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State v. Melchert-Dinkel
Citations: 844 N.W.2d 13; 42 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1555; 96 A.L.R. 6th 755; 2014 Minn. LEXIS 108; 2014 WL 1047082Docket: No. A11-0987
Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota; March 19, 2014; Minnesota; State Supreme Court
The State of Minnesota may prosecute William Melehert-Dinkel for assisting in the suicides of Mark Drybrough and Nadia Kajouji, as per Minn.Stat. 609.215, subd. 1, which criminalizes intentionally advising, encouraging, or assisting another in suicide. The court distinguishes between assisting and merely encouraging or advising. The district court had not determined whether Melehert-Dinkel assisted in the suicides, prompting a remand for further proceedings. Melehert-Dinkel, posing as a depressed nurse, engaged with both victims through suicide-related online forums. He manipulated Drybrough, who struggled with severe health issues, by instructing him on the method of hanging and feigning empathy. Despite Drybrough’s hesitance and fear of his parents discovering the act, he ultimately committed suicide four days after their last conversation. Similarly, Melehert-Dinkel interacted with Kajouji, who sought advice on suicide methods. He again presented himself as a sympathetic figure to gain her trust. The case highlights the complexities of prosecuting actions that may fall under free speech protections while addressing the serious implications of encouraging or facilitating suicide. Kajouji planned to commit suicide by jumping off a bridge into a river while wearing ice skates to disguise her death as an accident. Melchert-Dinkel, who engaged in online conversations with her, attempted to dissuade her from this method and suggested hanging instead, expressing a desire for them to die together. On March 9, Kajouji confirmed her intention to proceed with her plan, and later that night, she sent an email to her roommates stating she was going ice-skating. She was subsequently reported missing, and her body was discovered six weeks later in the river with her ice skates still on. Law enforcement traced communications between Kajouji, another individual named Drybrough, and Melchert-Dinkel, leading to his confession of encouraging their suicides. He was charged with two counts of aiding suicide under Minnesota law. The district court found him guilty, ruling that his actions constituted intentional advice and encouragement to commit suicide, and that this speech fell outside First Amendment protections. On appeal, Melchert-Dinkel contended that the statute violated the First Amendment. The State countered that the statute prohibits unprotected speech integral to unlawful acts and is narrowly tailored to protect vulnerable individuals. The court of appeals upheld the statute, stating that speech encouraging suicide is unprotected and that the statute does not constitute unconstitutional overbreadth. Melchert-Dinkel's petition for review raised the issue of whether the State could prosecute him under the First Amendment for aiding, advising, or encouraging suicide. The conclusion reached was that prosecution for assisting suicide is permissible, but not for merely advising or encouraging it. The constitutionality of statutes is reviewed de novo, with the State responsible for demonstrating that any content-based speech restrictions do not violate the First Amendment. The First Amendment, applicable to states via the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws that abridge freedom of speech, emphasizing that the government cannot restrict expression based on message or content. Such restrictions undermine the principle of open debate on public issues. An example of a content-based restriction is prosecuting individuals based on their speech. However, the Supreme Court allows limited content-based restrictions in areas where the speech holds minimal social value, such as speech integral to criminal conduct, incitement, and fraud. The State claims the speech in question is unprotected under these exceptions, starting with the argument that Minn.Stat. 609.215, subd. 1, addresses speech integral to criminal conduct. This view is contested, as the Supreme Court's precedent indicates that First Amendment protections do not cover speech that is part of illegal conduct associated with a valid criminal statute. This includes situations like union picketing aimed at violating antitrust laws, and advertising child pornography, which is seen as integral to its unlawful production. Minnesota Statutes, 609.215, subd. 1, establishes that providing intentional advice, encouragement, or assistance for someone to take their own life can result in a maximum sentence of 15 years imprisonment or a fine of up to $30,000, or both. Although suicide was previously a criminal offense in Minnesota until its repeal in 1911, it is no longer considered a crime in Minnesota, the UK, or Canada. This decriminalization complicates the application of the "speech integral to criminal conduct" exception, as the Supreme Court in Giboney emphasized that this exception only applies to speech associated with violations of valid criminal statutes. Given that suicide is not illegal, the speech related to advising or assisting suicide cannot be classified under this exception. The court acknowledges that while suicide is harmful and opposed by the state as a matter of public policy, the Supreme Court has not recognized an exception to the First Amendment for speech related to merely harmful conduct. The State's argument that advising or assisting suicide constitutes "speech integral to criminal conduct" is dismissed because the statute does not require physical assistance in the act. Furthermore, the State's claim that Minn. Stat. 609.215, subd. 1, aligns with the "incitement" exception to the First Amendment is also rejected. The Supreme Court's standard for incitement requires that advocacy be directed towards inciting imminent lawless action and likely to produce such action, which does not apply to mere advocacy of future illegal actions. The State contends that the 'imminence' requirement should be interpreted to mean that 'imminent' does not strictly equal 'immediate,' asserting that Melchert-Dinkel's actions would qualify under both interpretations. However, the core issue is that suicide is not a criminal act in any relevant jurisdiction, making it challenging to uphold a rule consistent with the First Amendment that punishes 'incitement' for non-lawless actions. Consequently, the argument fails since suicide cannot be categorized as 'lawless action,' leading to the rejection of the State's claim that the 'incitement' exception to the First Amendment is applicable. Additionally, the State argues that Melchert-Dinkel’s communications involved 'deceit, fraud, and lies,' which would categorize his speech under the 'fraud' exception to the First Amendment. While acknowledging his reprehensible conduct and dishonesty, the argument is rejected since speech is not unprotected merely due to the speaker's knowledge of lying, as established in United States v. Alvarez. The Court emphasized that allowing the government to criminalize false speech could lead to excessive regulation of various subjects. Furthermore, the assertion that Melchert-Dinkel’s speech constituted fraud fails, as the statute does not adequately define fraudulent speech, and there is insufficient evidence that he gained any material advantage from his falsehoods. The failure of the State's arguments regarding unprotected speech does not conclude the analysis. The government can regulate protected speech if it meets 'strict scrutiny' requirements, which necessitate a compelling government interest and a narrowly drawn law to serve that interest. The State has demonstrated a compelling interest in preserving human life. However, the examination continues to determine if the prohibitions against assisting, advising, or encouraging suicide are sufficiently narrow to effectively serve the State's compelling interest. The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed a First Amendment challenge regarding laws against assisting suicide, but in Washington v. Glucksberg, it rejected a due process challenge to such a statute, emphasizing the historical rejection of assisted suicide. The Court determined that the right to assistance in suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest rooted in American history. It upheld the statute, finding that the prohibition against aiding suicide serves legitimate state interests, such as preserving life and protecting vulnerable individuals. Although Glucksberg applied the rational basis test, its findings imply that a well-defined prohibition against assisting suicide could withstand stricter scrutiny. The Minnesota statute, section 609.215, specifically targets speech directed at an individual regarding suicide, indicating legislative intent to limit the statute's scope and exclude general public discourse on the topic. The term "assist," which lacks a statutory definition, is interpreted using its common meaning as "to help," implying a requirement for a significant level of involvement in the act of suicide. Consequently, the statute prohibits conduct or speech that enables another person to commit suicide, which includes instructing someone on methods of suicide, thus falling within constitutional speech limitations. Prohibiting speech that assists suicide, specifically targeting assistance at a particular individual, effectively limits the law's scope to direct connections between speech and suicide, aligning with the State's compelling interest in preserving life. The argument by Melchert-Dinkel against the statutory prohibition on assisting suicide as a violation of the First Amendment is rejected. The statute also prohibits 'advising' and 'encouraging' suicide, but lacks definitions for these terms. Common definitions indicate that 'advise' means to inform, while 'encourage' means to provide support or confidence. Unlike 'assist,' these terms do not require a direct causal link to suicide, thus encompassing broader speech that may only tangentially relate to the act. Consequently, these prohibitions are deemed overly broad and fail to adequately serve the State's interest in preserving life, failing strict scrutiny under First Amendment standards. The analysis then shifts to the issue of severability of the statute's unconstitutional provisions. Statutes are generally presumed severable unless explicitly stated otherwise by the Legislature. The court aims to retain as much of the original statute as possible while removing unconstitutional parts. Severance is not permissible if the valid provisions are fundamentally linked to the invalid ones or if the remaining provisions cannot fulfill the legislative intent on their own. The Legislature is presumed to have intended Minn.Stat. 609.215, subd. 1, to be severable, allowing the prohibition against assisting suicide to remain in effect independently of the prohibitions against advising or encouraging suicide. Assisting, advising, and encouraging are distinct concepts; thus, the prohibition on assisting is not dependent on the other terms. Since a substantial part of the statute remains valid, the court concludes that the Legislature would have intended this outcome had it known the other provisions were unconstitutional. Consequently, the portions of the statute related to advising or encouraging are severed, while the 'assisting' provisions remain intact. In the case of Melchert-Dinkel, he was convicted of intentionally advising and encouraging two individuals to commit suicide, but the district court did not assess whether his actions constituted assistance. Since he was convicted under the now-excised unconstitutional portions of the statute, his conviction is reversed and remanded for further proceedings based on the remaining constitutional provisions. Additionally, the court denies the State’s motion to strike an amicus brief that did not support the State's position but complied with procedural requirements. The court acknowledges the potential for unprotected First Amendment speech categories but refrains from addressing it, as it was not raised in this appeal. Furthermore, the serious public health issue of suicide is highlighted, supported by data from an amicus brief emphasizing the prevalence of suicide and mental health concerns in Minnesota. The ruling clarifies that the statute in question does not prohibit the publication of books detailing successful suicidal behavior, as it focuses solely on speech directed at individuals rather than public discourse. Evidence presented at trial confirmed that Melchert-Dinkel engaged in actions constituting assistance in suicides, countering the dissent's view that the case involved mere advising or encouraging. The complaint's statement of probable cause included multiple references to 'assists,' specifically noting Melchert-Dinkel's claim of having assisted five or fewer individuals in suicide. Both parties acknowledged the term 'assisted' during trial proceedings, with the State asserting Melchert-Dinkel's guilt for 'assisting, encouraging, and advising' the victims. Despite the dissent's claim of a deliberate omission regarding assistance findings, the judge's inconsistent use of terms like advise, encourage, assist, and aid indicates no clear distinction was intended. At sentencing, the judge affirmed Melchert-Dinkel's guilt on two counts of aiding suicide, suggesting a broad interpretation of 'assist' that encompasses advising, encouraging, and aiding. The dissent's argument for insufficient evidence of assistance relies on a narrower definition than that established by the ruling.