Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; September 9, 2002; South Carolina; State Appellate Court
Diana Mullís initiated a conversion action against Trident Emergency Physicians, resulting in a jury awarding her $20,000 in actual damages. Trident sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, claiming Mullís did not establish a legal basis for conversion. The trial court denied this motion, affirming that Mullís sufficiently proved her case, and subsequently denied Trident's motion for reconsideration.
Mullís, a medical doctor, was hired by Trident in early 1993, during which she was informed that 10% of her salary would be withheld for administrative expenses. However, she discovered an additional 10% was withheld, purportedly to accumulate $20,000 for a partnership buy-in. This withholding continued until November 1994, but when Mullís sought partnership in May 1995, Trident denied her request and refused to return the withheld funds, stating the money had been allocated among existing partners.
A Partnership Agreement detailed that associate doctors would have 90% of their net pay until the $20,000 was collected, which would be part of the partnership's net profits. The agreement also stipulated eligibility for partnership after three years of service. Despite Mullís’s repeated requests for a refund and continued employment until November 1996, her efforts were unsuccessful. Trident acknowledged refunding another associate but claimed Mullís's situation was unique.
Dr. Malaney, a partner, testified that Mullís received an informational packet that included the Partnership Agreement, though there was no written proof of this. Although Mullís signed an agreement with Trident, she did not sign the Partnership Agreement. It was noted that other associates had paid the buy-in without receiving refunds or becoming partners. The court denied both parties' motions for directed verdicts, and the jury ruled in favor of Mullís. Trident's appeal argues that the trial court wrongly denied its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that Mullís's consent to the withholding and her failure to prove an identifiable fund negate the conversion claim, a contention the court disagreed with.
The jury was deemed the appropriate body to assess whether Mullís consented in the context of a conversion claim, referencing Fredericks v. Commercial Credit Co. Conversion is characterized as the unauthorized exercise of ownership rights over another's property, which alters its condition or excludes the owner's rights, as established in Green v. Waidner. For conversion to be actionable regarding money, there must be an obligation on the defendant to deliver a specific, identifiable fund, as stated in Richardson’s Rests. Inc. However, money can be converted if it can be identified, even if the exact coins or bills are not specified, according to SSI Med. Servs. Inc. The court concluded that Mullís was not required to identify the money as a separate account since the buy-in amount constituted a determinable sum, and the commingling of funds did not negate its identifiable nature. The order being appealed was affirmed, with concurrence from the judges.
