Webster v. Hennepin Cnty.

Docket: A16-0736

Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota; April 18, 2018; Minnesota; State Supreme Court

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Tony Webster submitted a public data request to Hennepin County under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, seeking information on the County's use of mobile biometric technologies. His request included 14 items, primarily focused on data inspection and inquiries about biometric technology. Notably, he requested all relevant data since January 1, 2013, including emails containing specific keywords related to biometric data.

Two days after submitting the request, Webster received confirmation of its receipt and was assured that it was being processed. Over the next three months, he corresponded with the County, receiving ongoing assurances about the status of his request. In early November, an assistant to the Data Governance Officer informed Webster that the request was still being processed but could not disclose specific details about the response efforts.

The County's Data Governance Officer, Kristi Lahti-Johnson, conducted a survey across various departments to locate data pertinent to Webster's request, engaging approximately 25 employees from multiple County offices. The court found substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the County's procedures did not ensure prompt responses to data requests. However, it concluded there was insufficient evidence to support claims that the County's record arrangement violated the Data Practices Act. The court refrained from ruling on the validity of Webster's request or the County's ability to deem the request "unduly burdensome," citing a lack of appellate jurisdiction over those issues.

Lahti-Johnson assessed whether the County had contracts or grants related to a request for biometric data and how such data was transferred to the State. In late November, she provided responses to requests 1 through 13, including answers to questions 5 through 13, despite them potentially being invalid data requests, to maintain transparency and to help narrow down item 14, which she deemed too burdensome to fulfill. A preliminary search for emails responsive to the request resulted in 312 emails after 7 hours, indicating that a full search would significantly burden the County's servers for an extended period. Webster reacted in early December, expressing concern over the delay in addressing the burden and subsequently narrowed item 14 to include only emails from specific departments. He also indicated potential legal action, leading his attorney to request the preservation of data. By mid-December, Lahti-Johnson directed Webster to the Sheriff's Office for further inquiries regarding the narrowed request. In January 2016, Webster filed a complaint with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), prompting a response from the County and the assignment of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to the case. The ALJ conducted a hearing, during which testimony revealed that the County's email system, operating on Microsoft Exchange Server 2010, housed over 208 million emails across 19 servers, with a significant proportion being spam. The County does not index email content beyond sender, receiver, and other basic metadata. Multiple searches for responsive emails were conducted by a computer forensics supervisor over several dates in late 2015 and early 2016.

On September 18, Droege requested email mailboxes from five employees, transferring them to a forensic computer for analysis. He used a proprietary program to search these mailboxes, resulting in 312 emails, but did not limit the search to emails dated after January 1, 2013, despite Webster’s request, which could have reduced search time. After review by the Data Governance Office and County Attorney’s Office, 259 emails were provided to Webster. 

Following a narrowed request from Webster on December 4, 2015, Droege conducted further searches from January 6 to January 11, utilizing the Exchange Control Panel to expedite the process. He searched the mailboxes of 868 employees for six of Webster's 20 keywords, generating a PST file with 4,249 responsive emails without deduplication. A third search on January 19, 2016, targeted the remaining 14 keywords across 88 employees' mailboxes, yielding 1,726 responsive emails. However, the County did not share the results of these searches with Webster.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) estimated that completing the necessary searches would take about 18 hours, based on Droege's prior testimony regarding the time needed to search all mailboxes. The ALJ concluded that the County's procedures failed to ensure prompt compliance with data requests, that email correspondence was not easily accessible, and that the County unlawfully denied Webster access to public data. The County obtained a stay of the ALJ's decision, and the court of appeals reversed the first two conclusions but upheld the finding of unlawful denial of access. 

The Data Practices Act governs the management and accessibility of government data, which encompasses all information collected or maintained by counties. Public data are presumed accessible unless restricted by law or temporary classification.

Individuals requesting to inspect or copy government data must submit their requests to a designated responsible authority, as per Minn. Stat. 13.03, subd. 3(a). The authority is required to allow inspection or copying at a reasonable time and place and to explain the meaning of the data upon request. They must also create procedures to ensure timely and appropriate handling of such requests and maintain data in an accessible manner (subd. 2(a) and 1). If a requester believes their rights under chapter 13 have been violated, they can file a complaint with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) per Minn. Stat. 13.085, subd. 2. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) will then determine whether a violation occurred and can take several actions, including dismissing the complaint, finding a violation, imposing civil penalties up to $300, or ordering compliance with the law and setting deadlines for data production (subd. 5(a)). Affected parties may seek judicial review of the ALJ's decision through a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals (subd. 5(d)), which may remand, reverse, or modify the decision if substantial rights were prejudiced due to various legal errors (Minn. Stat. 14.69, 2016). 

In the case concerning the County's procedures for handling data requests, the ALJ found the County's procedures inadequate under Minn. Stat. 13.03, subd. 2(a). However, the court of appeals determined that this finding lacked substantial evidence, leading to a reversal (Webster, 2017 WL 1316109, at *3). Webster argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion. The court of appeals clarified that substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable person would find adequate, exceeding mere minimal evidence (Id.). The review of whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence is a legal question subject to de novo review (In re Application of Minn. Power, 838 N.W.2d 747, 757 (Minn. 2013)). There is a dispute between the parties regarding the standard of review and the deference owed to the ALJ's findings, with neither party accurately stating the applicable standard.

Webster asserts that the "substantial evidence" standard is defined in In re A.D., referencing similar applications in case law. The interpretation of "substantial evidence" stems from section 14.69, previously Minn. Stat. 15.0425, which has been endorsed by various precedents. Webster claims that the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) conclusions should receive deference from appellate courts; however, this is unsupported by existing case law as this situation does not involve a decision from a board or agency that warrants deference. Webster argues that the court of appeals did not properly consider the record favorably towards the ALJ's decision, citing Abrahamson and White. However, both cases are not directly applicable; Abrahamson pertains to early judicial review, while White involved a narrow review standard for factual findings, not conclusions of law. The standard of review Webster seeks is inconsistent with precedent and statute. Conversely, the County argues for a de novo standard due to undisputed facts and legal questions, drawing on cases like Ekdahl and Questar. However, these cases do not apply here as they involve different statutory provisions not relevant to the current matter.

The County does not clarify the application of plenary power in this case but implies a de novo review of the ALJ's legal application to the evidence. Section 14.69(e) mandates consideration of all evidence in the record, not solely the evidence cited by the ALJ. Consequently, both Webster and the County present review standards inconsistent with section 14.69 and existing precedent. Section 14.69(e) is applied to assess whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that the County's procedures violated the Data Practices Act.

The court of appeals determined that the ALJ overly focused on the County's inadequate response to Webster's request while neglecting the fact that Webster's request was one of over 500 monthly data requests. The court noted the appointment of Lahti-Johnson as the responsible authority, with established processes for handling these requests, and found no significant flaws in the County's internal procedures. Although the County's specific response to Webster was deemed poor, the court ruled that this alone did not constitute a violation of Minn. Stat. 13.03, subd. 2(a). It emphasized that a single violation is insufficient to uphold a claim under this statute, suggesting that evidence of multiple failures is necessary.

The County's argument, which is presented again here, revolves around whether a standard differentiating between single and multiple violations is valid. This case represents the first appellate challenge under section 13.03, subdivision 2(a). The statutory interpretation of the language begins with assessing its clarity and lack of ambiguity. The statute requires responsible authorities to create procedures ensuring that government data requests are handled appropriately and promptly, with the key term being "insure."

The Data Practices Act lacks a definition for "insure," prompting reliance on dictionary meanings which indicate it means "to make sure, certain, or secure," closely aligning with "ensure." The statute does not imply that a government entity can evade violations by avoiding multiple infractions. Instead, the term "insure" indicates that established procedures must lead to appropriate and timely responses in all cases. Section 13.03, subdivision 2(a), requires government data to be made available, with responsible personnel establishing procedures to ensure this availability. If these procedures are followed yet do not yield timely responses, they are deemed insufficient under the Act.

In this case, the County acknowledges its response to Webster's request was untimely. While it is recognized that not every late response indicates a failure to comply with the Data Practices Act, an established procedure is considered deficient when it causes delays. The County's established procedures led to the untimely response, evidenced by significant missteps in handling Webster's request. The County claims its procedures are adequate, citing the appointment of a responsible authority and its "data access policy." However, these points do not demonstrate the sufficiency of its procedures, as the former merely fulfills a statutory requirement, and the latter fails to outline the internal processes for managing data requests.

The County claims it has internal, unwritten procedures for handling data requests and has designated personnel for this purpose. However, the existence of these unwritten procedures indicates that the County's "established procedures" are inadequate, as they did not ensure timely responses to requests. Despite the lack of a statutory requirement for written procedures, the County's admission of delayed responses suggests its procedures failed to meet the standards of Minn. Stat. 13.03, subd. 2(a). Consequently, the decision of the court of appeals regarding this issue is reversed.

Regarding the arrangement of records, the County's compliance with Minn. Stat. 13.03, subd. 1 is examined. The statute mandates that records containing government data must be kept in a manner that allows easy access. Webster argues for a "functional" interpretation of the statute, asserting that the County's delays indicate a deficient record arrangement. However, the statute does not include a functional component; it simply requires that records be easily accessible.

The evidence shows that the County's email system, which allows for keyword searches over multiple mailboxes, fulfills the accessibility requirement. The delays in responses are attributed to procedural shortcomings rather than the arrangement of records. Thus, the court finds substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that the County's email system complies with the Data Practices Act, affirming the decision of the court of appeals on this issue.

The court declined to address the questions regarding Webster's email request and the County's undue burden defense under the Data Practices Act due to a lack of proper jurisdiction. Although the court of appeals ruled in Webster's favor on the validity of his request, he cannot appeal as he was the prevailing party, which negates his standing to appeal. The County did not file a separate petition for review, which is a requirement under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 117. Instead, it filed a response agreeing with Webster's identified issues, which cannot be construed as a separate petition. Therefore, both parties’ procedural missteps prevent the court from adjudicating these issues, leading to the dismissal of Webster's appeal.

The court's decision is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part. Justice Chutich concurs with most of the ruling but dissents regarding jurisdiction on keyword-search and undue-burden issues, arguing that the County had standing to seek review and adequately invoked jurisdiction despite not paying a filing fee, which is waived for government entities. The County's submission, titled "Response to Petition for Review," effectively requested review of the issues the court claims it lacks authority to address, specifically regarding the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA). The County's response indicates agreement with the need for review and can be treated as a conditional cross-review under Rule 117, which allows an opposing party to seek review on additional issues not raised by the initial petition.

Webster was unable to properly raise certain issues in his petition for review, as he was not the aggrieved party. However, the court's decision to classify these issues as "raised by the petition" under Rule 117, subdivision 4, prevents treating the County's submission as a request for conditional cross-review. The dissenting opinion contends that the court's reasoning unduly limits the scope of conditional review under subdivision 4, arguing that the court should still address issues raised in a conditional cross-review request, regardless of the petitioner's improper attempts to seek review. The dissent emphasizes principles of fairness and the need to address significant legal questions that could impact statewide policy related to the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act.

The dissent points out that the court’s decision unnecessarily postpones the determination of key legal issues, which have already been properly invoked for review. Additionally, it notes the relevance of biometric technology in the context of government data practices, as highlighted by amici including the American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, who argue that the County's practices in handling requests for electronic information are inadequate. 

Webster faced challenges in arranging an inspection of data requests, with the inspection being rescheduled and resulting in redactions that lacked proper statutory citation for denials of access, violating Minnesota Statute 13.03, subdivision 3(f). The ALJ determined that the County’s failure to respond adequately constituted a violation, which the County did not appeal.

The excerpt outlines several legal principles and cases concerning judicial review and data practices in Minnesota. It states that Microsoft Exchange and Outlook utilize a specific container file format for storing user emails. Deduplication refers to the removal of duplicate documents. The case of Webster v. Hennepin Cty. illustrates that the scope of judicial review for contested cases is governed by Minnesota Statutes 14.63 and 14.69, while proceedings under the Data Practices Act, specifically related to data-practices complaints, are not classified as contested cases. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) are to be reviewed favorably, and deference is given to the ALJ's factual determinations if supported by reasonable evidence. Webster's argument regarding the importance of Rule 117 for appealing a decision of the Court of Appeals is noted, highlighting concerns over potentially harmful statements in an unpublished opinion. However, the court emphasizes that hypothetical future injuries do not establish standing, referencing McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, and concludes that potential obiter dictum from a nonprecedential opinion does not significantly impact statewide interests.