State v. Trattner

Citations: 923 N.W.2d 183; 2019 WI App 1; 385 Wis. 2d 210Docket: Appeal No. 2017AP249

Court: Court of Appeals of Wisconsin; November 6, 2018; Wisconsin; State Appellate Court

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Steve L. Trattner appeals the denial of his WIS. STAT. 974.06 postconviction motion, which was dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. The circuit court found Trattner's claims were either previously raised or could have been raised, and he failed to provide a valid reason for not presenting them in prior proceedings. The court affirmed that Trattner's claims were procedurally barred. 

Trattner was convicted of killing his wife, Sin Lam, during a physical altercation, where he beat and strangled her, then concealed her body and misled authorities. After waiving his Miranda rights, he provided a detailed account of the incident, claiming self-defense. He was charged with first-degree reckless homicide and pled no contest after his attorney advised that he lacked viable defenses. At sentencing, the court imposed a 45-year bifurcated sentence. 

Previously, Trattner sought postconviction relief in 2008, which was denied, and affirmed on appeal. In 2010, he filed another motion to withdraw his plea, arguing he was unaware of the potential defense of imperfect self-defense and claiming the State withheld exculpatory evidence, which violated due process. Both motions were denied, and the ruling was affirmed on appeal.

On July 5, 2016, Trattner, represented by new counsel, filed a postconviction motion under WIS. STAT. 974.06, seeking to withdraw his plea based on the ineffective assistance of his postconviction counsel, Henak. Trattner alleged that Henak failed to: (1) argue that trial counsel was ineffective; (2) challenge the plea's factual basis; (3) claim prosecutorial vindictiveness concerning withheld statements; and (4) address the circuit court’s failure to inform him of his right to testify at the Miranda-Goodchild hearing. The circuit court, after reviewing the pleadings and arguments, determined that Trattner's claims were procedurally barred, as claims that could have been raised in earlier motions or appeals are barred without sufficient reason. Ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel may serve as a sufficient reason in some circumstances, provided the defendant shows both deficient performance and resulting prejudice, following the standards established in Strickland v. Washington. Furthermore, a defendant must demonstrate that the claims they seek to raise are significantly stronger than those presented by postconviction counsel. The court's findings on procedural bars and the sufficiency of claims for a hearing are reviewed de novo. The circuit court has discretion to deny a hearing if the motion lacks sufficient factual support or presents only conclusory allegations. Ultimately, Trattner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding the alleged ineffectiveness of his postconviction counsel.

Trattner claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on three points: (1) failure to obtain an independent forensic medical examiner's report, (2) inadequate litigation of the Miranda-Goodchild motion, and (3) lack of meaningful investigation into third-party statements that could have undermined the "utter disregard" element of first-degree reckless homicide. He argues that these shortcomings also reflect ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, which he believes is sufficient to overcome the procedural bar established in Escalona. 

The court concludes that Trattner has not demonstrated ineffective trial counsel. Specifically, regarding the forensic examination, the official autopsy report confirmed asphyxia and blunt force trauma as causes of death, and Trattner admitted to causing these injuries. A subsequent report by Dr. Jeffrey Jentzen, retained by new postconviction counsel, aligned with the initial findings and did not introduce any new evidence that would have influenced Trattner's decision to plead guilty. The court emphasized that to prove prejudice from ineffective assistance, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that they would have opted for a trial instead of pleading guilty, which Trattner failed to do.

On the issue of the Miranda-Goodchild hearing, Trattner's claim was deemed conclusory, lacking specific details about the unwarned statements he believed should have been suppressed. Furthermore, any potential suppression of these statements would have had little effect, given his written confession made after being Mirandized. Thus, the court ruled that both trial and postconviction counsel's performances did not meet the criteria for ineffectiveness, resulting in the dismissal of Trattner's claims as procedurally barred.

Trattner's claims regarding his trial and postconviction counsel's effectiveness are largely rejected based on the trial record. The circuit court found that Trattner was not in custody during his initial police encounter, as he was not restrained and exercised freedom of movement. The court determined that the initial interview was noncoercive until the Miranda warnings were provided, after which Trattner voluntarily waived his rights and answered questions. Trattner argued that his trial counsel failed to inform him he could testify at the Miranda-Goodchild hearing, claiming that he would have described the officers' overbearing demeanor. However, the court's findings on the admissibility of Trattner's unwarned statements remained unchallenged by his vague assertions.

Additionally, Trattner contended that trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating further before advising him to enter a no contest plea. He suggested that evidence about the victim, Lam, being anxious and upset before her murder could support a claim of imperfect self-defense. The court found no prejudice from counsel's failure to pursue this line of defense, as the information presented was irrelevant to the legal standards of self-defense and did not negate the elements of first-degree reckless homicide. The State had indicated a willingness to charge Trattner with first-degree intentional homicide, which carried a mandatory life sentence, making it improbable that any reasonable defendant would risk a jury trial based on weak self-defense claims. Trattner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding the factual basis of his no contest plea.

Trattner asserts that his plea lacked a sufficient factual basis regarding the element of acting with "utter disregard for human life," claiming he relied on facts from the Miranda-Goodchild hearing instead of those in the criminal complaint. However, the court found this claim unsubstantiated. Under WIS. STAT. 971.08(1)(b), a circuit court must confirm a factual basis for a guilty plea, ensuring the defendant understands the crime's elements and that their conduct aligns with those elements. Trattner's written statement from the hearing provided a factual foundation for first-degree reckless homicide, which includes causing death through actions that pose a substantial risk of death, awareness of that risk, and demonstrating utter disregard for human life. His statement details how he killed Lam by violently striking her head against the floor multiple times and then strangling her, indicating a clear disregard for her life, especially as he did not seek help afterward and covered her body.

Furthermore, Trattner's postconviction counsel was not ineffective for not raising the claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness, which he based on the State threatening additional charges and withholding exculpatory statements from an acquaintance. The claim failed to demonstrate retaliation, as established in State v. Williams, and has already been resolved legally, preventing relitigation. The court emphasized that once an issue has been litigated, it cannot be revisited, regardless of how it is framed.

Trattner's 2010 postconviction motion argued that his attorney, Henak, failed to disclose Behrndt's statements, claiming this omission violated due process and warranted withdrawal of his plea. The motion further contended that these statements supported an imperfect self-defense claim, undermining the "utter disregard" element under Miller. The State acknowledged the failure to disclose but deemed it harmless, asserting the statements were irrelevant, containing only information about an affair and speculative drug use. The circuit court agreed the statements should have been provided but found them irrelevant to discoverable evidence. 

Trattner's claim of "prosecutorial vindictiveness," derived from the same facts, was deemed insufficient to constitute a new claim. Additionally, he contended Henak was ineffective for not linking the exculpatory evidence claim to the Miller case; however, this assertion was rejected, as was his argument regarding postconviction counsel's failure to challenge the absence of a colloquy at the Miranda-Goodchild hearing. The court found no authority mandating such a colloquy, stating that counsel is not deficient for failing to raise novel claims. 

Trattner did not demonstrate any prejudice from this alleged deficiency, as his claims regarding the custodial nature of his statements were unsubstantiated and his perception of coercion was deemed conclusory. He was not entitled to a new trial based on cumulative errors, as the court found no ineffective assistance from either trial or postconviction counsel. Thus, the cumulative effect of the alleged errors was considered negligible.

Trattner requests to withdraw his plea based on the interest of justice under WIS. STAT. 752.35, which allows for a new trial if (1) the real controversy has not been fully tried, or (2) there is a probability of a miscarriage of justice. Such reversals are rare and reserved for exceptional circumstances. Trattner claims the real controversy was not fully tried, arguing that significant evidence was either excluded from jury consideration or that improper evidence clouded a crucial issue. However, he pled no contest and failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances justifying a discretionary reversal. His arguments largely reiterate previous claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, which have already been rejected. Consequently, the court affirmed the order, noting that this opinion will not be published and all citations refer to the 2015-16 version of the Wisconsin Statutes.