The Michigan Supreme Court addressed the case of Roberto Marchello Dupree, who was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Dupree argued that his violation of the felon-in-possession statute was justified under the common law affirmative defense of self-defense, asserting he acted to protect himself during a confrontation. The trial court allowed a standard self-defense jury instruction but also provided an instruction on momentary innocent possession, which Dupree objected to. The jury convicted him, but the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, stating that self-defense and duress could be valid affirmative defenses in such cases if supported by sufficient evidence.
The Supreme Court limited its analysis to self-defense, affirming that it is generally available against a felon-in-possession charge when adequate evidence is presented. The Court emphasized that Dupree had sufficiently demonstrated he believed his life was in imminent danger, justifying his use of force. Importantly, the Court reaffirmed that the prosecution must disprove a self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. It also found the trial court’s instruction on momentary innocent possession to be erroneous, leading to a probable miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision, granting Dupree a new trial on the felon-in-possession charge.
The case arose from an incident at a family birthday party where Dupree shot Damond Reeves after a quarrel, with conflicting testimonies regarding the circumstances of the altercation.
Horton testified that during a confrontation, the defendant struck her with a gun when she tried to intervene. After calling the police, she heard multiple shots and later found the defendant had pointed the gun at her but it did not fire. In contrast, the defendant and witnesses claimed the altercation began when Reeves pushed Adrian Dupree, leading to a physical struggle between the defendant and Reeves, who was larger and armed. The defendant asserted he feared for his life, and during the struggle for the gun, he shot Reeves three times. Defense counsel argued for self-defense and claimed the defendant's temporary possession of the gun was justified. The trial court instructed the jury that they could find the defendant not guilty of being a felon in possession if the gun was produced during the struggle, but defense counsel objected to a specific phrase in the instruction. After discussions, the court provided a modified instruction on momentary innocent possession, stating it could apply if the defendant had taken the gun out of necessity and intended to return it to the police promptly. Ultimately, the jury acquitted the defendant of all felony charges except for felon-in-possession. The court sentenced him to 48 months to 30 years as a habitual offender, but the Court of Appeals later reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.
The majority found that the defendant did not waive his claim of instructional error and recognized that common law affirmative defenses, such as self-defense and duress, are applicable to felon-in-possession charges. The term “justification” was adopted to describe a defense that allows temporary unlawful possession of a firearm if necessary to protect oneself or others from serious harm. The Court outlined five elements necessary for a justification defense in this context:
1) There must be an immediate and unlawful threat causing fear of death or serious harm to the defendant or another person.
2) The defendant must not have recklessly or negligently placed themselves in a situation leading to criminal conduct.
3) There must be no reasonable legal alternative to taking possession of the firearm to avoid harm.
4) The possession must be directly linked to avoiding the threatened harm.
5) The defendant must terminate possession as soon as the danger has passed.
The Court held that these elements were established in this case and ruled that the instructional error was not harmless, as the trial court's altered jury instruction effectively mandated a guilty verdict. In dissent, a judge argued that the instructional error was harmless and that evidence did not support a justification defense instruction.
The Court of Appeals noted that a defendant can assert justification as a defense to a felon-in-possession charge by providing evidence satisfying the five criteria. The prosecution sought leave to appeal, which was granted, focusing on whether traditional common law affirmative defenses are available for the charge under MCL 750.224f and whether the defendant bears the burden of proof for such defenses. The standard of review for the availability of these defenses and the burden of proof is de novo, while claims of instructional error are reviewed de novo, with the trial court’s jury instruction determinations assessed for abuse of discretion. The defendant must demonstrate that any instructional error led to a miscarriage of justice. The analysis will also consider whether the prosecution or the defendant properly raised and preserved the affirmative defenses of self-defense and duress in the trial court.
Preserving issues for appellate review is crucial; issues not raised in trial courts typically cannot be addressed on appeal unless extraordinary circumstances exist. In this case, neither the defendant nor the prosecution properly asserted the affirmative defense of duress during the trial. The defendant did not present evidence for the duress defense, nor did the prosecution raise this issue. The duress argument was first introduced in the Court of Appeals. Conversely, the defendant adequately raised the affirmative defense of self-defense at trial, supported by testimony, and requested a self-defense jury instruction, which the prosecution did not contest. Consequently, the appellate court agrees that self-defense is a valid defense for the felon-in-possession charge.
The felon-in-possession statute, MCL 750.224f, categorizes defendants into two groups regarding firearm possession rights. The first category includes individuals convicted of a felony who can regain firearm possession after three years of fulfilling specific conditions. The second category involves those convicted of a specified felony, requiring a five-year wait and restoration of rights. The defendant in this case was stipulated to have been convicted of a specified felony. Although the statute does not explicitly mention common law affirmative defenses, such as self-defense, it does not prevent defendants from using these defenses to justify violations of the statute. The common law self-defense doctrine remains an integral part of criminal law.
In cases where statutory provisions do not directly address an issue, courts have historically relied on common law, under the presumption that the Legislature intended to align statutes with established common law principles. The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the interconnectedness of criminal statutes and Anglo-Saxon common law. Consequently, in the absence of explicit legislative intent to eliminate or alter the common law affirmative defense of self-defense concerning the felon-in-possession charge under MCL 750.224f or within the Michigan Penal Code, it is presumed that self-defense remains a viable defense if supported by adequate evidence.
This conclusion is supported by various jurisdictions that have recognized self-defense as an available defense against similar charges. For instance, the Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged self-defense as a potential affirmative defense, while the Indiana Court of Appeals clarified that its firearm prohibition did not infringe on the right to use a firearm in self-defense. Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted the availability of self-defense but noted complexities regarding the extent of possession and aggression.
The common law defines the affirmative defense of self-defense as justifying otherwise unlawful actions, such as homicide, when a defendant reasonably believes they face imminent danger. Generally, a non-aggressor can use reasonable force when they genuinely perceive an immediate threat. A finding of justifiable self-defense requires that the defendant acted intentionally within justified circumstances. Professor LaFave articulated that it is just for an individual under unlawful attack to take reasonable defensive measures, providing a complete defense against charges like murder, manslaughter, and assault when such measures are deemed reasonable.
The Self-Defense Act (SDA), effective October 1, 2006, defines when deadly force can be used in self-defense without the duty to retreat. Since the incident occurred on September 11, 2005, the SDA does not apply retroactively, and the common law defense of self-defense governs. Evidence presented supported a jury instruction on this common law defense, as the defendant demonstrated that he acted in self-defense during a struggle with Reeves, which included Reeves attempting to grab the defendant and possessing a firearm.
The defendant claimed he feared for his life due to Reeves being significantly larger, intoxicated, and armed. Despite shooting Reeves three times, the struggle continued, raising questions about when the threat from Reeves ceased. The jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant’s possession of the firearm, albeit a violation of the felon-in-possession statute, was justified under these circumstances.
The prosecution must disprove the self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant presents sufficient evidence for a prima facie defense. This burden of proof is established and affirmed by previous court rulings. The trial court's jury instruction regarding the momentary innocent possession defense was determined to be a significant error, warranting a new trial for the defendant on the felon-in-possession charge. According to MCL 769.26, a nonconstitutional error must be shown to have likely affected the outcome to warrant reversal.
The trial court initially instructed the jury on the necessity defense for a felon in possession charge but later rescinded that instruction in favor of a modified momentary innocent possession defense, despite defense counsel's objections. This new instruction required the jury to find that the defendant took the gun from someone in wrongful possession, that the possession was brief, and that the defendant intended to deliver the gun to the police as soon as possible. However, the defendant's actions—throwing the gun from a vehicle—contradicted this requirement, leaving the jury no choice but to find him guilty of being a felon in possession. The Court of Appeals determined that the modified instruction was not harmless and that the jury was not properly instructed on the defense, which detrimentally affected the case. The court concluded that the traditional common law self-defense was available to the defendant, and once he presented some evidence supporting this defense, the prosecution had the burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's error in instructing the jury was determined to be outcome determinative, warranting a new trial for the felon-in-possession charge. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded for further proceedings. Justices concurred on the validity of self-defense as a defense but noted differing levels of agreement regarding the specifics of the instruction errors.
The author expresses disagreement with the majority’s assertion that the affirmative defense of duress is not properly before the Court. They argue that the record contradicts this claim, noting that the defendant provided evidence supporting a duress defense despite labeling his defense as self-defense. The author cites the case People v Dupree, emphasizing that the defendant's testimony involved a scenario consistent with duress. Specifically, the defendant described being threatened by a heavily intoxicated man, Damond Reeves, who had a gun and during a struggle, the defendant feared for his life. The defendant also indicated that Reeves attempted to take the gun from him after he shot Reeves three times, reinforcing the claim of duress. The author believes this testimony meets the essential elements required for a duress defense. Furthermore, they agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court effectively instructed the jury on the duress defense, allowing for a potential defense against the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Despite differing views on the duress issue, the author concurs with the majority's conclusion to grant the defendant a new trial.
