E.D. v. Bellevue Pub. Sch. Dist.

Citations: 909 N.W.2d 652; 299 Neb. 621Docket: No. S-17-590.

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court; April 13, 2018; Nebraska; State Supreme Court

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Funke, J. E.D. filed a lawsuit against the Bellevue Public School District (BPS) and teacher Bradley Nord under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), alleging negligence related to a nonconsensual sexual relationship between Nord and E.D. while she was a student. E.D. claimed BPS failed to ensure a safe environment and to enforce reasonable policies regarding the teacher's aide program that paired her with Nord, arguing that her injuries were a foreseeable result of BPS’s negligence. BPS and Nord sought dismissal based on claims of sovereign immunity, which the court denied. BPS appealed the dismissal, while Nord cross-appealed. The Nebraska Court of Appeals initially dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but later reinstated it upon reconsideration. BPS contended that the lower court erred in not recognizing its immunity, arguing that Nord's intentional acts were the sole cause of E.D.'s claims and that the court improperly relied on cases involving third parties rather than public subdivision employees. Nord's cross-appeal asserted similar claims of immunity. The court emphasized the importance of determining its own jurisdiction, noting that jurisdictional issues can be raised at any time and that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing decisions made by the Court of Appeals.

Appellate jurisdiction in Nebraska is strictly governed by statutory requirements; an appellate court can only acquire jurisdiction if the appellant is appealing from a final order or judgment. A 'judgment' is defined as the final determination of rights in an action, while any written direction not included in a judgment is considered an order. The appellate court can review three types of final orders: those affecting substantial rights that prevent a judgment, those made during special proceedings, and those made post-judgment on summary applications. Interlocutory orders, such as a motion to dismiss, are typically not final and therefore not immediately appealable to prevent piecemeal litigation.

In the case of BPS, it was acknowledged that the order overruling its motion to dismiss was not final. However, prior decisions, such as StoreVisions v. Omaha Tribe of Neb., recognized that under the collateral order doctrine, an appellate court may assume jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders, provided they conclusively determine a disputed question, address an important issue separate from the merits, and are unreviewable on final judgment appeal. This doctrine had roots in the Richardson v. Griffiths decision, which allowed for appeals from nonfinal orders, including attorney disqualifications.

Recent rulings, particularly in Heckman v. Marchio, have overruled the Richardson exception, emphasizing that appellate jurisdiction cannot exist without a final order or specific statutory authority. This shift is based on the necessity for adherence to legislative statutes regarding appellate jurisdiction, thus disallowing judicial circumvention of such statutes. The reasoning in Heckman contradicts the continued application of the collateral order doctrine to interlocutory orders denying sovereign immunity, as illustrated in StoreVisions, where the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity was also deemed non-final.

An order denying sovereign immunity is immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, as established in precedent including Hallie Mgmt. Co. v. Perry and Williams v. Baird. However, unlike in Richardson, no statutory authority supports applying this doctrine to sovereign immunity cases in StoreVisions, Hallie, or Williams, as these cases relied on an earlier adoption of the doctrine without legislative backing. The court reiterates that applying the collateral order doctrine to permit appeals from interlocutory orders denying sovereign immunity lacks justification under Nebraska's statutory definition of 'final order' as outlined in Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1902, which explicitly identifies three types of final orders. This omission indicates the Legislature's intent, suggesting the court's previous interpretation effectively constituted unauthorized judicial legislation. The current reconsideration of StoreVisions parallels issues previously resolved in Heckman, which also apply here. Consequently, the court overrules StoreVisions to the extent it permitted appellate jurisdiction without a final order or statutory authorization, leading to the dismissal of the appeal and cross-appeal as they stemmed from a nonfinal order. Wright, J. did not participate in this decision.