Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota; August 22, 2018; Minnesota; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court is reviewing whether the rulings in Birchfield v. North Dakota and subsequent Minnesota cases established a new substantive constitutional rule applicable retroactively in collateral review. The lower courts deemed the rule procedural and non-retroactive. This case involves appellant Mark Jerome Johnson, who faced two traffic-related arrests for test refusal in 2009 and 2014, resulting in guilty pleas and sentences without direct appeals. In December 2016, Johnson sought postconviction relief, claiming that the Birchfield decision rendered his test refusal convictions unconstitutional and warranting vacatur. The district courts, however, ruled that the Birchfield rule was procedural and not retroactive, and also indicated that Johnson had waived his right to challenge his conviction by pleading guilty. Johnson's appeals were subsequently affirmed by the court of appeals, leading to the current review.
The case involves an appeal concerning the denial of Johnson's postconviction petition. The court reviews such denials for abuse of discretion, which includes arbitrary or capricious actions, incorrect legal interpretations, or clearly erroneous factual findings. Johnson argues for the retroactive application of the Birchfield rule, while the State asserts that Johnson waived this right due to his guilty plea and contends that the rule is procedural and not applicable in collateral reviews.
The Birchfield rule, established in Birchfield v. North Dakota, addressed the constitutionality of criminal test-refusal laws under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court ruled that while breath tests may be conducted without a warrant, blood tests require either a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Following Birchfield, Minnesota courts applied this ruling in State v. Trahan and State v. Thompson, concluding that the test-refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied to cases where no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood or urine tests. Therefore, the Birchfield decision prohibits the criminalization of refusal to submit to blood or urine tests in DWI cases absent a warrant or valid exception. The document indicates that the court will now consider the arguments presented by both parties in light of the Birchfield rule.
Johnson’s guilty plea does not preclude him from arguing that the Birchfield rule is retroactive, contrary to the State's assertion. The State claims Johnson forfeited his right to challenge his convictions by pleading guilty to test refusal, framing his argument around a Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches. However, Johnson contends that he was convicted under a statute deemed unconstitutional as applied, rendering the district court without jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea. The court maintains that it has jurisdiction over crimes recognized under Minnesota law, but lacks jurisdiction over non-criminal conduct. If a statute is unconstitutional, it is considered void, and convictions under such laws are illegal and cannot lead to imprisonment. Johnson’s challenge pertains to the constitutionality of the statute underlying his conviction, which is a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. Unlike previous cases cited by the State, Johnson is not contesting police conduct or Fourth Amendment violations, but rather asserting that the Birchfield rule invalidates the statute he was convicted under. Thus, his guilty pleas do not forfeit his right to argue for the retroactive application of the Birchfield rule.
The dispute centers on the retroactivity of the Birchfield rule regarding its application to final convictions. The court reviews this issue de novo, relying on the framework established in Teague v. Lane to determine if a rule of federal constitutional law is new or old. The Birchfield rule is acknowledged as a new rule, which typically does not apply retroactively; however, exceptions exist for substantive rules or "watershed" rules of criminal procedure. The parties contest whether the Birchfield rule is substantive or procedural. The State argues it is procedural, affecting only police conduct and the scope of permissible searches under the Fourth Amendment. In contrast, Johnson asserts it is substantive as it alters the elements of the crime of test refusal and creates a class of individuals immune from punishment. A rule is considered substantive if it changes the range of conduct punishable by law or places certain conduct beyond the state's punitive authority. The Birchfield rule qualifies as substantive because it modifies who can be prosecuted for test refusal, establishing that convictions can only occur if a breath test is refused or if a blood or urine test is refused under a warrant or valid exception, contrasting with previous statutes that allowed convictions for broader refusals.
Under the Birchfield rule, drivers who refuse warrantless blood or urine tests cannot be prosecuted unless the State demonstrates an applicable exception to the warrant requirement. If no exception is established, these drivers cannot be punished by the State. This rule is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Bousley v. United States, which addressed the retroactive application of the Bailey ruling concerning the use of firearms during crimes. The Bailey decision clarified that "use" of a firearm required active employment rather than mere possession, thus altering the substantive reach of the law. The Supreme Court in Bousley determined that this substantive change could be applied retroactively to challenge convictions based on guilty pleas.
Similarly, the Birchfield rule has created a substantive barrier to prosecution for test refusal, requiring that a conviction can only occur if a driver refused a breath test or a blood or urine test supported by a warrant or a valid exception. The State contends that the Birchfield rule is procedural, arguing it merely modifies police conduct regarding obtaining warrants before testing. However, this view is rejected, as the Birchfield rule fundamentally alters the scope of criminal conduct by removing the possibility of conviction for test refusal without a warrant or an exception. Thus, any conviction under such circumstances is invalid, as the conduct no longer constitutes a crime. The distinction between substantive and procedural rules is emphasized, indicating that the procedural changes do not negate the substantive nature of the rule's effect on prosecutorial authority.
The Birchfield rule is characterized as substantive, determining culpability regarding refusal to submit to chemical tests. Changes in police procedures to comply with this rule do not affect its substantive nature for retroactivity. The State argues that retroactivity requires universal application, but acknowledges that individual case assessments may be necessary under the Birchfield rule to evaluate warrant requirements at the time of test refusal. The precedent set in Montgomery, which allowed retroactive application despite requiring case-by-case analyses, supports the argument that the Birchfield rule is also substantive and retroactive. This requires courts to determine if the test-refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied to specific cases, including Johnson's, without altering the substantive nature of the rule. The district court is tasked with further proceedings to assess the constitutionality of Johnson's convictions under the Birchfield rule, leading to a reversal and remand for additional evaluation. Johnson faced charges for first-degree test refusal due to prior impaired driving incidents, with both parties recognizing the Birchfield rule's application in relevant cases.
Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction is established, as noted in City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band. Retroactivity analysis applies only when a conviction is final prior to the announcement of a new rule. Johnson’s test-refusal convictions became final after the period for direct appeal lapsed, which was 90 days according to Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 4(3)(a). Consequently, both his 2010 and 2015 convictions were final before the Birchfield rule was announced in 2016. The Minnesota Legislature later amended the test-refusal statute to align with the Birchfield rule.
The State contends that Welch, which examined the retroactivity of a different ruling, is distinguishable. While it agrees that Birchfield does not render the test-refusal statute facially unconstitutional, it argues the rule is substantive. The Welch case clarified that the retroactivity analysis should not differ based on whether a new rule invalidates a statute or merely interprets it.
Concerns about the practical application of the Birchfield rule do not negate the necessity for retroactive enforcement of substantive rules. Under Birchfield, the State cannot penalize a driver for refusing a blood or urine test without a warrant or valid exception, such as exigent circumstances. The applicability of Missouri v. McNeely regarding exigent circumstances for Johnson's convictions remains unaddressed.
