title through two quitclaim deeds, public dedication of the canals, and the State's title in trust for the public. The jury ruled in favor of the State on all counts. East Cherry Grove contends that the trial court wrongly denied its motions for a directed verdict on these theories.
In 1961, the State initiated litigation against East Cherry Grove's predecessors to assert title over tidal lands in the East Cherry Grove area. A 1963 consent order clarified that specific property was exempt from the suit and a temporary injunction against East Cherry Grove's sale of property below the mean high-water mark was in place. A subsequent survey established a demarcation line, releasing certain lands from the lawsuit.
After a bench trial favoring East Cherry Grove, a 1969 settlement led to the exchange of quitclaim deeds, which defined an "agreed-on mean high water mark." This mark did not align with the earlier demarcation line. The deeds transferred land below this mark to the State and land above it to East Cherry Grove. Additional provisions in the deed specified conditions related to Nye Cut and land resulting from excavation. These quitclaim deeds were incorporated into a 1969 court order concluding the original case, which maintained the integrity of the 1963 order. The court upheld the jury's decision regarding ownership under the quitclaim deeds.
Parties have acknowledged that the canals have been publicly accessible since their construction. The City of North Myrtle Beach initiated a lawsuit against East Cherry Grove, LLC, and the State to resolve ownership of the canal bottoms associated with property deeded to East Cherry Grove in a 1969 settlement. The City contended that the State owned the canal bottoms, a claim the State supported. The City and State are collectively referred to as Respondents. Following a jury trial, the trial court rejected Appellant’s motions for a directed verdict. The jury determined that the State holds title to the canals based on quitclaim deeds, that East Cherry Grove dedicated the canals to public use, and that the State maintains title in trust for the public.
The appeal raises two issues: 1) whether the trial court erred by not finding the 1963 order conclusive regarding ownership and deeming the quitclaim deeds ambiguous; and 2) whether the trial court erred in not ruling that the State is estopped from denying the 1963 order. The standard of review notes that declaratory judgment suits depend on the nature of the underlying issue, with property title determinations treated as actions at law. The appellate court's review is limited to correcting legal errors, and factual findings by the jury are upheld unless unsupported by evidence.
Appellant contends that the trial court wrongly denied a directed verdict, asserting that the 1963 order unambiguously established title to the canals in East Cherry Grove. The jury, however, found otherwise, affirming the State's ownership. Appellant also argues that the 1963 order should be deemed conclusive on ownership and that the quitclaim deeds clearly transferred all interests in the canals to East Cherry Grove, with the State being estopped from claiming otherwise. The court disagreed, emphasizing that judgments should be interpreted as coherent documents, considering the intent of the court as expressed throughout the entire ruling. If the language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as such without need for interpretation.
The case involves a settlement from a 1969 order that incorporated quitclaim deeds but stated it did not affect a previous 1963 order. Both the 1963 order and quitclaim deeds are to be interpreted as components of a unified, court-approved settlement agreement. The 1963 consent order suggests that most property in East Cherry Grove is titled to it, which the appellant interprets as the State's acknowledgment of no claim to that land and the court's ratification of this in 1969. However, the interpretation is deemed ambiguous regarding ownership of canal bottoms when all documents are considered together.
Key points include:
1. The distinction between the Estimated Line of Demarcation in the 1963 order and the mean high water mark in the quitclaim deeds indicates different boundary definitions.
2. Settlements can include property not originally part of the lawsuit, which may lead to the court approving the quitclaim despite the 1963 order.
3. The 1969 order's statement that the settlement did not affect the 1963 order may have aimed to protect the titles of lots sold by East Cherry Grove between 1963 and 1969.
4. The quitclaim deed specifically relinquishes rights to areas below the mean high water mark, suggesting that the delineation of this boundary was necessary and separate from the 1963 order.
5. The quitclaim deed excludes certain areas from its scope, indicating a careful delineation of property rights, with canals being included in the quitclaim to the State except for specific future changes involving Nye Cut.
Overall, the analysis reveals significant complexities in property ownership and rights as defined by both the 1963 and 1969 orders and the quitclaim deeds.
The affirmation of the 1963 order within the 1969 settlement suggests potential reaffirmation of title to the lower portion of East Cherry Grove’s plat; however, this interpretation undermines the specific exceptions in the quitclaim deed. The Appellant contends that the deed's mentions of canals refer only to their junctures with State land or imply a promise against damming the canals. Despite these interpretations, the deed's language supports the notion that East Cherry Grove intended to quitclaim title to the canal bottoms to the State. A subsequent ruling by the same judge regarding a dispute over Recreational Lake indicated that East Cherry Grove never owned that area, contradicting the Appellant's view of the settlement agreement. This finding reinforces that the 1963 order was not meant to affirm East Cherry Grove's title over all lands, including the Recreational Lake, which was excluded from their holdings. The court found the 1963 order and quitclaim deeds ambiguous and did not affirm East Cherry Grove's title to the canals.
Regarding judicial estoppel, the Appellant argued that the trial court erred in denying motions for nonsuit and directed verdict based on the claim that the State is estopped from disputing East Cherry Grove's ownership of the canal bottoms as established by the 1963 order. The court disagreed, noting that judicial estoppel is meant to maintain the integrity of judicial proceedings and is not applicable here since the 1963 order does not clearly indicate a position from the State regarding the canal bottoms. Furthermore, any contrary position from the State is supported by intervening documents like the quitclaim deeds. Therefore, the court concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply, allowing the State to assert its title to the canals, and upheld its denial of the Appellant’s motions.
The State is entitled to claim title to the canal bottoms as the 1963 order does not resolve ownership issues, and the quitclaim deeds are ambiguous. Consequently, the trial court acted correctly in denying the Appellant's motions for nonsuit and directed verdict, allowing the jury to determine ownership based on the quitclaim deeds. The Appellant's other exceptions are resolved under Rule 220(b), SCACR, citing several case authorities that affirm the trial court's broad discretion in evidentiary matters and the adequacy of jury instructions. These authorities emphasize that evidence may be excluded if it misleads the jury or is redundant, and that jury charges must reflect the law without necessitating reversal if they adequately cover the relevant legal principles. The ruling concludes that no taking occurs without deprivation of a property interest and ultimately affirms the jury verdict. The discussion under the two-issue rule indicates that the court does not need to evaluate other theories submitted to the jury. Additionally, the area released from the temporary injunction is delineated on a related plat as lying between a specified demarcation line and the Atlantic Ocean.
