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Willis Construction Co. v. Sumter Airport Commission

Citations: 308 S.C. 505; 419 S.E.2d 240; 1992 S.C. App. LEXIS 115Docket: 1832

Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; June 8, 1992; South Carolina; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, Willis Construction Company, Inc. appealed a special referee's decision denying its petition for attorney fees under South Carolina Code Ann. 15-77-300, which allows for fee recovery by a prevailing party in State action cases. The dispute arose from a contract with the Sumter Airport Commission for additional work, where the Commission imposed liquidated damages and refused payment. The special referee awarded Willis over $75,000, but both parties' appeals were dismissed. Willis sought attorney fees, which were denied on the grounds that the Commission did not initiate an action. The appellate court affirmed the denial, not on the initial procedural grounds, but by determining that the Commission does not qualify as a political subdivision of the State per the statute. The court reasoned that the Commission lacks governmental powers and functions in a proprietary manner, distinguishing it from entities defined as political subdivisions or special purpose districts. The decision was further supported by the absence of definitions for 'State' or 'political subdivision' within the relevant statutes. Consequently, the court upheld the special referee’s denial of attorney fees to Willis, leaving the other issues raised by Willis unaddressed.

Legal Issues Addressed

Definition of Political Subdivision

Application: The court determined that the Sumter Airport Commission does not qualify as a political subdivision because it lacks governmental powers such as revenue generation and eminent domain.

Reasoning: A political subdivision is defined as a segment of the State with governmental functions (Jackson v. Breeland, 1916). The Sumter Airport Commission, created by a specific Act, lacks governmental powers such as revenue generation and eminent domain, thus it does not qualify as a political subdivision under 15-77-300.

Proprietary Capacity of Airport Commissions

Application: The Sumter Airport Commission acts in a proprietary capacity rather than as a governmental functionary, impacting its qualification under the statute.

Reasoning: The Sumter Airport Commission was determined not to qualify as a State agency under South Carolina Code Ann. 15-77-300 in its contract with Willis for runway improvements, as it acted in a proprietary capacity rather than fulfilling a governmental function.

Recovery of Attorney Fees under S.C. Code Ann. 15-77-300

Application: The court affirmed the denial of attorney fees to Willis because the Airport Commission is not considered a political subdivision of the State under the statute.

Reasoning: The appellate court affirms this decision on different grounds, clarifying that the Airport Commission does not qualify as a political subdivision of the State under 15-77-300, citing its creation by Act No. 141 of 1959, which outlines its structure and powers.

Special Purpose Districts under S.C. Code Ann. 15-78-30

Application: The Airport Commission is not a 'special purpose district' as it has no assigned local governmental function, contrasting with other districts that have such powers.

Reasoning: Additionally, under S.C. Code Ann. 15-78-30, the Airport Commission is not a 'special purpose district' since no local governmental function has been assigned to it, contrasting with other airport districts that were explicitly granted such powers and tax exemptions upon their establishment.

State Agency Definition

Application: The court found that the definition of a 'State agency' under the Tort Claims Act does not apply to Chapter 77, affecting the petition for attorney fees.

Reasoning: Willis argues that the Commission is a 'State agency' under the same code, but this definition pertains to the Tort Claims Act and does not apply to Chapter 77, which lacks a specific definition of 'agency.'