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Hilton Head Plantation Property Owners' Ass'n v. Donald
Citations: 375 S.C. 220; 651 S.E.2d 614; 2007 S.C. App. LEXIS 141Docket: No. 4272
Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; July 6, 2007; South Carolina; State Appellate Court
In the quiet title action, the Hilton Head Plantation Property Owners’ Association, Inc. (the Association) appeals a special referee's ruling that the State of South Carolina holds title to a disputed strip of land (the Property) adjacent to Bear Creek Subdivision II. The Association argues it acquired the Property through either a chain of title via a quitclaim deed from the Developer or through adverse possession. The State and the owners of lot 54 countered that the State has paramount title under the public trust doctrine. The special referee determined that the Property was formed in the 1970s due to spoil from dredging activities conducted by the Developer, concluding it belongs to the State. The Association's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to the appeal. The court affirms the special referee's decision, emphasizing that the State has presumptive title to lands below the high water mark due to historical legal principles. The court reinforces that where paramount title is claimed by a defendant, issues of title must be determined by the court; thus, a judge's factual findings will not be overturned on appeal unless unsupported by evidence. To assert title to the land, one must provide a specific grant from the sovereign, which is interpreted strictly against the grantee. The Association claims that the Developer acquired title through accretion when it owned Hilton Head Plantation and that its quitclaim deed conveyed the Property to the Association. Generally, a riparian owner has rights to land formed by accretion; however, artificial accretions created solely by the upland owner's actions do not benefit them, as they cannot expand their estate at the State’s expense. Testimony indicated that the Property was formed by the Developer’s dredging activities in the 1970s, with the conclusion that the State owned the Property since it was below the high water mark prior to the dredging. Consequently, the Developer lacked title to the Property when it quitclaimed it to the Association. Therefore, the Association cannot claim the Property through the Developer’s deed. Moreover, since the State holds title, the Association cannot claim it through adverse possession, as such claims do not run against the State or its political subdivisions. The special referee’s decision is thus affirmed, with concurrence from Justices Stilwell, Short, and Williams, and the case was decided without oral argument under Rule 215, SCACR.