Court: North Dakota Supreme Court; February 15, 2017; North Dakota; State Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court remanded cases involving administrative license suspensions for further proceedings under Birchfield v. North Dakota. The Court directed reargument on two key issues: (1) the appropriate forum for determining the voluntariness of drivers' consent to warrantless blood tests during lawful arrests, and (2) whether evidence must be suppressed in administrative license suspension cases if the drivers’ consent is deemed involuntary. For these appeals, the Court assumed the drivers' consent was involuntary but concluded that the exclusionary rule does not necessitate the suppression of warrantless blood test results in license suspension proceedings.
In the specific case of Steven Beylund, who was arrested for driving under the influence in August 2013, he consented to a warrantless blood test after receiving the North Dakota implied consent advisory. This advisory stipulates that operating a vehicle in North Dakota implies consent to testing for alcohol or drugs, and refusal can lead to criminal penalties and license revocation. Beylund's blood test indicated a blood-alcohol level exceeding the legal limit, prompting him to request an administrative hearing concerning the Department's suspension of his driver’s license. The Department suspended his license for two years, asserting reasonable grounds for the arrest and that the test results confirmed his intoxication.
The Court upheld this suspension in a prior decision, ruling Beylund's consent was voluntary and that statutes criminalizing refusal to submit to chemical tests did not infringe upon Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court later consolidated Beylund's case with others to determine if drivers can be penalized for refusing warrantless tests. In Birchfield, the Supreme Court clarified that while warrantless breath tests are permissible, warrantless blood tests require a warrant unless another exception applies.
The Court reversed Birchfield's conviction for refusing a warrantless blood test during a lawful DUI arrest while affirming Bernard's conviction for refusing a breath test under similar circumstances. Regarding Beylund's license suspension, the Supreme Court determined that prior assumptions about the validity of warrantless tests were erroneous, necessitating a reevaluation of the voluntariness of Beylund's consent based on the totality of circumstances, particularly due to inaccuracies in the officer’s advisory. If consent is deemed involuntary on remand, the Court must decide if evidence from the search must be suppressed, considering relevant precedents. Separately, Douglas Wojahn consented to a warrantless blood test after an implied consent advisory and later challenged his license suspension, arguing he felt coerced. The Department suspended his license based on evidence that supported the arresting officer's belief he was driving under the influence. The Court affirmed the suspension based on precedents confirming that refusal statutes do not violate Fourth Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Wojahn's certiorari petition, leading to remand for reevaluation in light of Birchfield. The two cases were consolidated for reargument, focusing on the appropriate forum for determining consent voluntariness and whether evidence should be suppressed in administrative proceedings if consent is found involuntary.
The Administrative Agencies Practice Act (N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32) outlines the standards for reviewing administrative decisions related to driver’s license suspensions or revocations. Appeals from district court judgments in these cases are governed by N.D.C.C. 28-32-49 and require affirmance of agency orders unless specific criteria are met, such as noncompliance with law, violation of constitutional rights, lack of fair hearings, or unsupported findings of fact. The reviewing court does not make independent factual determinations but assesses whether a reasonable mind could support the agency’s conclusions based on the evidence presented.
In the context of Beylund and Wojahn’s case, they claim their consent to warrantless blood tests was involuntary, referencing Birchfield v. North Dakota, which states that motorists cannot be deemed to have consented under threat of a criminal offense. They argue that involuntary consent necessitates exclusion of the test results in administrative proceedings, regardless of the nature of those proceedings, and that the implied consent laws violate due process and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Conversely, the Department contends that the results of the blood tests are admissible in administrative proceedings even if consent was involuntary, as the exclusionary rule typically does not apply in such contexts. They also argue that even if it did apply, the results could fall under a good-faith exception to the rule.
During the administrative hearing, Wojahn expressed feeling coerced into taking the test, while Beylund did not testify. For the purposes of appeal, both drivers’ consent is assumed to be involuntary, prompting a consideration of whether the evidence from the blood tests should be suppressed based on the remand language from Birchfield.
In Scott, 524 U.S. at 359, the Supreme Court addressed whether the federal exclusionary rule applies to state administrative parole revocation hearings. The Court declined to extend the rule beyond criminal trials, emphasizing that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs with illegal searches or seizures, and that the exclusionary rule serves primarily as a deterrent to such actions rather than as a constitutional mandate. The Court referenced prior cases, stating that the rule does not prohibit the introduction of illegally obtained evidence in all contexts, but is instead applied where its deterrent effect is most effective. It noted that if the exclusionary rule does not significantly deter illegal actions, its application is unwarranted. Recognizing the substantial social costs associated with excluding reliable evidence, the Court determined that applying the rule in parole revocation proceedings would disrupt their flexible nature and yield only minimal deterrence, as the existing application of the rule in criminal trials already sufficiently deters unconstitutional searches. The Court ultimately balanced the social costs of excluding pertinent evidence against the minimal deterrent effect in this administrative context.
The Court determined that the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule to administrative proceedings are significantly outweighed by the drawbacks of excluding reliable evidence. It ruled that the exclusionary rule does not apply to state administrative parole revocation hearings, allowing for the admission of evidence obtained in violation of a parolee's Fourth Amendment rights. In the case of Holte, a driver who was denied the right to consult an attorney before a chemical test had the results of that test admitted in an administrative hearing despite the violation. The district court had reversed the license suspension based on this statutory violation, but the Court upheld the admissibility of the test results, stating that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil administrative proceedings. This aligns with the purpose of implied-consent laws, which aim to reliably gather evidence of intoxication. The statute mandates that results from fairly administered chemical tests be admissible in any DUI-related proceedings, reinforcing that constitutional protections in criminal cases do not generally extend to administrative license suspensions. The Court supported its position by referencing similar rulings, emphasizing that the need for reliable intoxication evidence in license revocation cases outweighs the potential deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule. The ruling was consistent with earlier decisions, including Fasching v. Backes, affirming the admissibility of Intoxilyzer test results in administrative hearings when properly administered, regardless of statutory right to counsel claims.
Minimal due process in administrative agency proceedings differs from judicial proceedings, as established in Holen v. Hjelle. Proceedings related to implied consent statutes under N.D.C.C. ch. 39-20 are civil and distinct from criminal proceedings for DUI arrests, as noted in Williams v. N.D. State Highway Comm’r. Evidence suppression in criminal cases does not affect administrative proceedings under these statutes, clarified in Pladson v. Hjelle. The hearings focus on specific issues such as the officer’s reasonable grounds for arrest, compliance with testing procedures, and the validity of test results, as described in N.D.C.C. 39-20-05. The records from the director and state crime lab can be introduced without additional foundation. Section 39-20-07 allows chemical test results to be admitted in any action, provided the samples are properly obtained and tests fairly administered. After the hearing, the officer must notify the person of the decision and take possession of any temporary permits if the decision is adverse, reporting this to the director within ten days. Judicial review of the Department’s decision is permitted within seven days of the hearing, by filing an appeal with the district court.
Streamlined administrative procedures outlined in N.D.C.C. ch. 39-20 align with flexible parole revocation protocols as per Scott. The administrative hearing aims to address specific issues quickly, without the need for a criminal trial format. A significant number of courts have determined that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil administrative license suspension cases, citing cases like Nevers v. State and Tornabene v. Bonine, among others. These rulings emphasize that the marginal benefits of applying the exclusionary rule are outweighed by substantial costs. The societal impact of drunk driving, discussed in Birchfield v. North Dakota, further supports this view, indicating that the exclusionary rule offers minimal deterrence to law enforcement, as significant deterrents already exist within the criminal justice framework.
Consequently, this document reaffirms the decision in Holte, asserting that blood test results should not be excluded in civil administrative license suspension cases. It assumes that law enforcement will adhere to Birchfield's requirements in both civil and criminal contexts. The argument made by drivers referencing N.D.C.C. 28-32-24(3) and 28-32-46(2) is dismissed, clarifying that while evidence may be excluded on constitutional grounds, previous case law indicates a hearing officer can exclude such evidence only under specific conditions, such as illegal detention, as noted in Richter v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp.
In the case of Richter, the primary legal issue was whether game wardens unlawfully seized a driver through a citizen's arrest during an accident investigation, specifically focusing on the law enforcement's reasonable grounds for believing the individual was in control of the vehicle. The hearing officer's authority to exclude evidence related to the driver's seizure was also questioned, but no issue was raised concerning the exclusion of blood test results in the administrative license proceeding. The court highlighted that under North Dakota Century Code (N.D.C.C.) 39-20-07(5), results from properly obtained and fairly administered blood tests must be admitted as evidence in license suspension cases.
The court emphasized that specific statutory provisions regarding the admissibility of blood test results take precedence over general provisions. It concluded that the civil nature of administrative proceedings does not necessitate the exclusion of blood test results, referencing N.D.C.C. 28-32-16(2), which states that agency decisions should be affirmed unless they infringe on constitutional rights. The court referenced U.S. Supreme Court precedents, asserting that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs at the time of illegal search or seizure and that excluding evidence does not remedy the initial constitutional infringement.
Furthermore, the court rejected arguments that North Dakota's implied-consent laws violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, reinforcing its stance in previous cases. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, which permitted warrantless breath tests but found warrantless blood tests to violate the Fourth Amendment, was noted. However, the court maintained that the exclusionary rule does not apply to warrantless blood tests in civil administrative license suspension proceedings. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgments that upheld the license suspensions for Wojahn and Beylund, with one judge not participating in the decision.
