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Campbell v. Campbell
Citations: 300 S.C. 68; 386 S.E.2d 305; 1989 S.C. App. LEXIS 142Docket: 1417
Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; November 12, 1989; South Carolina; State Appellate Court
A resulting trust case involves disputes over a house and lot in Aiken County among relatives, specifically between David Campbell and William and Dorothy Campbell. The lower court determined that David Campbell holds an undivided eighty percent interest in the property, with William and Dorothy owning the remaining twenty percent, which they have appealed. The property, deeded in 1979 for $7,500, was primarily meant to provide a home for David and Louise Campbell, who were elderly and lacked formal education. A life estate was established for David and Louise in 1980, with a remainder interest to William and Dorothy. The court found that David and Louise made the majority of mortgage payments and contributed to the down payment, while William and Dorothy made minimal payments. The judge deemed William and Dorothy's claim to a life estate as implausible, ultimately concluding that a resulting trust existed in favor of David Campbell. The court valued the property at $16,700 and affirmed William and Dorothy’s twenty percent interest. The court noted that the dispute over the 1980 deed arose after the mortgage was paid, and David Campbell described the deed as a protective measure for David and Louise. William and Dorothy contested the finding of a resulting trust, asserting it contradicted their agreement regarding the property, but the court upheld the lower court's findings. The court affirms the trial court's finding of a resulting trust regarding property ownership. Resulting trusts are established by law and can be evidenced by parol evidence. The general rule states that if one person pays for real estate while another is the titleholder, a presumption arises that the payer intended to benefit themselves, thus creating a resulting trust. In this case, David and Louise Campbell had agreed to repay a loan from William and Dorothy Campbell, which, alongside their down payment contribution, indicates they paid or committed to covering most of the property's purchase price, thereby establishing a resulting trust for their benefit. The court views the transaction as a loan from William and Dorothy to David and Louise to finance part of the purchase price, allowing the property holder to retain it as security for the loan. William and Dorothy Campbell's claim for a fifty percent interest in the property is rejected; the trial court determined their contributions warranted only a twenty percent interest, valued at $3,340, which exceeded their monetary input of $1,540. Their risk/benefit analysis is deemed inappropriate given the mortgage's satisfaction. Additionally, their arguments of waiver and estoppel were not addressed by the trial court, leaving no grounds for appeal on those issues, as unruled matters are not preserved for review. The court calculated their interest based on a $1,000 down payment, equating to approximately a 13% share of the property. The decision of the trial court is thus upheld, with concurrence from Judges Shaw and Bell.