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In the Interest of Joseph B.

Citations: 278 S.C. 502; 299 S.E.2d 331; 1983 S.C. LEXIS 215Docket: 21842

Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina; January 3, 1983; South Carolina; State Supreme Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves the adjudication of a juvenile delinquent for trespassing on public school property, as governed by S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-620. The appellant contested the applicability of this statute to public school grounds, citing State v. Hanapole, where the statute was deemed inapplicable to a public airport. The court distinguished this precedent by emphasizing that public school property does not offer universal public access, unlike an airport. The court further clarified that, under § 16-11-530, school district trustees are considered 'owners and possessors' of school property, thereby falling within the purview of 'premises of another person' as stipulated in § 16-11-620. Consequently, the court upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that the statutory framework supports the application of trespassing charges on public school grounds. This decision reinforces the interpretation that public school property, despite being publicly owned, is subject to trespass laws under the management of school district authorities.

Legal Issues Addressed

Application of Trespassing Statute to Public Property

Application: The court affirmed that S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-620 applies to trespassing on public school grounds, interpreting 'the premises of another person' to include public property managed by school district trustees.

Reasoning: The court referenced § 16-11-530, which designates school district trustees as the 'owners and possessors' of school property for trespass determinations.

Distinction from State v. Hanapole

Application: The court distinguished the present case from State v. Hanapole by clarifying that, unlike a public airport, school property does not have universal public access, allowing § 16-11-620 to apply.

Reasoning: The court noted that, despite being publicly owned, school property does not have universal public access, distinguishing it from the context of Hanapole.

Interpretation of 'Premises of Another Person'

Application: The court interpreted 'the premises of another person' in § 16-11-620 to include public school property, aligning with § 16-11-530 which confers ownership status to school district trustees for trespass purposes.

Reasoning: This establishes that trespassing on school grounds is indeed trespassing 'on the premises of another' under § 16-11-620.