Court: North Dakota Supreme Court; May 14, 2013; North Dakota; State Supreme Court
Felipe Estrada appeals a district court judgment following a jury conviction for two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of reckless endangerment. The charges stem from a shooting incident in a Fargo movie theater parking lot, where Estrada shot Juan Garza six times, fracturing Charles Roskom's skull with a handgun, and endangered others present in the vicinity. Eyewitnesses, including Garza, his ex-wife DeShawn Sto-dola, and Roskom, testified about the events leading up to and during the shooting, including Estrada's pursuit and shooting of Garza as he attempted to flee.
Estrada claimed he was threatened by Garza, who he alleged was armed, and testified that he fired in self-defense. He admitted to shooting ten times, including after Garza had fallen. The jury received instructions on self-defense and lesser charges, ultimately convicting Estrada of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. The district court sentenced him to ten years for aggravated assault with a firearm, with additional consecutive sentences for the other counts.
Estrada's appeal argues that the jury instructions on self-defense failed to adequately differentiate between justification and excuse. The court confirmed its jurisdiction over the case and the timeliness of Estrada's appeal.
Estrada did not object to the self-defense jury instruction provided by the district court, which is critical because failure to propose an alternative instruction or object precludes claiming error under N.D.R.Crim. P. 30(c). When an issue regarding jury instructions is not preserved for appeal, the court's review is limited to determining if there was an obvious error affecting substantial rights, as outlined in N.D.R.Crim. P. 52(b). Such errors must show a clear deviation from legal standards and must meet three criteria: there must be an error, the error must be plain, and it must affect substantial rights.
The court evaluates jury instructions as a whole, ensuring they accurately convey the law, even if some parts may be insufficient. The district court is not obligated to use specific language requested by a party as long as the instructions are not misleading and adequately inform the jury of the law on essential issues. Estrada contends that the court erred by not providing a justification jury instruction, arguing that evidence warranted both justified and excused self-defense instructions.
The district court offered a modified self-defense instruction, explaining that it removed the term "justified" to avoid misleading the jury into thinking that the instruction only applied to justification rather than also to excuse. The modification was made to ensure the instruction was applicable in both contexts, as the standard instructions generally assume self-defense is claimed as justification in most cases in North Dakota.
The excerpt addresses the district court's instructions regarding self-defense, specifically the use of "justified" in relation to self-defense claims. The court proposed to remove the term "justified" from the instructions to clarify that the jury could consider both justified and excused self-defense, aiming to prevent confusion. It was noted that, although the instruction was not ideal, it did not constitute obvious error.
Estrada contended that the jury was inadequately informed of the State's burden to disprove both justified and excused self-defense in its instructions. The district court's nonexistence of defense instruction stated that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-defense, and it was clarified that the defendant bore no burden of proof concerning this defense. The instruction did not specifically mention excused self-defense but was deemed adequate when read as a whole.
Furthermore, Estrada argued that the instruction on the limits of excessive or deadly force was insufficient, particularly in failing to specify that excessive force is defined as using more force than what the defendant reasonably believed was necessary. The district court's instruction defined when deadly force may be used, emphasizing that it must be necessary to prevent serious harm and that safe retreat should be considered.
The jury received a "reasonableness of accused’s belief" instruction, requiring them to assess the defendant's conduct based on his honest belief in the necessity of his actions to prevent death or great bodily injury. Estrada acknowledged that this instruction likely negated any reversible error concerning excessive or deadly force instructions because jury instructions are considered collectively. Consequently, Estrada failed to demonstrate obvious error.
Estrada also contended that the district court erred by excluding the word "particular" from the reckless endangerment jury instruction, arguing it led to an overly broad interpretation. However, because there was no objection during the trial, the standard for obvious error applies. The relevant statute defines reckless endangerment based on the existence of risk, regardless of whether an individual’s safety is actually threatened. The jury was instructed that creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death constitutes reckless endangerment.
In previous cases, the court has clarified that the term "particular" pertains to situations where a group, rather than individuals, is endangered, allowing the state to prove endangerment to any group member rather than a specific individual. In a cited case, although the omission of "particular" was deemed erroneous, the overall jury instruction sufficiently conveyed the applicable law by requiring the jury to find that at least one individual was endangered, thereby mitigating the error's impact.
Estrada contends that the term "members of the public" in the jury instruction was overly broad and did not necessitate the jury to determine if an individual was in jeopardy. The district court's instruction required the State to demonstrate that Estrada "created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death to members of the public," corresponding to the charges of reckless endangerment based on Estrada's actions of discharging a handgun in a public area. Testimony was provided by members of the public present during the incident. While the inclusion of "members of the public" may be deemed overbroad in different contexts, it was clear in this case, and the jury was adequately informed of the law regarding the essential elements of the offense. The court concluded that there was no obvious error in the jury instruction.
Estrada also accused the State of prosecutorial misconduct through improper leading questions, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by permitting such conduct. The analysis of prosecutorial misconduct involves assessing whether the prosecutor’s actions amounted to misconduct, and if so, whether it prejudicially affected the defendant's rights. The court examines the overall context of the trial to determine if the misconduct violated due process. Under Rule 611(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, leading questions are generally not allowed during direct examination unless necessary to elicit testimony from a hostile or adverse witness. The district court has broad discretion in managing witness interrogation, and such decisions will only be overturned on appeal if clear abuse of discretion is shown that prejudiced the defendant. Leading questions may be employed to extract information from witnesses who are uncooperative, but if the circumstances do not justify this, and the violation results in inferred prejudice, appellate courts may reverse the decision.
Estrada contends that the State's questioning of witness Stodola was leading and that the trial court erred in permitting it. During the exchange, objections were raised regarding leading questions and hearsay, but the court ruled that the question was not hearsay under North Dakota law and classified Stodola as a hostile witness. Estrada argued that the State's reference to a previous statement by Stodola undermined his defense by suggesting credibility to statements she could not recall. The State countered that Stodola's memory was intact for unrelated questions, asserting that the prosecutor's conduct was not prejudicial, referencing State v. Kruckenberg. The court noted that the leading questions pertained to Estrada's alleged intent to kill, and the jury ultimately convicted him of aggravated assault rather than attempted murder. The court found that the State's questioning was justified given Stodola's uncooperative demeanor and ruled that there was no misconduct or abuse of discretion by the district court. Additionally, Estrada challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. The court reiterated that evidence must be viewed favorably to the prosecution and that it does not reassess conflicting evidence or witness credibility.
Estrada challenged the sufficiency of evidence for his aggravated assault conviction, claiming self-defense based on his assertion that Roskom was the initial aggressor. Estrada testified that Roskom hit him with his vehicle and later attacked him, but evidence revealed that this incident occurred after Estrada had already shot at Garza. Roskom recounted a physical altercation where Estrada struck him with a gun, resulting in serious injuries, including multiple skull fractures. The district court provided the jury with instructions clarifying that self-defense was not applicable. The court determined that evidence supported a reasonable conclusion of Estrada's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, refraining from reassessing conflicting evidence or witness credibility.
Additionally, Estrada argued against the evidence supporting his reckless endangerment conviction, contending that he only aimed at Garza during the shooting. However, the record demonstrated that Estrada fired ten shots, hitting Garza six times and causing collateral damage, including a shattered movie theater window. A witness testified to narrowly avoiding a bullet, indicating a disregard for human life.
Ultimately, the court found sufficient evidence to uphold the guilty verdicts and affirmed the judgment. The opinion was concurred by Chief Justice Gerald W. Vande Walle and Justices Daniel J. Crothers, Mary Muehlen Maring, and Carol Ronning Kapsner.
